From: Lee Corbin (lcorbin@tsoft.com)
Date: Sat Oct 26 2002 - 07:49:22 MDT
Michael writes
> -----Original Message-----
> From: owner-extropians@extropy.org
> [mailto:owner-extropians@extropy.org]On Behalf Of Dickey, Michael F
> Sent: Thursday, October 24, 2002 8:26 AM
> To: 'extropians@extropy.org'
> Subject: RE: duck me!
>> What one must first do, however, is dispense with the idea
>> that the *particular* atoms have anything to do with one's
>> identity.
>
> I disagree, the 'particular' atoms do have something to do with ones
> identity, and I have attempted to show this logically, please point out any
> fallacious aspects to my argument, as I would be eager to hear them.
Some others have already provided some arguments that
I consider valid, but perhaps this is a slightly
different angle. Suppose that the science of making
duplicates was vastly more advanced than you thought,
and that before 1940 it had been possible, albeit
very expensive to teleport physical objects and make
duplicates of them, but this had been successfully
kept from the public until now. Moreover, after the
age of micro-electronics, it became possible to
replace all of one's atoms with other atoms many times
per second with no apparent change in behavior of any
mammal on whom this operation was performed.
Finally in the 1990's it became possible to replace all
of one's atoms with entirely different atoms each
nanosecond. While yes, you have no reason to believe
(nor do I) that this has in fact happened, it's
not impossible.
Now an extremely perceptive layman learning these "facts"
would have to conclude that his identity didn't depend
on atoms. After all, suppose that he found that during
some of the hours of his day, he was undergoing replacement
at a furious rate, and during other hours of the day he
was not; yet it was not possible for him to tell the
"bad" hours from the "good" ones. He would face the
fact that life was equally good all the time, atomic
replacement or not.
Thus cries during some of those hours that he was not
the same person from second to second would be found
persuasive either by him or the people who knew him.
It would be of no consequence in his daily agendas,
and he would quickly conclude that it made no sense
at all to pay serious money for "good" hours as
opposed to "bad" hours. The changes would be invisible
to him and it's this very *him* with which we are
concerned.
> The particular atoms have no special attributes, no
> magical properties, the only significance to them
> is that they happen to be the atoms that make up that
> pattern at that time.
That is what *we* are saying, yes.
> If the particular atoms had nothing to do with one's
> identity, then if we transferred the pattern, then
> subjective experience would be retained, would it not?
Yes.
> This is obviously not the case, because if we transfer the pattern
> into another group of atoms (make a copy) then the other group of atoms,
> which now share the same pattern as the original, do not have the same
> sensory experience as the original pattern / group of atoms.
But it's like moving into another room, or having someone
suddenly turn on a light: you suddenly do not have the
same experience as before, yet your identity is untouched.
> claim - the pattern is important to identity, the atoms are not
>
> hypothesis - copy the pattern but is different atoms, see if they share the
> same sensory experience
> result - copy made, copy and original, although difficult to distinguish, do
> not share same sensory experience
> conclusion - identity can be copied, but does not retain subjective
> continuity
And of course as I think John said, your result does not
necessarily follow from the claim and hypothesis. You
might be teleported to a different but identical hotel
room and obtain not the same yet an identical sensory
experience. Or you might be "teleported in place", i.e.,
just have your atoms exchanged. As I argued above, this
would soon become seen as no threat to your person.
> claim - the atoms are important, the pattern is not
>
> hypothesis - use the same atoms, but change the pattern, see if identity is
> still recognizable
> result - mushed pattern up in blender, does not answer when asked 'who are
> you'
> conclusion - pattern is an integral part to identity.
We agree there.
> Through these though experiments, it is clear that a copy, which is made of
> new atoms with the same pattern, will not experience the same subjective
> events that the reference or original does, even if we can not determine who
> is the reference and who is the original, one of them was.
This is where I don't follow, and I think that several other
people don't either. If the original is in the plainest and
most severe soundless cell in the Lubyanka, then after having
his atoms swapped he experiences exactly what he did before
the swap.
And if you are talking about teleporting, I can easily
imagine my surrounding transforming instantaneously,
and I wouldn't be able to tell whether I had teleported
or nanotech had just quickly altered my surroundings
an I had stayed put.
> > > If you think you cannot [right, I cannot], then you are
> > > two separate persons in separate places, albeit persons
> > > that are identical.
> >
> > "So say you. I contend that we are actually the same *person*, though
> > clearly what is to be contended is what is meant by that construction.
> > (This is, of course, the entire basis of the discussion.)"
>
> Agreed, there seems to be some confusion as to what 'the same person' means.
> People seem to be confusing 'those two people are the same (identical)' with
> 'That is the same person' If we copied an apple, one could point at both
> apples and claim they are identical, but one can not (logically) point at
> both apples and claim that are the *same* (i.e. only one) apple, as they
> obviously exist separately spatially. I do not disagree that one can point
> at an original and a copy and state a) I can not tell which is which (unless
> referencing the copying process) and b) their personalities are identical,
> they are similar people, if not entirely the same. But I would disagree if
> one claims that they are 'one' person, as they are obviously two, albeit
> identical, people, each with their own distinct existence and sensory
> experience.
Here you have company. While as a realist I concede that
if an apple is copied, one is the original and one is only
a copy, they are identical for all practical purposes, and
this includes (for people) survival (and the "personal
identity" which tracks survival).
> > > If none of our atoms are replaced, we remain the same
> > > person (same pattern,same atoms) if all are replaced,
> > > we are a different person (same pattern, different
> > > atoms, different subjective experience).
> >
> > What evidence would you ever have that this is the case?"
>
> Would you like to present evidence that if none of your atoms are replaced
> or your pattern does not change then you are a different person?
Good gracious no! *That* certainly is not controversial,
unless certain parties wish to claim that even a nanosecond
inflicts so much change that we aren't the same person from
instant to instant. But not most of your correspondents!
> If someone should
> present evidence that I am being destroyed and re-copied every microsecond
> in operations that only require nanoseconds then I would take that into
> account and make a judgement accordingly, however just because we can
> imagine that this is a possible scenario does not make it a plausible one.
> How would you know that you ARE being copied and destroyed each microsecond?
Well, a good SF writer can lead you into such a scenario
where you'd have little choice but to accept that as the
case. Why, with an open mind, it would take God only
15 minutes or so to convince me of His existence, were He
to charge down here to Earth in a big enough Holy Chariot
and commence to impress me with miracles and plausible
explanations concerning his absence lately! Sure, any
sufficiently advanced technology is indistinguishable
from magic, but since I'm a reasonable guy, I'd soon
come to believe in God were that to happen. Likewise
you must consider your reaction were the aforesaid
secret government project that accomplished duplication
revealed to you now.
> > > I, for one, will not ever walk into a destructive copying or uploading
> > > mechanism, as this will surely lead to my demise.
> >
> > Yet as I have said many times before, you would soon be in the small
> > minority as more practical people used teleportation to get about quickly
> > and cheaply. Finally, you'd be seen to be an old fogey from the last century
> > who had some strange hang-up about atoms."
>
> That strange hang up being based on science and reason.
> Oh well, to bad for the rest of them. I'll wait for
> wormholes (which may come about before destructive
> copier / teleporters anyway).
No, you wouldn't. Suppose that you were forced (by the way, have
you ever read much SF?) to teleport the first few times---friends
grab you and throw you in to the teleporter terminal just as the
Thought Police are about to capture you all. And then, to avoid
an incredibly taxing mile-high climb each morning, you just
eventually relent and agree to teleport. The social effect on
you of seeing your friends and loved ones teleport over and over
again with no bad effects would get to you. You would yield to
their exhortations to avoid the grinding climb each day that
was injurious to your health. It would be easier to revise
your beliefs about atoms and identity than to scale that wall
every morning.
Now I agree that this latter argument is not air-tight; sometimes
logic for the sake of consistency must override such social and
psychological inducements. But take it as another indication
that you might view teleportation as less threatening if you
did it a lot. You perhaps do have to go back and question on
what your strong conviction that atoms matter is based.
Mach would presumably teleport because he didn't even believe
in atoms, and yet was a leading scientist and profoundly
knowledgable scientist with great common sense.
Lee
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