From: Dickey, Michael F (michael_f_dickey@groton.pfizer.com)
Date: Mon Oct 28 2002 - 14:52:10 MST
From: Lee Corbin [mailto:lcorbin@tsoft.com]
First of all, I must disagree with your chosen title of this thread offshoot
'Does Our Identity depend on atoms' as this was not ever what I argued.
Instead, it should read 'Does the continuation of a particular perceived
consciousness depend upon a 'particular' group of atoms (and not just any
atoms)' With that in mind, does your answer remain the same?
Of course our identity does not 'depend on atoms' (by this, I assume you
mean some particular atoms, and not just any atoms) because we can copy our
pattern with any group of items and still have an entity whose identity is
for all intents and purposes identical to the reference group of atoms in
that particular pattern. I do not dispute this, what I dispute is that the
pattern, which is identical to the reference pattern, and is imprinted upon
a new group of atoms, is not a subjective continuation of the reference
pattern. That is, it is not you. The evidence I have for the fact that the
same pattern in a different group of atoms is that if we were to copy the
pattern and imprint it into a new group of atoms the new group/pattern will
be identical to the reference, but would not experience the same subjective
events as the reference, and therefore *would not* be a continuation of the
subjective experiences of the reference (original)
I feel I have had difficult moving this discussion forward, swimming
upstream so to speak, primarily because of misconceptions of my arguments
such as that which made you title this thread as such. In making a logical
argument it is key to define the terms we are using in discussion, this
argument in particular is based upon some pretty vague notions, so let me
attempt to define them.
identity (you, me, I)-
definition 1 - a group of thoughts, emotions, experiences that make a person
a particular person.
definition 2 - a pattern which contains thoughts, emotions, and experiences
that experiences subjective continuity from one moment to the next
As you can see, these two definitions have quite different implications, I
think when you say 'identity' you mean something similar to the first, when
I say it, I mean something similar to the second.
To put it another way, when you say 'that copy is you' I translate that
roughly (as you say it) as all the thoughts, emotions, experiences etc. that
make you *you* are present in the copy as well. If this is the definition
of *you* I do not dispute that 1) a copy is 'you' (for the instant after
copying) and that 2) semantically, there are two 'yous'
However, when I say that 'copy is not you' I mean that the copy may have
the same thoughts, memories, emotions that 'you' did, but it does not exist
as a continuation of subjective experience.
This is proven by imprinting a reference pattern into a new group of atoms,
and retaining the reference pattern. The new pattern does not experience
the same subjective experience that the reference pattern does, thus it is
not a continuation of the subjective experience of the reference pattern (a
simple, easy, logical experiment) This is the argument I have yet to see an
objection to. Is a copy (the same pattern imprinted on new atoms identical
to a reference pattern) a continuation of the subjective experience of the
reference? The answer, NO, it is not, because the new pattern and the
reference pattern do not share the same subjective experience.
It seems to me that one of these definitions (yours) can be thought of as
identity as change in time approaches zero, and mine (since it fundamentally
resides on the continuation of subjective experience) requires a time
component.
These two definitions of identity seem to be intermingled in this
discussion, am I correct in interpreting your definition of 'identity' (I,
me, you)?
I think It is necessary to clarify this definition and probably some others,
to make this discussion more useful.
> The particular atoms have no special attributes, no
> magical properties, the only significance to them
> is that they happen to be the atoms that make up that
> pattern at that time.
"That is what *we* are saying, yes."
> If the particular atoms had nothing to do with one's
> identity, then if we transferred the pattern, then
> subjective experience would be retained, would it not?
"Yes."
I should have emphasized 'continuation' of subjective experience, which I
guess I skipped over in typing that particular message. As I have
emphasized from the get go, a copy will not experience the same subjective
events that a reference or original does, thus it CAN NOT be a continuation
of the consciousness of the original.
Consider, a reference may be copied *without his knowledge* if a copy was
truly a continuation of a particular identity (by my definition) then he
would experience what the copy does. If he does not, then they are two,
distinct, separate, isolated entities.
> This is obviously not the case, because if we transfer the pattern
> into another group of atoms (make a copy) then the other group of atoms,
> which now share the same pattern as the original, do not have the same
> sensory experience as the original pattern / group of atoms.
"But it's like moving into another room, or having someone suddenly turn on
a light: you suddenly do not have the same experience as before, yet your
identity is untouched."
Having 'different' experiences then the ones from the previous instant does
not preclude continuation of consciousness. You seem to be arguing that an
identity (by your definition?) has a different experience in one moment from
the next and that is no different than a copy having a different experience
in a successive moment from the original before copying. Moving into
another room is a far different scenario than having a pattern transferred
to another group of atoms while the original group remains intact. When I
walk into a room, I may have new subjective experiences, by they are
experienced in an entity that experienced them the moment before, with the
same pattern, and the same group of atoms.
If I were copied, and them my copied entered the room, he may be said to
feel the same, but since I can not sense what he senses, than he can not, by
definition, be a continuation of my consciousness. Simply removing me (the
reference) from the equation does not change this fact. A copy is not a
continuation of the subjective experiences of the original.
> claim - the pattern is important to identity, the atoms are not
>
> hypothesis - copy the pattern but is different atoms, see if they share
the
> same sensory experience
> result - copy made, copy and original, although difficult to distinguish,
do
> not share same sensory experience
> conclusion - identity can be copied, but does not retain subjective
> continuity
"And of course as I think John said, your result does not necessarily follow
from the claim and hypothesis."
Since the result says "copy and original, ...do not share same sensory
experience" And you say that does not follow, the converse would be that the
copy and original DO share the SAME sensory experience. Would you assert
then that both the reference and the copy *share* subjective experiences?
THAT would indicate an immaterial soul that connected patterns. If they do
not, then they must 1) be separate entities (and identities) and 2) the copy
must not be a continuation of the subjective experience of the reference
(else he would have the same subjective experiences!)
"You might be teleported to a different but identical hotel room and obtain
not the same yet an identical sensory experience."
If that were the case, then there is no way I could know that I was
destroyed and copied, and thus the original died. But just because I am
ignorant of the occurrence, does not mean it did not occur. The people who
manned the heisenberg compensators, pattern buffers and refinement beams
would very well know what they had done to me.
> Through these though experiments, it is clear that a copy, which is made
of
> new atoms with the same pattern, will not experience the same subjective
> events that the reference or original does, even if we can not determine
who
> is the reference and who is the original, one of them was.
"This is where I don't follow, and I think that several other people don't
either."
I really do not know if I can explain it any clearer. This is either
because I can not convey my ideas clearly enough, or there is a fundamental
misunderstanding of what I am saying. If I walk into a scanner, and a copy
is made of me, and we both walk out, I can not see what he sees, and he can
not see what I see. I do not share the same subjective experiences as he
does. Therefore, he *can not* be a subjective continuation of me, because
he does not share the same subjective experiences. To claim that he is
means he and I must share the same subjective experiences, ALWAYS, otherwise
we have to be different unique individuals (all beit who both think we are
the same person) If we do not share the same subjective experiences, than
he can not be a continuation of my subjective consciousness. Therefore a
copy is NOT me.
> > > If you think you cannot [right, I cannot], then you are
> > > two separate persons in separate places, albeit persons
> > > that are identical.
> >
> > "So say you. I contend that we are actually the same *person*, though
> > clearly what is to be contended is what is meant by that construction.
> > (This is, of course, the entire basis of the discussion.)"
>
> Agreed, there seems to be some confusion as to what 'the same person'
means.
> People seem to be confusing 'those two people are the same (identical)'
with
> 'That is the same person' If we copied an apple, one could point at both
> apples and claim they are identical, but one can not (logically) point at
> both apples and claim that are the *same* (i.e. only one) apple, as they
> obviously exist separately spatially. I do not disagree that one can
point
> at an original and a copy and state a) I can not tell which is which
(unless
> referencing the copying process) and b) their personalities are identical,
> they are similar people, if not entirely the same. But I would disagree
if
> one claims that they are 'one' person, as they are obviously two, albeit
> identical, people, each with their own distinct existence and sensory
> experience.
" Here you have company. While as a realist I concede that if an apple is
copied, one is the original and one is only
a copy, they are identical for all practical purposes, and this includes
(for people) survival (and the "personal identity" which tracks survival)."
Good to hear, this clarification of definitions seems very important to
continuing a discussion.
> > > I, for one, will not ever walk into a destructive copying or uploading
> > > mechanism, as this will surely lead to my demise.
> >
> > Yet as I have said many times before, you would soon be in the small
> > minority as more practical people used teleportation to get about
quickly
> > and cheaply. Finally, you'd be seen to be an old fogey from the last
century
> > who had some strange hang-up about atoms."
>
> That strange hang up being based on science and reason.
> Oh well, to bad for the rest of them. I'll wait for
> wormholes (which may come about before destructive
> copier / teleporters anyway).
"No, you wouldn't. Suppose that you were forced (by the way, have you ever
read much SF?) to teleport the first few times---friends grab you and throw
you in to the teleporter terminal just as the Thought Police are about to
capture you all. And then, to avoid an incredibly taxing mile-high climb
each morning, you just eventually relent and agree to teleport. The social
effect on you of seeing your friends and loved ones teleport over and over
again with no bad effects would get to you. "
This seems to be another significant misunderstanding in this discussion, or
rather two different ways of looking at things that are commonly thought of
as the same. When you speak of my seeing my friends and loved ones
teleported with no ill effects is really a red herring. I know that when
they are teleported a virtually exact copy of them was made, a copy which
from every external measurement is identical to the original. It will have
the same thoughts, emotions, and experiences (your definition of identity)
but because it would not experience the same subjective events of the
original if the original had not been destroyed, it does not abide by my
definition of 'identity' in which case I would mourn the death of that loved
one. Though I am sure it would be easier to get over, I would never lose
the nagging feeling that somewhere, someone with the same hopes, dreams,
fears, loves et all as my copied loved on in front of me now ceases to
exist. But I digress, where the misunderstanding is, I believe, is that you
perceive 'you' as what people external to you define you as. If your
contribution to the universe were what made you valuable, then a copy of
you would perform just as well, sans the original, with no net loss on the
universe. For everybody other than you, that would be you. I would be less
upset if someone were to tell me I was to be destroyed and copied, and that
copy allowed to live my life with my loved ones because I know that the joy
I would bring to the world would likely remain, than I would be to simply be
destroyed. But that is not me, and I would still fear death, that is, the
cessation of my subjective experiences, in such an instance.
Humans self aware beings are unique in the universe in that they are aware
of their own existence. In your case of observing no ill effects on ones
friends, this would be fine if my friends were the only ones aware of my
existence. Unfortunately I am as well, and thus destroying me ends my
existence, while my friends may be fine with the copy, I will not be,
because I am dead.
This is the difference between external and internal existence I suppose. I
believe it a classic case of scientism to presume that our only existence of
any value is value placed on our external existence. Do you not have
thoughts that others, externally, are unaware of? If you do, then you must
have an internal existence, separate from the existence of your friends
perception of you. This is what would die.
Incidentally, I have not read a lot of sci fi really, I stick mostly to
non-fiction, but if you can suggest a book that will help to clarify the
logical implications of copying / teleporting I would check it out.
Now I agree that this latter argument is not air-tight; sometimes
logic for the sake of consistency must override such social and
psychological inducements.
Regards,
Michael
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