From: Dickey, Michael F (michael_f_dickey@groton.pfizer.com)
Date: Thu Oct 24 2002 - 09:25:41 MDT
-----Original Message-----
From: Lee Corbin [mailto:lcorbin@tsoft.com]
Michael Dickey writes
> You said "And if you
> agree to that, then you can see why logically I can consider myself to be
> the same person as a close duplicate" But gts is made up of the same
atoms,
> molecules, and neurons in the same pattern performing the same functions
as
> gts t-10s was. However, a duplicate of gts is made up of entirely
different
> atoms, molecules, and neurons, even though they are in the same pattern.
"What one must first do, however, is dispense with the idea
that the *particular* atoms have anything to do with one's
identity."
I disagree, the 'particular' atoms do have something to do with ones
identity, and I have attempted to show this logically, please point out any
fallacious aspects to my argument, as I would be eager to hear them. The
particular atoms have no special attributes, no magical properties, the only
significance to them is that they happen to be the atoms that make up that
pattern at that time.
If the particular atoms had nothing to do with ones identity, then if we
transferred the pattern, then subjective experience would be retained, would
it not? This is obviously not the case, because if we transfer the pattern
into another group of atoms (make a copy) then the other group of atoms,
which now share the same pattern as the original, do not have the same
sensory experience as the original pattern / group of atoms.
claim - the pattern is important to identity, the atoms are not
hypothesis - copy the pattern but is different atoms, see if they share the
same sensory experience
result - copy made, copy and original, although difficult to distinguish, do
not share same sensory experience
conclusion - identity can be copied, but does not retain subjective
continuity
claim - the atoms are important, the pattern is not
hypothesis - use the same atoms, but change the pattern, see if identity is
still recognizable
result - mushed pattern up in blender, does not answer when asked 'who are
you'
conclusion - pattern is an integral part to identity.
claim - the atoms AND the pattern are important to indentity
hypothesis 1 - change atoms, retain pattern
result 1 - accomplished by transfering pattern to new atoms, entity two does
experience the same subjective sensations that reference pattern does (see
above). Conclusion, changeing atoms but retaining pattern must be new
identity.
hypothesis 2 - change atoms, change pattern
result 2 - mushed pattern in blender, then copied new pattern, entity does
not exhibit any identity
hypothesis 3 - retain atoms, change pattern
result 3 - mushed pattern in blender, same atoms. No identity recognizable
hypothesis 4 - retain atoms, retain pattern
control reference, no changes made, entity has recognizable identity
matching that of previous state in time.
Through these though experiements, it is clear that a copy, which is made of
new atoms with the same pattern, will not experience the same subjective
events that the reference or original does, even if we can not determine who
is the reference and who is the original, one of them was. And they are two
distint identities. If a copy is made the retains the original pattern but
is using new atoms, and comparing it with the original reveals seperate
sensory experiences, and they must be two distinct seperate entities, then
copying the pattern to new atoms and destroying the original will result in
a new entity that would not have shared a subjective continuity of
experience with the original. The original was destroyed.
"Namely, if during the next nanosecond it were somehow possible to remove
atom1 from your body and replace it with an identical atom---and QM assures
us that all atoms of a given element excluding different isotopes are
equivalent ---then I don't think that you would notice the difference. If
one does agree with me, then, that the *particular* atoms have nothing to do
with your personal identity, then the objection you make in your last
paragraph falls to the ground."
You assert, if I can correctly interpret this, that if we replaced one atom
and you appeared to be the same person, then this is identical to replacing
ALL atoms and then assuming that you are the same person? If you read
through your statement, your logical conclusion 'If one agrees with me, the
particular atoms have nothing do to' should more accurately be said 'if one
agrees with me, than THAT particular atom has nothing do do with your
personal identity' You jumped from one atom having no significance to ALL
atoms having no significane. Presenting this as a simple logical argument
shows why I would disagree with it, as the conlclusion does not follow
logically from the premise.
premise - replacing one atom in your brain does not significantly affect
your personality
conclusion - Therefore replacaing all atoms in your brain does not
significantly affect your personality
I would agree with you that the particular atom you are referencing has
nothing to do with your personality if it is replaced with an identical
atom. But give the fact that if we replace recreate the pattern in all new
atoms and the copy does not share its sensory experience with the original,
then it is reasonable to assume that replacing all atoms without keeping the
original means that the copy does not share continuity of sensory experience
with the original either. Replacing 1 atom is far different than replacing
all atoms.
> If you think you cannot [right, I cannot], then you are
> two separate persons in separate places, albeit persons
> that are identical.
"So say you. I contend that we are actually the same *person*, though
clearly what is to be contended is what is meant by that construction.
(This is, of course, the entire basis of the discussion.)"
Agreed, there seems to be some confusion as to what 'the same person' means.
People seem to be confusing 'those two people are the same (identical)' with
'That is the same person' If we copied an apple, one could point at both
apples and claim they are identical, but one can not (logically) point at
both apples and claim that are the *same* (i.e. only one) apple, as they
obviously exist seperately spatially. I do not disagree that one can point
at an original and a copy and state a) I can not tell which is which (unless
referencing the copying process) and b) their personalities are identical,
they are similiar people, if not entirely the same. But I would disagree if
one claims that they are 'one' person, as they are obviously two, abliet
identical, people, each with their own distinct existence and sensory
experience.
> 3) the rate of change of those molecules / atoms in that part are orders
of
> magnitude smaller than the total atoms / molecules that make up the
pattern,
> so at any given time the vast majority of the molecules and atoms that
make
> up your pattern are the same as the ones at the instant before.
>
> If none of our atoms are replaced, we remain the same person (same
pattern,
> same atoms) if all are replaced, we are a different person (same pattern,
> different atoms, different subjective experience).
"What evidence would you ever have that this is the case?"
Would you like to present evidence that if none of your atoms are replaced
or your pattern does not change then you are a different person? My
evidence is the fact that no other evidence exist suggesting otherwise and
it is the simplest explanation for observed phenomena. Just because we can
imagine other possibilites that are outside the realm of the testable does
not mean they are all equally valid as explanations. If you are referring
to 'if all atoms are replaced we are a different person' see the above
thought expirements for the evidence.
"Is there any way that you can know that this is not being done to you each
millisecond in an operation that requires
only one nanosecond?"
No, is there anyway I can know true knowledge? Is there anyway I can know
that the entire universe was not created just a microsecond ago with all our
atoms arranged in a manner to trick us into thinking that it has been around
a while? But just because I can not KNOW that this is not the case does not
mean it isnt reasonable to assume that is not the case. If someone should
present evidence that I am being destroyed and re-copied every microsecond
in operations that only require nanoseconds then I would take that into
account and make a judgement accordingly, however just because we can
imagine that this is a possible scenario does not make it a plausible one.
How would you know that you ARE being copied and destroyed each microsecond?
What test would show it? This is similiar to the 'how do you know you are
not destroyed and copied every time you go to sleep' argument. I know it
because I do not wake up in a destructive scanner in a large labratory, I
wake up in my bedroom in my house.
"If you talked to someone who was, in your terms, a thousand different
people each second"
I do not believe I ever implied that.
> I, for one, will not ever walk into a destructive copying or uploading
> mechanism, as this will surely lead to my demise.
"Yet as I have said many times before, you would soon be in the small
minority as more practical people used teleportation to get about quickly
and cheaply. Finally, you'd be seen to be an old fogey from the last century
who had some strange hang-up about atoms."
That strange hang up being based on science and reason. Oh well, to bad for
the rest of them. I'll wait for wormholes (which may come about before
destructive copier / teleporters anyway)
Michael
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