From: Dickey, Michael F (michael_f_dickey@groton.pfizer.com)
Date: Tue Oct 29 2002 - 12:40:32 MST
-----Original Message-----
From: Lee Corbin [mailto:lcorbin@tsoft.com]
I apologize Lee, I will attempt to keep my posts more brief, but I fear that
will contribute to misunderstandings of my points.
> [The title of this thread] should read 'Does the continuation
> of a particular perceived consciousness depend upon a 'particular'
> group of atoms (and not just any atoms)' With that in mind,
> does your answer remain the same?
"Namely: in no way does one's identity depend on
particular atoms. "
Then if you copied your pattern to a new group of atoms, would that new
entity experience the same subjective events as you? If it did, then
identity does not depend on particular atoms, but if it did not (the
reasonable outcome) then since the only changed variable is the atoms, then
one must logically conclude that in some manner identity does depend on
atoms.
I contend that it is dependant on using the majority of the same atoms from
one moment to the next. Copying replaces all atoms simultaneously, growth
and development and simple existence through time only replaces a small
number of atoms at any given moment.
> what I dispute is that the pattern [in a copy], which is identical
> to the reference pattern, and is imprinted upon a new group of atoms,
> is not a subjective continuation of the reference pattern. That is,
> it is not you.
"You don't really know this! How can you be so *sure* that
teleporters really do anything to someone besides change
their location?"
This is why I suspect you do not understand what I am saying. I "know" this
through the simple thought experiment. If my pattern of my atoms is
imprinted on new atoms, creating a new group of atoms in the same pattern,
while I am still standing around, we do not feel / see / hear the same
things. If he does not sense what I sense, then he must not be a
continuation of me. There is no appeal to mystical thought, no soul, so
irrationality, it purely the simplest explanation for oberseved phenomena.
observation - a copy of me does not have the same subjective experiences as
me
conclusion - a copy of me is not the continuation of me, since to be the
continuation of me it must share the same subjective experiences as me from
one moment to the next.
"Why, atoms were unknown to vastly better philosophers than you or I for
millenia, and you must read
at least enough SF to understand that duplicates would be accepted as the
original people *regardless* of what the
underlying theories are, so long as the theories do not contain the
equivalent of souls."
So a lot of Sci Fi authors have said this, therefore it must be so? I do
not dispute that many people (like you) would accept copies as the
originals, instead of another person much like the original, but that does
not mean that a) that are justified in doing so (argumentum ad populum) and
b) that I must. And it does not necessitate the equivalent of souls, all
one need to is show that a copy does not experience the same subjective
events as the original to show that he is a copy, and not a continuation of
the original subjective consciousness.
> The evidence I have for the fact that the same pattern
> in a different group of atoms is that if we were to copy
> the pattern and imprint it into a new group of atoms
> the new group/pattern will be identical to the reference,
> but would not experience the same subjective events as the
> reference, and therefore *would not* be a continuation of the
> subjective experiences of the reference (original)
"Have you considered the case that the replacement is done without altering
the location? In that case, the experience would be the same."
Subjectively it would be the same, I do not know if I am continually
destroyed and recreated in the same place from instant to instant. But is
that reason enough to assume that I am being destroyed from one instant to
the next and to then think it ok to be destroyed and recreated the next
instant somewhere else without worry? If you first show that I am being
destroyed and recreated from one instant to the next then I will consider
this a valid argument (as I addressed this point in my post to gts) but just
because it is possible does not mean it is occurring and that we should
adjust our lives to something we merely imagine as a possible explanation
for the way the universe works.
But even if it were subjectively the same, if a copy was placed elsewhere at
the next instant, it is clear that it would not experience the same
subjective events as me. If the copy was placed where I was, that means I
was destroyed. That I was destroyed does not invalidate the fact that the
copy was not a continuation of my consciousness. And the individuals
operating the scanning and reconstruction machine that scanned and recreated
me in an instant would know what happened, and if logical would know that
subjectively the copy they created is not a continuation of my subjective
consciousness, they would know if they had made the copy somewhere else and
not destroyed me, the copy and me would not feel the same events.
"Most importantly, however, if your location suddenly changes and so you
start having "different experiences" it does *not* alter your identity.
How can my location 'suddenly change' exactly without me either moving from
point a to b (and thus having the same pattern and same atoms) the only way
it can suddenly change is if I were teleported. If I were teleported
without destroying the original, the teleported entity would clearly have
different subjective experiences then I would, thus it is not a continuation
of me.
"Your posts are very long, and I'm sorry that I don't have time at present
to respond to them in detail."
No problem, I will try to keep them shorter, but it seems necessary to
describe these points in detail to help prevent misunderstanding, as in
cyberspace people continually address either what they think you mean, or
your literal words instead of the ideas you are trying to convey. The same
points seem repeated, if you think a copy is you, then shouldn't you and the
copy share the same experiences? If you do not, he is a different person,
regardless of whether or not the copying process destroyed you and/or moved
him. You said you have seen valid objections to this? Which one?
> I should have emphasized 'continuation' of subjective experience, which I
> guess I skipped over in typing that particular message.
"Yes, right."
Yes, right, I see you chose not to respond to the very next sentence "As I
have emphasized from the get go, a copy will not experience the same
subjective events that a reference or original does, thus it CAN NOT be a
continuation of the consciousness of the original. "
> Since the result says "copy and original, ...do not share same sensory
> experience" And you say that does not follow, the converse would be that
the
> copy and original DO share the SAME sensory experience. Would you assert
> then that both the reference and the copy *share* subjective experiences?
"No, of course not. I would simply say that choosing which one is the
*reference* version is an arbitrary choice."
AND
""An axiom of your thought---which you seem unable to challenge ---is that
you *would* be the original and *would not* be
the duplicate. Here you should say "neither can see what the other sees"
without presuming to know which is the *real* "
So you admit that a copy and an original do not share the same experiences?
Then would you agree that a copy is NOT a continuation of the consciousness
of the original?
I can tell them apart, whichever one walked out of the 'scanner' side of the
'scanner copying machine'. But it does not matter if you cant tell them
apart, it does not defeat the point that they were separate and that one was
the original and was is the copy. One of these was clearly the 'reference'
pattern, and one must clearly be the pattern imprinted onto a new grouping
of atoms using the 'original' as a 'reference'.
"Which one is the original?" is not the same question as "Was there an
original?"
AND
"then there is NO SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE TWO OF THEM."
Depends on what you consider significant. Do you disagree that one of them
was made up of the same atoms that made up his pattern the instant before?
And the other one is made up of atoms that were not arranged into his
pattern the instant before? There is clearly a difference, rather you
consider it significant is a matter of opinion.
"Then in this case, we have *no* reason to suppose that the one who happened
physically to be the original
differs in any important way from the other. "
If he and the other do not share the same subjective experiences, then it is
clear that he and the other differ in a pretty significant way, they are
both individual unique entities and do not have some sort of shared
consciousness.
"But Greg Egan's AXIOMATIC is *the* book with which to jolt your unconscious
assumptions and gain a different and puzzling (for me too!) take on all
this."
I will check it out
Michael
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