From: Lee Corbin (lcorbin@ricochet.net)
Date: Sat Jun 02 2001 - 17:41:55 MDT
Harvey Newstrom provides four aspects of why he (one copy)
is not him (the other copy). Paraphrased, they are
1. I have control over my own body and mind.
2. The duplicate body sitting next to me is not under my control.
3. From my vantage point the (other) duplicate is evidently
being controlled by a consciousness different from mine.
4. Tomorrow, "my" body tomorrow is still under "my" control.
(I changed the order; I hope my summary is accurate.)
>What is so difficult about this concept? Even if the duplicates are
>identical in every way and are the same in appearance and *external*
>function, they are different in *internal* function.
Yes---as some say, the "first person" is different.
Now first, I think that you'll agree that all four of your
reasons depend heavily on exactly what is meant by "I" and
"me". You may even readily admit that under a somewhat
broader concept of "I" and "me", they are no longer true.
Namely, that if "I" is thought to be "Program 2399647199099882",
then these statements are false.
I have to convince you that this latter formulation of what
"I" am---or what a person is---is better for us to adopt.
With the wider definition, you can see that your 2 and 3
are patently untrue: the consciousness (objectively speaking)
is not different, it is the same as yours. The duplicate
next to you is under "your" control, where "your" now has
this more objective meaning. (Yes; it is rather counter-
intuitive.)
But before I do that, observe that your number 4 isn't true
in the narrower (animal) notion of what "I" and "me" are.
Suppose that we place you in a room where you can see yourself
on closed circuit television. Now, when you move your arm,
so does the one on the television. (The same is true of a
mirror.) You admit that you are seeing yourself.
But in the next experiment, you are tied up and can only
barely move. You can visibly squirm or not squirm, and
it's pretty hard to see whether "you" are or not doing so.
But this time instead of a present you, you get to watch the
you from hours ago on television. By your definition, that's
not you. But that's incorrect. It most certifiably was you.
Here is the real thing you're after: you *anticipate* being
future you's. You will sacrifice to help a future you. You'll
gladly submit to a few second's torture to avoid an hour's
torture tomorrow. So this facilitates your argument. You
don't anticipate being your duplicate---you say "torture him"
when put to a severe enough test. I had freely admitted this
in earlier posts, but you must have missed it.
Now then, what is the reason to adopt the global, objective
definition of what a person is and what "I" am? Here it is:
As soon as one becomes a committed materialist, something
about the original picture seems wrong, because under total
materialism, what is true about a thing is entirely captured
by its physical description. So on very literal (rather non-
intuitive) level one can find absolutely no significant
difference between one and one's physical duplicate. Moreover,
since you are the same person over time---it's really silly to
deny it---then what is you (in a four-dimensional spacetime sense)
is anything that has an equivalent physics description.
Of course this is different from the usual concept; we have to
decide whether its advantages prove superior or not. Here is
a list of the advantages
1. physics is complete---there are no additional and peculiar
axioms involving the soul or its equivalent. Physical
symmetry between two identical objects is preserved (pace
the lack of absolute identiticalness in *some* experiments)
2. equivalence of time and space are preserved: "you" can be
at the same time in two different places as well as the
same place at two different times
3. what is "you" remains constant through experiments involving
duplicates, memory erasure, teleportation. Your life's work,
your interfaces with others, relationships, and so on are
unaffected. You can, for instance, erase some memories,
then teleport, then acquire new memories to become the
duplicate sitting next to you, and there is no problem.
4. state is all that matters (apologies to several people who
wondered what I meant by "statist"---I guess the spelling is
"stateist"); we have path independence which feels very right
5. backups become possible and convenient: you can't make a
backup under the older view, because the nanosecond after its
made, it isn't "you" any more
6. values vary continuously: in 5., for just one example, the value
of a backup, which is +1 right up to the nanosecond of duplication
is carried smoothly over in the nanoseconds following duplication,
instead of plummeting inexplicably to zero
7. language of identity is enhanced: two duplicates claim to be
the same person as they were yesterday, and the person yesterday
claims to be them, yet they do not claim to be each other---i.e.,
B is A, C is A, yet somehow B is not C.
8. evolution would favor the broader view: duplicates who sacrifice
for each other from the old view, but who are just being selfish
from the new view, survive better in a number of scenarios.
Each of these can be broadened in many thought experiments. Take
number 3, for example. Suppose that you already agree to teleport
(there are other, almost impossible obstacles for the materialist
who refuses even that). So you are teleported into a black box,
but into a thousand locations within that black box. Then 999 are
killed (painlessly, of course) and one emerges. Is it you? Only
the information view of identity is 100% clear that it is. Some
people say that your odds (even before entering the black box)
are only 1 in 1000 of surviving. Others say that each of the 1000
should break into a cold sweat because he has almost no chance of
survival. But under the state view, such concerns are silly.
Of course, there is a list of disadvantages, but they don't seem so
telling. They all seem to be based upon identification with very
low-level types of animal feelings, whereas the state view of
identity favors identifying with higher things, such as beliefs,
aspirations, and many other things that make us human.
Lee Corbin
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