From: Harvey Newstrom (mail@HarveyNewstrom.com)
Date: Sat Jun 02 2001 - 14:29:46 MDT
Lee Corbin wrote,
> On completely objective grounds the duplicate sitting next
> to you resembles you far more than the "you" of tomorrow
> does. Why can't people rise above the idea that somehow
> it's not you? Just because it doesn't "feel" like it is?
No. Nobody is claiming that they just don't "feel" that the duplicate is
themselves. You obviously don't understand the objections, so you are
reducing the argument that you don't understand down to a meaningless
statement. There are obvious key differences between the original and the
identical copy.
The question of self-identity cannot be answered on the atomic level. Just
because a copy is physically the same does not mean it is the same as "me".
The question of self-identity cannot be answered on the mental level. Just
because a copy has my memories and my personality does not mean it is the
same as "me". The question of self-identity cannot be answered externally
by other people. Just because other people can't tell the copies apart does
not mean that they are both "me". The true answer, in my opinion, is based
on self-determination, self-actualization, and self-control.
Please pay careful attention while I try to explain the difference between
"me" and an identical duplicate that is "not me".
1. I have control over my own body and mind. I can make my arm move. I
can feel a sensation when somebody touches me. I can tell my mind to relax.
I can consider a new idea. The original copy is a puppet that I control.
2. The body of tomorrow is the same. It may grow older, break its leg, or
change its appearance. It may be radically different from the original
"me", but it's still obviously me. It's still a puppet under my control.
3. The duplicate body sitting next to me is not under my control. I can't
make its arm move. I can't feel a sensation when somebody touches it. I
can't tell its mind to relax. I can't consider an idea that it is thinking
in its brain. If it is my body, then it is paralyzed. I can't make it
move. Therefore, it is a separate person disconnected from "me".
4. Yet, the duplicate is moving, not under my command but from external
commands. There is another consciousness that is controlling the duplicate
in the exact same manner that I am controlling the original. This
consciousness is another "me", in the same way that all people refer to
themselves as "me", yet they are all different "me's". I am a "me". The
duplicate is a similar "me". Other people are other "me's". Yet I can only
control *my* "me", while each of them controls *their* "me".
What is so difficult about this concept? Even if the duplicates are
identical in every way and are the same in appearance and *external*
function, they are different in *internal* function. If one of them has a
thought, a sensation or an internal organ failure, it will not affect the
other. They have separate bodies, minds, and lives. Unless they are
physically connected in one body, have their sensory inputs merged into one
perception, and have their minds linked telepathically so that they think a
single thought stream, they are not the same entity.
The question of which identical bodies holds my consciousness is very
simple. The body that raises its hand at my command is "me". The body that
sends me a physical sensation when touched is "me". The one that falls down
when my mind loses consciousness is me. It is easy and obvious to any mind
to figure out what body it is inhabiting. Just because there are duplicate
bodies made, it still will be easy to tell if one is inhabiting them or not.
-- Harvey Newstrom <http://HarveyNewstrom.com> <http://Newstaff.com>
This archive was generated by hypermail 2.1.5 : Sat Nov 02 2002 - 08:07:55 MST