From: Harvey Newstrom (mail@HarveyNewstrom.com)
Date: Sun Jun 03 2001 - 03:10:32 MDT
Lee Corbin wrote,
> Now then, what is the reason to adopt the global, objective
> definition of what a person is and what "I" am? Here it is:
> As soon as one becomes a committed materialist, something
> about the original picture seems wrong, because under total
> materialism, what is true about a thing is entirely captured
> by its physical description. So on very literal (rather non-
> intuitive) level one can find absolutely no significant
> difference between one and one's physical duplicate. Moreover,
> since you are the same person over time---it's really silly to
> deny it---then what is you (in a four-dimensional spacetime sense)
> is anything that has an equivalent physics description.
You are not addressing the same requirement I have for "me". I do not
dispute that what you say is true. I do not dispute the physical attributes
or mental attributes of the copies we are discussing. I think everybody
agrees on what they will look like and what they will think like. The
question is: Does one entity control all bodies or is each body controlled
by a separate entity. (Stress the word "separate" not "different"
entities.)
> Of course this is different from the usual concept; we have to
> decide whether its advantages prove superior or not. Here is
> a list of the advantages
>
> 1. physics is complete---there are no additional and peculiar
> axioms involving the soul or its equivalent. Physical
> symmetry between two identical objects is preserved (pace
> the lack of absolute identiticalness in *some* experiments)
My viewpoint does not require a mystical soul. It is your viewpoint that a
single entity controls multiple bodies across space and time with no
discernable communications mechanism.
I have deleted the rest of your arguments. None of them were scientific.
They all represented descriptions of how much nicer things would be under
your view. Unfortunately, we cannot choose a viewpoint because we like it.
A viewpoint must be chosen that matches reality, or the viewpoint will fail
to deliver all the things you wish for.
> 2. equivalence of time and space are preserved: "you" can be
> at the same time in two different places as well as the
> same place at two different times
I do not object to being in different places or different times. If I
control the bodies in those places and times, then I believe they are "me".
If I cannot control them, cannot get sensory input from them, and especially
if I can't even detect if they exist or not, I certainly can't agree that
they are "me". They must be some other "me" that is separate from the "me"
that I control.
> 3. what is "you" remains constant through experiments involving
> duplicates, memory erasure, teleportation. Your life's work,
> your interfaces with others, relationships, and so on are
> unaffected. You can, for instance, erase some memories,
> then teleport, then acquire new memories to become the
> duplicate sitting next to you, and there is no problem.
Irrelevant. This is a goal, not an objective observation. You may hope
that these things will turn out the way you want. That is not a good basis
for scientific definition.
> 4. state is all that matters (apologies to several people who
> wondered what I meant by "statist"---I guess the spelling is
> "stateist"); we have path independence which feels very right
I agree only if state covers more than all physical atoms and all stored
memories. A person who is killed has all the same atoms and all the same
stored memories. But they are not a conscious entity who calls themselves
"me". Besides a static state, there must be body control functions, sensory
input, communications output, and mental processing. These functions are
all that matters.
> 5. backups become possible and convenient: you can't make a
> backup under the older view, because the nanosecond after its
> made, it isn't "you" any more
> 6. values vary continuously: in 5., for just one example, the value
> of a backup, which is +1 right up to the nanosecond of duplication
> is carried smoothly over in the nanoseconds following duplication,
> instead of plummeting inexplicably to zero
Again, these are merely wishes. You hope backups are possible and
convenient. You hope your view is correct so that you can make backups.
This is not a good reason to "choose" that viewpoint. You must
scientifically determine what is true. If you base your backups on faulty
logic and facts, then your backups may not work as you desire.
> 7. language of identity is enhanced: two duplicates claim to be
> the same person as they were yesterday, and the person yesterday
> claims to be them, yet they do not claim to be each other---i.e.,
> B is A, C is A, yet somehow B is not C.
I'm not sure if you are arguing for or against this. If one person "A" is
duplicated to produce "B" and "C", then yes, they both are continuations of
"A", but they are not continuations of each other. This is standard logic.
To assume that the relationship between "A and B" and "A and C" must match
the relationship between "B and C" would be faulty logic.
> 8. evolution would favor the broader view: duplicates who sacrifice
> for each other from the old view, but who are just being selfish
> from the new view, survive better in a number of scenarios.
Again, we should not choose our world-view to make ourselves better people.
I think it is more honest to choose the world-view that best matches the
real world.
> Each of these can be broadened in many thought experiments. Take
> number 3, for example. Suppose that you already agree to teleport
> (there are other, almost impossible obstacles for the materialist
> who refuses even that). So you are teleported into a black box,
> but into a thousand locations within that black box. Then 999 are
> killed (painlessly, of course) and one emerges. Is it you? Only
> the information view of identity is 100% clear that it is. Some
> people say that your odds (even before entering the black box)
> are only 1 in 1000 of surviving. Others say that each of the 1000
> should break into a cold sweat because he has almost no chance of
> survival. But under the state view, such concerns are silly.
Again, you choose the easy way out. You choose what you *want* to occur.
You are not giving any evidence that your view is correct. It would be even
more comforting to believe in a mystical soul that magically jumps into the
only surviving body at the end. However, this does not help us build a
machine that can create uploads and backups.
-- Harvey Newstrom <http://HarveyNewstrom.com> <http://Newstaff.com>
This archive was generated by hypermail 2.1.5 : Sat Nov 02 2002 - 08:07:55 MST