From: Lee Corbin (lcorbin@tsoft.com)
Date: Tue Dec 03 2002 - 20:53:00 MST
Lee Daniel Crocker wrote
> -----Original Message-----
> From: owner-extropians@extropy.org
> [mailto:owner-extropians@extropy.org]On Behalf Of Lee Daniel Crocker
> Sent: Monday, November 25, 2002 11:52 AM
>
> [Eliezer wrote]
> > [Lee wrote]
> > >What the hell does that mean? At most it could mean,
> > >
> > > "I disapprove, and so do most societies with
> > > which I am familiar, though not all, and most
> > > people you respect would agree with me."
> > >
> > >It cannot, via good epistemology, possibly mean anything
> > >more. In fact, since it cannot, I usually find its use
> > >somewhat dishonest.
> >
> > Um, even if those two statements turned out to be coextensional for all
> > speakers, I don't think your epistemological work is done until you
> > explain the origins of the perceived cognitive difference. Why is it that
> > people seem to see "It is MORALLY WRONG that x!" as a different statement
> > than "I and most people disapprove of x"? Why does one statement seem to
> > imply legal prohibition while the other implies, at the most, social
> > ostracization? What is it that, for you, distinguishes that which you
> > disapprove of with a frown, and that which many people including you band
> > together to disapprove of with a gun?
>
> That's not the distinction that Lee is trying to draw here; that's
> another axis of the argument entirely. Lee is taking A. J. Ayer's
> position on the meaning of all moral statements, to whatever degree.
Yes, it is with great embarrassment that I admit
to agreeing with the logical positivists on this
one.
> In other words, he's arguing that the English sentence "X is morally
> wrong (to whatever degree)" is in fact expressing nothing more than
> the speaker's personal feelings about action X.
I will revise my view (and think that perhaps I
already did earlier): "X is morally wrong" is also
coded talk for "X is not only stridently disagreed
with by me, but also by the great majority of people
that you know and the great majority people in our
society and probably other societies". In that, I
find it an acceptable abbreviation, except in careful
philosophical discussions, where some might think that
the is/ought barrier is being breached, or suppose that
the speaker depends on a Higher Power or something for
his values.
> But the question of degree does bring up a possible counterargument;
> the existence of the libertarian position that one can disapprove of
> an action while at the same time more strongly disapproving of laws
> against it point out that people can and do make moral judgments for
> reasons more sophisticated than mere discomfort with acts themselves.
> I, for example, do not approve of people going into business as
> astrologers or psychics; but I would not interfere with anyone's
> legal right to do so, because I believe that the consequences of
> such interference would produce outcomes I desire even less...
Ever since Voltaire (at least) there have been those
of principle that might disagree with something without
wishing it to be outlawed. I disapprove of discourtesy,
for example.
> Therefore, there does exist at least one other interpretation of
> "X is wrong", and that is "However I may feel about action X itself,
> it inevitably leads to outcome Y, which I disapprove of". We can
> therefore argue for or against certain moral codes based on their
> expected outcomes rather than our feelings about the actions
> themselves.
I don't think that this is quite logical. To use my
example again, I do not believe that discourteous
behavior is ever necessary (except in very rare
cases), and so in fact believe that it leads to
outcomes Y which I find also bad (e.g., greater
incivility and more violence). But that's not why
I would hate to see discourtesy prohibited by law.
Obviously, it's just too difficult to enforce a
prohibition on discourtesy, and it would also lead
to diminished freedom of action.
> Going a step even further, I think there are a few basic
> outcomes that we can reach near unanimous agreement on, and that
> therefore would serve as a rational basis for certain moral
> strictures. For example, universal destruction of all life is
> an outcome that I think most people can agree is "bad", and that
> actions which bring about that would therefore be wrong.
Hear, hear! We can encode our near-unanimous agreements
in laws. In fact, failure to do so for a well-known
class of conduct is disastrous for societies.
Question: does my avowal that "It is MORALLY WRONG that x!"
means only "I and most people disapprove of x" make me a
moral relativist?
Lee Corbin
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