From: Lee Daniel Crocker (lee@piclab.com)
Date: Mon Nov 25 2002 - 12:51:40 MST
> (Eliezer S. Yudkowsky <sentience@pobox.com>):
> Lee Corbin wrote:
> >
> >Think about it: you see someone stridently say "It is
> >MORALLY WRONG that x!"
> >
> >What the hell does that mean? At most it could mean,
> >
> > "I disapprove, and so do most societies with
> > which I am familiar, though not all, and most
> > people you respect would agree with me."
> >
> >It cannot, via good epistemology, possibly mean anything
> >more. In fact, since it cannot, I usually find its use
> >somewhat dishonest.
>
> Um, even if those two statements turned out to be coextensional for all
> speakers, I don't think your epistemological work is done until you
> explain the origins of the perceived cognitive difference. Why is it that
> people seem to see "It is MORALLY WRONG that x!" as a different statement
> than "I and most people disapprove of x"? Why does one statement seem to
> imply legal prohibition while the other implies, at the most, social
> ostracization? What is it that, for you, distinguishes that which you
> disapprove of with a frown, and that which many people including you band
> together to disapprove of with a gun?
That's not the distinction that Lee is trying to draw here; that's
another axis of the argument entirely. Lee is taking A. J. Ayer's
position on the meaning of all moral statements, to whatever degree.
In other words, he's arguing that the English sentence "X is morally
wrong (to whatever degree)" is in fact expressing nothing more than
the speaker's personal feelings about action X.
But the question of degree does bring up a possible counterargument;
the existence of the libertarian position that one can disapprove of
an action while at the same time more strongly disapproving of laws
against it point out that people can and do make moral judgments for
reasons more sophisticated than mere discomfort with acts themselves.
I, for example, do not approve of people going into business as
astrologers or psychics; but I would not interfere with anyone's
legal right to do so, because I believe that the consequences of
such interference would produce outcomes I desire even less than the
presence of a few con men. On the other hand, I fully approve of
forcible interference with other acts such as violent assault, for
the same reason: I believe that tolerance of such acts would result
in unacceptable outcomes.
Therefore, there does exist at least one other interpretation of
"X is wrong", and that is "However I may feel about action X itself,
it inevitably leads to outcome Y, which I disapprove of". We can
therefore argue for or against certain moral codes based on their
expected outcomes rather than our feelings about the actions
themselves.
Going a step even further, I think there are a few basic basic
outcomes that we can reach near unanimous agreement on, and that
therefore would serve as a rational basis for certain moral
strictures. For example, universal destruction of all life is
an outcome that I think most people can agree is "bad", and that
actions which bring about that would therefore be wrong.
There aren't too many other universals that come to mind, but we
can still create rational moral codes by looking for the smallest
set of chosen values (to maximize agreement about them) that leads
to a working system that avoids the one universal. For example,
"suffering" is probably a reasonable choice for a negative value
that most agree with. It's not a universal, but it's very
/productive/, in that choosing it as a negative value produces a
lot of useful moral guidance (and more rational moral guidance
than other proffered values like "pleasing God").
-- Lee Daniel Crocker <lee@piclab.com> <http://www.piclab.com/lee/> "All inventions or works of authorship original to me, herein and past, are placed irrevocably in the public domain, and may be used or modified for any purpose, without permission, attribution, or notification."--LDC
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