From: Jef Allbright (jef@jefallbright.net)
Date: Thu Oct 24 2002 - 19:25:28 MDT
Lee -
I was happy to see your posting on the Seven Levels since it should help move the discussion beyond the interminable debate running on about whether the same object can be in two places at once.
My response to your 7 levels is as follows:
The first four strike me as representing naive understandings held by some and not useful to discuss further here.
> 5. Finds backups acceptable, provided that they've had no run time.
>
> Subject finds it desirable to keep frozen physical duplicates in
> storage (in case anything happens to him or her), but only provided
> that the duplicate, whether physically instantiated or merely kept
> safe as information, is completely identical to him or her at a
> particular past instant. In this case, he or she expects to survive
> physical destruction of the present body, but not if that body has
> already been reanimated and is having experiences elsewhere.
This is where, for me, it begins to get interesting. The key point is how we understand our self-identity.
I define my self-identity as a particular pattern, continuously changing, of thoughts, memories, drives, etc. moving through time and space. This pattern evolves as it interacts with its environment, and as determined by its own structure and the laws of physics. In accordance with current convention, and instinct, I limit my working concept of self to just those thoughts, memories, drives, etc. that appear to be contained within a particular human organism, and extending along a timeline from birth to death of that organism. Although my identity is associated with a human organism, it is perceived as essentially independent of that organism, since virtually any physical change in the organism is not perceived as a change in identity.
If another instantiation of myself were to be created, then clearly that new entity would begin as equivalent to me but then the two entities would proceed to diverge increasingly with time.
Here's where it seems to get messy for some people. It depends on how we choose to define self under these unfamiliar conditions.
Argument A
a.. We could say that the two entities are effectively the same person, pointing out that the differences between them are less than the differences the original entity went through during his lifetime, and such differences over time were never cause for an identity dispute before so why should they be now?
b.. We could point out that to his friends, and even to his mother, it would be obvious that he's the same person, so why dispute it?
c.. We could point out that he pursues the same interests and passions as before, so even intangibles such as values are the same, and this is an important measure of a person.
Or,
Argument B
a.. We could point out that we now have two entities operating independently of each other in our society, and that for society to function properly we must have individual rights and responsibilities. For example, entering into contracts.
b.. We could point out that after a while, significant enough differences will develop that if the two entities were brought together they would have disagreements and even compete with each other. This is overwhelmingly consistent with our understanding of separate individuals.
c.. We could argue that just as genes evolve and propagate themselves through time without any identity paradox, so can replicated humans, each branching off on his own path through the universe.
In the end it's all semantics. The facts stand on their own, and how we choose to describe them depends on the scope and context we use.
> 6. Anticipates future experiences of duplicates, but only one in
> particular.
>
> This is the nearly incoherent "closest continuer" theory. If you
> must die, but N duplicates of you were made at several points in
> the past, then you "really are" whichever one of them survives
> and is the most similar to you. Somehow your soul, or identity,
> is transferred by hidden celestial machinery into this particular
> one, but not into any of the others.
I agree this appears quite incoherent. I question why you chose to place this so near the top of your list, but I suspect it has to with the "anticipation" to which you refer. I've run into something like this in discussions with others, and I think its roots are in the mind/body dichotomy. To me this is cleared up by realizing that "you" are not your body, nor are "you" in your body. Rather, your consciousness is a result of processes conducted by your body.
> 7. Logically, but not necessarily emotionally, anticipates all
> experiences of all duplicates past or future, near or far.
>
> By subscribing to "the faith of a physicist", the subject believes
> that any physical object at any coordinates whatsoever is the same
> person that he or she is, provided only that the physical process
> running in the object resembles him or her closely enough.
>
> The extreme difficulty of sitting across a table, watching
> your physical duplicate, and honestly being able to exclaim,
> "There goes I, by the grace of God", or of being able to say
> with a straight face, "Logically, I anticipate the dinner that
> I had last night as much as I anticipate tonight's repast",
> prevents almost everyone from accepting level seven.
To me, the position stated in #7 is based on following the logic in Argument A past its point of usefulness, beyond the point where that subjective definition of what constitutes a personal identity makes sense. It's a cool idea, and it tickles the brain in the way novel ideas do, but it seems to me to be much less practical than Argument B.
> My own belief is that nonetheless, one is lead inexorably
> through countless thought experiments to level seven, and to
> the realization that the other concepts of personal identity
> are outmoded legacies of evolution which cannot sustain
> careful scrutiny.
I believe I'm open to the possibility of being convinced, and I'm curious what may be learned in the process.
- Jef
This archive was generated by hypermail 2.1.5 : Sat Nov 02 2002 - 09:17:46 MST