From: gts (gts@optexinc.com)
Date: Thu Oct 24 2002 - 10:57:57 MDT
Dan Fabulich wrote:
> The point of this is just in certain situations
> we can ignore rather significant differences.
I can agree with that. It makes sense from a pragmatic viewpoint.
However I am no pragmatist; I must insist that the differences between
the objects remain real even if we decide they are not relevant to
whatever purpose we have in mind.
For example if for pragmatic reasons you find it useful to drink coffee
from a real garbage truck then I won't object, but please don't expect
me to keep a straight face when you tell me the garbage truck is
actually a coffee cup. :)
> We can draw the distinction out more clearly with an example.
> You don't believe in personal continuity over time, so we'll speak in
> your language for a moment. Consider Lee, who *does* believe that
he's the
> same guy he was yesterday. Is his belief relevant in figuring out
> whether he really IS the same guy he was yesterday? No; at least,
> not in a language in which persons are defined to be different
> people across time (due to a metaphysical commitment to temporal
> parts or whatever). Just because he thinks he persists doesn't
> mean he really does.
>
> Now consider the scenario from within a language more like
> Lee's, in which people *do* persist over time (at least
> under ordinary circumstances). You believe that you don't.
> But is that relevant in figuring out whether you really do
> persist over time? Again, no, not in this language; in
> this language, it's the "same person" at different times,
> as a point of definition, regardless of what you think
> about the matter.
All I see above are two valid arguments that neither Lee nor I should
beg the question of identity. My assertion that personality changes
constantly through time is certainly not evidence that it changes
constantly, nor is his assertion that personality persists evidence that
it persists. In terms of my personal inventory method of checking for
identity, any such statements we or our alleged dupes might make would
not be evidence for either case. However if for example Lee stated that
his personality persists and his copy stated that his does not persist
then we would have clear evidence that Lee is not his copy. This would
be so not because either assertion is true. It would be so simply
because the beliefs conflict.
>> I don't think so. A true duplicate would describe himself
>> in exactly the same way as his original and have exactly
>> the same idea of what is relevant to his identity.
>> To use Eugene's word, they would be "synched" in every way.
>
> All this says is that the duplicates would agree as to
> whether they were the same person; they'd find
> the same properties relevant, whatever those
> properties might be. This is obvious. :)
Right, it is perfectly obvious. It is also perfectly obvious that two
individuals who did *not* give the same account of themselves and who
did *not* offer the same ideas of what is relevant would *not* be the
same person. And there we have a simple and obvious test for the
equivalency of identity.
And as you know it is my contention that given enough time to discuss
and compare notes, the original and his alleged dupe would eventually
find some area of disagreement. The disagreement might be large and very
significant to them or it might be small and insignificant to them, but
it would be a disagreement nonetheless. That disagreement would be
evidence of their inequality *even if they agreed it was insignificant
to them*.
To use the simplest kind of example, the original might say "I am
looking up at the sky" while the other says "I am looking down at my
shoes." That difference in their self-descriptions is sufficient reason
to call them different people, even if they are friendly to Lee's way of
thinking and so prefer to sweep their differences under the rug for the
purpose of making a dubious argument. :)
-gts
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