From: Dan Fabulich (dfabulich@warpmail.net)
Date: Thu Sep 05 2002 - 16:46:37 MDT
gts wrote:
> > I like the "working hypothesis" language, but it's not my
> > only language, and it's not necessarily my favorite.
> > I definitely wouldn't go in saying that "truths" are
> > *really* "working hypotheses"; that would require
> > needless (and inconclusive) metaphysical argument.
>
> I think we agree on that point, though I'm not quite clear what you mean
> by "*really*". I do accept that real objects exist in the world separate
> from my hypotheses about their possible existence, if that's what you
> mean.
Neither would I want to say that "People who say X really mean Y,"
That's all.
> >> And there is where you find me writing about my 100%
> >> confidence in an immortality machine proven to be 100% reliable.
> >
> > I don't follow the last step.
>
> The problem for all empiricists is that we cannot go through life
> without at least acting as though our working hypotheses are "really
> true". Life would become quite confusing, if not impossible, if we were
> to assume consciously that nothing is actually true and then act
> accordingly. :) So then, in this example, if I accept the hypothesis
> that an immortality machine is 100% reliable then I will speak and act
> according to that hypothesis.
Right... this is what I had expected. I charge that you should accept
the hypothesis that you could be immortal in the manner we described, even
though there's a slim chance that it's not true, on the same grounds that
you can accept the hypothesis that I'm 23, even though it might be false.
A slim chance is a slim chance is a slim chance. If you reject one of
these, you've got to reject both. Accept one; accept both.
> > I don't see why it matters that you can't get 100%
> > on "immortal", any more than it matters that you can't
> > get 100% on "23 years of age."
>
> I think that to make the comparison accurate, you would need to tell me
> there is a 99.99 percent probability that you can produce concrete
> empirical evidence that you are 23. In that case I would not conclude
> that you are 23, just as I do not conclude a person is immortal if that
> person has a only a 99.99 probability of demonstrating immortality.
Well, of course, there's no need to be too precise about the numbers.
Suffice it to say that the odds that I'm 23 have a lower bound of, say,
99.99%, and an upper bound of, say, 99.99999999999999. The odds that I
can provide evidence of this (where IS my birth certificate anyway? Have
I lost it? is it even genuine?) has similar upper and lower bounds.
Anyway, the odds definitely aren't 100% here, but they're still quite
high.
In that circumstance, you should accept the hypothesis that I'm 23 (by
saying things like "Dan is 23" when anyone asks you this year, and acting
as if I'm 23).
I still don't see any relevant difference between this and the immortality
hypothesis.
> > Oh, is it 100% true or false? I thought you weren't prepared
> > to concede that there was a fact of the matter on this point...?
>
> You asked earlier if I was willing to concede that my possible
> immortality or lack of immortality is a settled fact that exists now in
> the world (or words to that effect) and yes I am not willing to concede
> any fact of the matter on that point. I do not know if I am mortal and I
> do not know if I am immortal, and I see no reason to think the matter of
> my mortality or lack of it is already a settled fact in the world.
>
> But that issue is quite different than that of whether my hypothesis
> above is true or false. If you read it again, you'll see that it refers
> to the possible "achievability" of immortality. And yes I believe it is
> either 100% true or 100% false that immortality is achievable.
Isn't the "achievable" a subset of the possible? If your possible
immortality isn't a fact, the achievability of immortality will presumably
go the same way.
> > <ahem> If you're not saying that you're mortal, then what
> > *are* you saying when you say that you can't be immortal?
>
> I haven't argued that I can't be immortal, either. :) I've only argued
> that the probabilistic arguments presented so far are not convincing; to
> have any probability of dying, however small, is to be subject to death
> and not immortal.
>
> As for the question of whether I am saying I am mortal, I just yesterday
> criticized someone in this thread for even hinting that I am predestined
> to die.
>
> I really don't know if I will die.
OK, skepticism. But your skepticism is general. It's not specific to
immortality or quantum tunneling in any meaningful way. So if you refuse
to render judgement on immortality, I see no reason to think that you can
render judgement on anything else.
> I simply ask those who would accept the achievability of immortality to
> prove that quantum tunneling is not an obstacle.
We're done, because we're not general skeptics.
This question has nothing to do with quantum tunneling and immortality,
but the question of whether we can know anything at all about the world.
I think that if you speak basically the same way we do about the future,
you'll say that immortality is achievable, despite quantum tunneling, in
the manner Eliezer described, even though there's a slim chance that it's
false.
-Dan
-unless you love someone-
-nothing else makes any sense-
e.e. cummings
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