From: gts (gts@optexinc.com)
Date: Thu Sep 05 2002 - 15:11:52 MDT
Dan,
This is an interesting discussion. Thanks.
> gts wrote:
>
>> As I think you may agree, all supposed "truths" about
>> the world, including the "truth" that you are 23,
>> are in reality only "working hypotheses."
>
> I like the "working hypothesis" language, but it's not my
> only language, and it's not necessarily my favorite.
> I definitely wouldn't go in saying that "truths" are
> *really* "working hypotheses"; that would require
> needless (and inconclusive) metaphysical argument.
I think we agree on that point, though I'm not quite clear what you mean
by "*really*". I do accept that real objects exist in the world separate
from my hypotheses about their possible existence, if that's what you
mean.
>> Most importantly, two competing hypothesis about the world
>> cannot be true. We are thus forced to accept one hypothesis
>> as (contingent) "truth," which is a rather black and white
>> proposition despite the inherent uncertainty of knowledge.
>
> OK...
>
>> And there is where you find me writing about my 100%
>> confidence in an immortality machine proven to be 100% reliable.
>
> I don't follow the last step.
The problem for all empiricists is that we cannot go through life
without at least acting as though our working hypotheses are "really
true". Life would become quite confusing, if not impossible, if we were
to assume consciously that nothing is actually true and then act
accordingly. :) So then, in this example, if I accept the hypothesis
that an immortality machine is 100% reliable then I will speak and act
according to that hypothesis.
> I don't see why it matters that you can't get 100%
> on "immortal", any more than it matters that you can't
> get 100% on "23 years of age."
I think that to make the comparison accurate, you would need to tell me
there is a 99.99 percent probability that you can produce concrete
empirical evidence that you are 23. In that case I would not conclude
that you are 23, just as I do not conclude a person is immortal if that
person has a only a 99.99 probability of demonstrating immortality.
> Again, going back to the predicates, if you're prepared
> to accept evidence that you're P, despite some obvious (and,
> in some cases, measurable!)chance that you're not P, and
> you're therefore prepared to then say "I'm P!" (as "true,"
> as a "working hypothesis," whatever,) then I see no reason
> why it matters whether P is "immortal" or P is "23 years old."
> Apparently you're willing to let me do it in the case of "23
> years old" on
> the basis of a mere written document; I don't see why the standard for
> claiming immortality should be higher.
>
> What's the relevant difference between these two? It can't be the
> possibility of their falsehood, because they both have that.
> So, what is
> it?
I think I answered this in my paragraph above.
>> Strictly speaking that is true. However the question is whether we
>> should accept or reject the hypothesis that immortality is
>> achievable given the empirical evidence that molecules decay
>> spontaneously via quantum tunneling. The hypothesis itself is
>> either 100% true or 100% false.
>
> Oh, is it 100% true or false? I thought you weren't prepared
> to concede that there was a fact of the matter on this point...?
You asked earlier if I was willing to concede that my possible
immortality or lack of immortality is a settled fact that exists now in
the world (or words to that effect) and yes I am not willing to concede
any fact of the matter on that point. I do not know if I am mortal and I
do not know if I am immortal, and I see no reason to think the matter of
my mortality or lack of it is already a settled fact in the world.
But that issue is quite different than that of whether my hypothesis
above is true or false. If you read it again, you'll see that it refers
to the possible "achievability" of immortality. And yes I believe it is
either 100% true or 100% false that immortality is achievable.
>> Actually, I'm not so ready to let the point drop this
>> easily. If you can't say that you're immortal because you
>> don't have 100% subjective confidence, you can't say that
>> you're mortal either; you don't have
>> 100% subjective confidence in that.
> > But I am not attempting to say that I am mortal.
>
> <ahem> If you're not saying that you're mortal, then what
> *are* you saying when you say that you can't be immortal?
I haven't argued that I can't be immortal, either. :) I've only argued
that the probabilistic arguments presented so far are not convincing; to
have any probability of dying, however small, is to be subject to death
and not immortal.
As for the question of whether I am saying I am mortal, I just yesterday
criticized someone in this thread for even hinting that I am predestined
to die.
I really don't know if I will die.
> You can't argue "that's not immortality!" because, to do so,
> you have to argue that you're mortal.
That's not true. I'm not obliged to prove the negative.
I simply ask those who would accept the achievability of immortality to
prove that quantum tunneling is not an obstacle.
-gts
This archive was generated by hypermail 2.1.5 : Sat Nov 02 2002 - 09:16:45 MST