From: Lee Corbin (lcorbin@ricochet.net)
Date: Sun Jun 03 2001 - 17:22:03 MDT
Harvey writes, speaking of duplicates
> These entities will have no more connection to each other than twins,
> siblings, relatives or even nonrelated people do to each other. By
> simple counting processes of determining how many entities there are, we
> would have to count them separately. If we decide that difference pieces
> of "one" entity do not have to communicate or even be aware of each
> other, we might as well define everybody in the universe as being "one"
> cosmic mind, and be done with it.
But of course, this is not what I am suggesting. I agree with
you that I am not you. I think that you already know that I
am only suggesting that all sufficiently similar instances of,
say, Harvey Newstrom be regarded as a single person. I agree
with you also that if one duplicate has a cold, and the other
does not, then the answer to the question "how are you?" could
be, "we are of two minds about it" :-) Seriously, of course,
as has been belabored, each instance sees, hears, and---about
unimportant things---thinks differently.
Interestingly, I was once told that Buddhists are less
sure that they aren't each other, that it was easier
for them to conceive of having the same identical soul
as other people, but only different memories, etc.
I don't think that this is complete nonsense. Every
time someone reaches out across a chessboard and answers
1. e4 c5 with 2. c3 (Alapin's attack), I think that
a little bit of me is there too. (Sadly, this falls
into one of the funny categories Eugene described in
a post about how people argue in email. This guy must
be smart, and hence, right, because he plays chess!)
> None of [your arguments] are scientific. They all represent
> descriptions of how much nicer things would be under your view.
> Unfortunately, we cannot choose a viewpoint because we like it.
> A viewpoint must be chosen that matches reality, or the
> viewpoint will fail to deliver all the things you wish for.
I agree. But it is wrong for you to suggest that there
is any straightforward scientific answer to this question,
and that someone will be proved to be completely wrong, or
to have overlooked something obvious. If that were true,
this discussion would have been settled long ago. Now
arguments between socialists and conservatives actually
go all the way down to values, and it's so silly to hear
them denounce each other as "thinking poorly", "dumb", or
"uneducated". Not that anyone here has made such crass
accusations, but our dispute is a little similar: there
do exist "right answers" insofar as we will find out what
works best (under various characterizations), and by
and by people will decide what they like.
> You hope backups are possible and convenient. You hope
> your view is correct so that you can make backups.
> This is not a good reason to "choose" that viewpoint.
> You must scientifically determine what is true. If you
> base your backups on faulty logic and facts, then your
> backups may not work as you desire.
For better or worse, indeed we do choose some viewpoints
"because we like it". You can't tell me that you would
be completely unaffected if your friends and neighbors
got to exploit some new technology that you couldn't
because of your philosophical views. So it's not entirely
irrelevant whether having backups is advantageous. Our
intuitions are strongly affected by possibilities,
options, and unconscious judgment calls.
>> 7. language of identity is enhanced: two duplicates claim
>> to be the same person as they were yesterday, and the
>> person yesterday claims to be them, yet they do not
>> claim to be each other---i.e., > B is A, C is A,
>> yet somehow B is not C.
> I'm not sure if you are arguing for or against this.
Against this. These claims are presumably what you would make.
Using the language that I suggest, this gets cleaned up.
> If one person "A" is duplicated to produce "B" and "C",
> then yes, they both are continuations of "A", but they
> are not continuations of each other. This is standard
> logic. To assume that the relationship between "A and B"
> and "A and C" must match the relationship between "B and
> C" would be faulty logic.
You're not giving me much credit for being able to use
logic! I note here that you take my notorious "is" of
identity, and slowly replace it with "continuation".
I grant that this is correct in your view. But it's not
correct in my view. I see "continuity" as the OTHER CAMP
to which I do not belong. I am a statist (or stateist).
Imagine there are three entities A, B, and C, that
subscribe to your view who you get to interview (I'm
sorry if you already understand my point, now, but
there are other readers). So on Monday you go to A
and say: "will B who is a copy of you made tomorrow be
you?". He'll say yes. "How about C? Will he also
be you?" Again, he'll say yes. Now we go to Tuesday
and ask B, "Are you the same person as A?" He'll say
yes, and C will also maintain that he's the same person
as A. So your view generates that A and B are the same
person, and that A and C are the same person, but that
B and C are entirely different people! Something
sounds wrong here!
Yes, I know that you can explain it under your view.
(Boy, do I know.) I merely listed this as an advantage
to my view, namely that the language is simplified:
if they agreed with me, each of A, B, and C would admit
to being each of the other two.
Lee
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