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Cc: Bitcoin Dev <bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net>
Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] Malleable booleans
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To be clear: I indeed meant to only allow 0 and 1 as booleans (or,
more precisely: [] and [0x01]). Evaluating any stack element as a
boolean that is not any of these would result in script failure.
The only places where this is relevant:
* Inputs to OP_IF and OP_NOTIF (which are currently allowed to be any
byte array).
* Inputs to OP_BOOLAND and OP_BOOLOR (which are currently allowed to
be any valid number).
* The resulting final element on the stack for validity.
The code for converting stack elements to booleans is also invoked for
all OP_*VERIFY operators, but for those it is always the output of a
previous operator, so it will not have any semantic impact.
On Tue, Oct 14, 2014 at 1:09 AM, Peter Todd <pete@petertodd.org> wrote:
> I noticed this awhile back myself. More interestingly, I remember
> noticing some non-std scripts on mainnet that had opcodes that appeared
> to be attempts to solve this issue with variations of the following:
>
> DUP
> IF
> 1 EQUALVERIFY
> <do stuff>
> ELSE
> 0 EQUALVERIFY
> <do stuff>
> ENDIFo.
>
> I'll have to admit, I decided to keep quiet about it because it's a good
> example of how relying on BIP62 for specialty contract applications that
> absolutely need to avoid malleability for security reasons is a dubious
> idea; it's hard to be sure that we've really gotten every relevant case
> correct.
I think my goal is to have the property that for every possible
script, there is an equivalent one that is non-malleable. There are
likely still holes in that idea, but at least for just standard
scripts I think BIP62 (as is) covers this. And as your example points
out (Greg and I discussed this, though we didn't come up with such a
concise one), it is already possible for boolean inputs too.
> I think a decent argument *for* doing this is that if a script author
> fails to properly 'bool-ize' every boolean-using path that can have
> non-minimal encodings in normal execution, you can always create a
> nVersion=1 transaction manually to spend the output, preventing funds
> from getting lost. Meanwhile in the general case of a compenent script
> author having the canonical bool testing in every boolean-using opcode
> saves a lot of bytes.
The real question is whether there are use cases for not having this
requirement. I can't come up with any, as that would imply a boolean
that is also interpretable as a hash, a pubkey or a signature - all of
which seems crpytographically impossible to ever result in false.
--
Pieter
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