Received-SPF: pass (sog-mx-4.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com: domain of gmail.com
	designates 209.85.213.169 as permitted sender)
	client-ip=209.85.213.169; envelope-from=pieter.wuille@gmail.com;
	helo=mail-ig0-f169.google.com; 
MIME-Version: 1.0
In-Reply-To: <20141014080905.GA10545@savin.petertodd.org>
References: <CAPg+sBjbeAaTmEvqrHHU4Mb45VPyRvFxdRzz1S6+-t7ep20ZtQ@mail.gmail.com>
	<20141014080905.GA10545@savin.petertodd.org>
Date: Tue, 14 Oct 2014 11:54:36 -0700
Message-ID: <CAPg+sBh4r8CzdOZ_nfJpq_7W07-e0bP7Subnxpsm=29tzKK0OQ@mail.gmail.com>
From: Pieter Wuille <pieter.wuille@gmail.com>
To: Peter Todd <pete@petertodd.org>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1
Cc: Bitcoin Dev <bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net>
Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] Malleable booleans
Precedence: list

To be clear: I indeed meant to only allow 0 and 1 as booleans (or,
more precisely: [] and [0x01]). Evaluating any stack element as a
boolean that is not any of these would result in script failure.

The only places where this is relevant:
* Inputs to OP_IF and OP_NOTIF (which are currently allowed to be any
byte array).
* Inputs to OP_BOOLAND and OP_BOOLOR (which are currently allowed to
be any valid number).
* The resulting final element on the stack for validity.

The code for converting stack elements to booleans is also invoked for
all OP_*VERIFY operators, but for those it is always the output of a
previous operator, so it will not have any semantic impact.

On Tue, Oct 14, 2014 at 1:09 AM, Peter Todd <pete@petertodd.org> wrote:
> I noticed this awhile back myself. More interestingly, I remember
> noticing some non-std scripts on mainnet that had opcodes that appeared
> to be attempts to solve this issue with variations of the following:
>
>     DUP
>     IF
>         1 EQUALVERIFY
>         <do stuff>
>     ELSE
>         0 EQUALVERIFY
>         <do stuff>
>     ENDIFo.
>
> I'll have to admit, I decided to keep quiet about it because it's a good
> example of how relying on BIP62 for specialty contract applications that
> absolutely need to avoid malleability for security reasons is a dubious
> idea; it's hard to be sure that we've really gotten every relevant case
> correct.

I think my goal is to have the property that for every possible
script, there is an equivalent one that is non-malleable. There are
likely still holes in that idea, but at least for just standard
scripts I think BIP62 (as is) covers this. And as your example points
out (Greg and I discussed this, though we didn't come up with such a
concise one), it is already possible for boolean inputs too.

> I think a decent argument *for* doing this is that if a script author
> fails to properly 'bool-ize' every boolean-using path that can have
> non-minimal encodings in normal execution, you can always create a
> nVersion=1 transaction manually to spend the output, preventing funds
> from getting lost. Meanwhile in the general case of a compenent script
> author having the canonical bool testing in every boolean-using opcode
> saves a lot of bytes.

The real question is whether there are use cases for not having this
requirement. I can't come up with any, as that would imply a boolean
that is also interpretable as a hash, a pubkey or a signature - all of
which seems crpytographically impossible to ever result in false.

-- 
Pieter