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Date: Fri, 04 Jul 2014 16:55:04 -0400
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Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] ASIC-proof mining
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Hi All,
This is a bit tangential to the conversation, but since the genesis of
this conversation is Mike's decentralization blog post, I decided to
post here.
Perhaps the solution to the mining problem lies in the reward structure
rather than in the proof of work/asics.
Is it possible instead to allocate a portion of the reward to " a # of
runner up(s)" even though the runner-up(s) block will be orphaned? For
example, X% of the block reward goes to Y number of runner-ups based on
some type of criteria?
This will appear to be a bit like a tax on the winner, but it could
potentially solve the problem, since a large pool would not want to
split the pool up to solve multiple blocks.
There are some possible downsides, like probably having to keep those
orphaned blocks around in the future, etc.
If this is possible, the question that remains then, what would be the
criteria for the X% payout/allocation?
-Randi
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