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Date: Fri, 04 Jul 2014 16:55:04 -0400
From: Randi Joseph <randi@codehalo.com>
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Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] ASIC-proof mining
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Hi All,

This is a bit tangential to the conversation, but since the genesis of 
this conversation is Mike's decentralization blog post, I decided to 
post here.

Perhaps the solution to the mining problem lies in the reward structure 
rather than in the proof of work/asics.

Is it possible instead to allocate a portion of the reward to " a # of 
runner up(s)" even though the runner-up(s) block will be orphaned? For 
example, X% of the block reward goes to Y number of runner-ups based on 
some type of criteria?

This will appear to be a bit like a tax on the winner, but it could 
potentially solve the problem, since a large pool would not want to 
split the pool up to solve multiple blocks.

There are some possible downsides, like probably having to keep those 
orphaned blocks around in the future, etc.

If this is possible, the question that remains then, what would be the 
criteria for the X% payout/allocation?

-Randi