1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
|
Received: from sog-mx-3.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com ([172.29.43.193]
helo=mx.sourceforge.net)
by sfs-ml-3.v29.ch3.sourceforge.com with esmtp (Exim 4.76)
(envelope-from <sipa@ulyssis.org>) id 1RjvM9-00021q-IZ
for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net;
Sun, 08 Jan 2012 16:12:25 +0000
X-ACL-Warn:
Received: from rhcavuit01.kulnet.kuleuven.be ([134.58.240.129]
helo=cavuit01.kulnet.kuleuven.be)
by sog-mx-3.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com with esmtp (Exim 4.76)
id 1RjvM8-0005Ru-Hy for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net;
Sun, 08 Jan 2012 16:12:25 +0000
X-KULeuven-Envelope-From: sipa@ulyssis.org
X-Spam-Status: not spam, SpamAssassin (not cached, score=-48.798, required 5,
autolearn=disabled, DKIM_ADSP_CUSTOM_MED 0.00,
FREEMAIL_FROM 0.00, KUL_SMTPS -50.00, NML_ADSP_CUSTOM_MED 1.20)
X-KULeuven-Scanned: Found to be clean
X-KULeuven-ID: E6058138098.A6A69
X-KULeuven-Information: Katholieke Universiteit Leuven
Received: from smtps02.kuleuven.be (smtpshost02.kulnet.kuleuven.be
[134.58.240.75])
by cavuit01.kulnet.kuleuven.be (Postfix) with ESMTP id E6058138098;
Sun, 8 Jan 2012 17:12:16 +0100 (CET)
Received: from smtp.ulyssis.org (mail.ulyssis.student.kuleuven.be
[193.190.253.235])
by smtps02.kuleuven.be (Postfix) with ESMTP id C0588F3862;
Sun, 8 Jan 2012 17:12:16 +0100 (CET)
Received: from wop.ulyssis.org (wop.intern.ulyssis.org [192.168.0.182])
by smtp.ulyssis.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 9692810052;
Sun, 8 Jan 2012 17:12:25 +0100 (CET)
Received: by wop.ulyssis.org (Postfix, from userid 615)
id BC07387C1B0; Sun, 8 Jan 2012 17:12:16 +0100 (CET)
Date: Sun, 8 Jan 2012 17:12:16 +0100
X-Kuleuven: This mail passed the K.U.Leuven mailcluster
From: Pieter Wuille <pieter.wuille@gmail.com>
To: Gavin Andresen <gavinandresen@gmail.com>
Message-ID: <20120108161215.GA13828@ulyssis.org>
References: <1325956875.73286.YahooMailNeo@web121006.mail.ne1.yahoo.com>
<CABsx9T00=X+0-59+pQN6MqAox8hnqm-08gr2GA=QWfqe_qSF5g@mail.gmail.com>
<1325977874.57604.YahooMailNeo@web121006.mail.ne1.yahoo.com>
<CABsx9T26Uit2jHkKeZSHOW51p8H31osmBo7JYp8Md6RaBDWPhw@mail.gmail.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Content-Disposition: inline
In-Reply-To: <CABsx9T26Uit2jHkKeZSHOW51p8H31osmBo7JYp8Md6RaBDWPhw@mail.gmail.com>
X-PGP-Key: http://sipa.ulyssis.org/pubkey.asc
User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.20 (2009-06-14)
X-Spam-Score: 1.2 (+)
X-Spam-Report: Spam Filtering performed by mx.sourceforge.net.
See http://spamassassin.org/tag/ for more details.
0.0 FREEMAIL_FROM Sender email is commonly abused enduser mail provider
(pieter.wuille[at]gmail.com)
0.0 DKIM_ADSP_CUSTOM_MED No valid author signature, adsp_override is
CUSTOM_MED 1.2 NML_ADSP_CUSTOM_MED ADSP custom_med hit,
and not from a mailing list
X-Headers-End: 1RjvM8-0005Ru-Hy
Cc: "bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net"
<bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net>
Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] Pull 748 pay to script hash
X-BeenThere: bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9
Precedence: list
List-Id: <bitcoin-development.lists.sourceforge.net>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development>,
<mailto:bitcoin-development-request@lists.sourceforge.net?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://sourceforge.net/mailarchive/forum.php?forum_name=bitcoin-development>
List-Post: <mailto:bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net>
List-Help: <mailto:bitcoin-development-request@lists.sourceforge.net?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development>,
<mailto:bitcoin-development-request@lists.sourceforge.net?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Sun, 08 Jan 2012 16:12:25 -0000
On Sat, Jan 07, 2012 at 08:12:35PM -0500, Gavin Andresen wrote:
> Pieter's compressed-public-keys patch (which was just pulled)
Uhm, was it? I just added some unit tests though.
> interacts with pay-to-script-hash to make ECDSA denial-of-service
> attempts less expensive; I think we need to think hard again about
> transaction fees before releasing 0.6, and maybe tweak the fee policy
> so denial-of-service attacks using compressed public keys and 1-of-3
> CHECKMULTISIG transactions is expensive enough to deter would-be
> attackers.
Very true; compressed public keys are 32 bytes smaller (so more keys
fit in a script), and are about 5% more CPU intensive to verify.
--
Pieter
|
