Date: Sun, 8 Jan 2012 17:12:16 +0100
From: Pieter Wuille <pieter.wuille@gmail.com>
To: Gavin Andresen <gavinandresen@gmail.com>
Message-ID: <20120108161215.GA13828@ulyssis.org>
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Cc: "bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net"
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Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] Pull 748 pay to script hash
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On Sat, Jan 07, 2012 at 08:12:35PM -0500, Gavin Andresen wrote:
> Pieter's compressed-public-keys patch (which was just pulled)

Uhm, was it? I just added some unit tests though.

> interacts with pay-to-script-hash to make ECDSA denial-of-service
> attempts less expensive; I think we need to think hard again about
> transaction fees before releasing 0.6, and maybe tweak the fee policy
> so denial-of-service attacks using compressed public keys and 1-of-3
> CHECKMULTISIG transactions is expensive enough to deter would-be
> attackers.

Very true; compressed public keys are 32 bytes smaller (so more keys
fit in a script), and are about 5% more CPU intensive to verify.

-- 
Pieter