From: Rafal Smigrodzki (rms2g@virginia.edu)
Date: Fri Nov 22 2002 - 08:04:30 MST
gts wrote:
> Rafal Smigrodzki wrote:
>
>>> Even you would agree that his subjective idea of himself is
>>> critical to his identity.
>>
>> ### No, this thread is not about pennies. It's about personal
>> identity. Personal identity does not include your bank account.
>> No ifs, ands or buts about it.
>
> Try explaining that to Mr. Hefner! Do you think he would have the same
> idea of himself if he lost everything he owned as result of some
> half-baked duplication experiment performed on him? As I said, his
> concept of himself would change drastically, and you are the one who
> wants to argue that identity is determined subjectively.
### So now you say that if somebody's bank account suffers a loss, he is no
longer the same person. Exactly how many $ loss does it take to stop Mr
Hefner from being Mr. Hefner?
------
>
> If and when we upload ourselves, I should hope that we also have a way
> to upload proxies for our property and wealth in some way. Those who
> contribute most to society should be rewarded for it, in this world or
> the next.
>
> (Granted, many pious people might argue that Hugh Hefner has
> contributed nothing to society, but you know what I mean. :)
>
> This subject of the importance of personal property to identity is
> probably suitable for another thread. For now I will set it aside and
> accept your position, with prejudice.
### Good. (Please disregard the question I posed above)
-------
>
>> ### No, no need for corrections. Reciprocal exchange of data
>> would preserve memories of both persons, including the memories
>> of the exchange process, with full convergence of values and
>> opinions. At which point does Mr. Hefner stop being himself?
>
> The key question here is who you would consider yourself to be while
> you where accessing Hefner's data.
>
> Would you be thinking "Here I am, Rafal Smigrodzki, experiencing Hugh
> Hefner's memories and current experience and current personality and
> current body"?
>
> Or would you be thinking "Here I am, Hugh Hefner, experiencing Hugh
> Hefner's memories and current experience and current personality and
> current body"?
>
> If the former then you are Rafal. If the latter then you are Hugh
> Hefner. If neither then you are neither Rafal nor Hefner, both of whom
> are now dead and replaced by something else entirely.
### Now, let me ask again - at which point does Mr. Hefner stop being
himself (or die, as you wrote)?
At the end of the data exchange I would think "Here I am, a sentient entity
with memories of RS and HH, present equally in the bodies designated RS and
HH". Mr. Hefner would undergo the same transformation. No discontinuities at
any point.
Where do we die?
-------
>
>
>>>>> If you bifurcated into two people, Rafal-1 and Rafal-2, and
>>>>> Rafal-2 committed a crime against me, then I would not hold
>>>>> Rafal-1 responsible. I would consider Rafal-1 innocent
>>>>> regardless of what Rafal-1 thought about his identity. If
>>>>> Rafal-1 wanted to accept responsibility for Rafal-2's criminal
>>>>> acts then I would consider him deluded and take pity on him.
>>
>> ### The answer to my question can be "Yes", "No", "Depends", or
>> "I don't know". Which one of these does anecdote above mean?
>
> It means "No." I would not coerce you into considering yourself
> different people. Nor would I allow you to coerce me into treating you
> as one person. I would not press charges against you if your copy
> committed a crime against me, unless I had reason to believe you were
> an accomplice.
### Excellent. As long as both of us agree to let the other be, all else is
just intellectual sparring. This is very good.
Rafal
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