From: Louis Newstrom (louisnews@comcast.net)
Date: Thu Jun 13 2002 - 06:52:24 MDT
From: "Hal Finney" <hal@finney.org>
> Suppose we accept, with John, that two *identical* simulations represent
> exactly one conscious observer. And presumably we all accept that
> two different simulations represent exactly two conscious observers.
...
> Identity is
> identity, and there's a big difference between "the same" and "almost
> the same".
I would disagree with this hypotheses. I think there is only a small change
in "the same" and "almost the same". I think it has almost no affect on
whether there are one or two conciousnesses. This is perfectly consistant,
because I believe that two identical copies would still have two
conciousnesses.
I would suggest the reverse of your experiment...
Start with two people and rearrange the atoms in one to duplicate the other.
I think that it would affect his mind, and his memories. However, I think
he would still be one conciousness. He would be the person sitting in the
"transmogrifier" while the other person is sitting in the "scanner". I do
not think as the last atom is moved, a signifigant change in conciousness
would occur.
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