From: Nick Bostrom (nick@nickbostrom.com)
Date: Wed Apr 03 2002 - 19:46:08 MST
Mark Walker wrote:
>A few small points:
>
>2. Is your discussion limited to genetic enhancements of humans? (See 3
>below). If so, it might help to say what sorts of genetic manipulations are
>not covered by your discussion.
I only discuss the human case, but I'm not sure I'm saying anything that
wouldn't also apply to transhumans.
>3. I see how the issue of personal identity comes into it, if you are
>talking about in vivo enhancements. But isn't another central issue 'species
>identity'? Genetic manipulation of a human zygote raises the possibility of
>a speciation event.
The main difference between a distinction between race (which is very
superficial) and a distinction between species, as I see it, is that
members of different species cannot interbreed under natural conditions;
that gives a little more substance to the latter distinction. Apart from
the possible practical problem of interbreeding, I don't see any ethical
significance of species boundaries.
From a technical point of view, I expect human-descendants to be
interbreedable for at least as long as we remain biological. By the time
genetic differences have accumulated to the point of causing difficulties
in natural breeding, I think genetic science will have progressed to make
it possible to overcome those difficulties.
The upshot is that I don't see an issue in speciation, apart from the
concerns about inequality that I talk about in the paper.
>5. I realize that you are attempting to confine the discussion to the realm
>of practical ethics, I wonder whether this is ultimately possible. But a
>single example: You say, "But at least we can conclude that an enhancement
>that has both intrinsic benefits for the enhanced individual and significant
>net positive externalities for the rest of society - health and intelligence
>enhancements, for instance, seem to belong to this category - should not be
>banned; the question, rather, is how strongly they should be encouraged, and
>by what means." The idea, I take it, is to evaluate in part in terms of
>raising the total good--is the question of the nature of this good besides
>the point for your purposes? It seems that if we plugged different values
>into this equation, e.g., 'pleasure', 'happiness', or 'perfection we might
>get quite different recommendations about how to proceed, i.e., about which
>enhancements to encourage and which to discourage.
I'm using the 'benefits' in the social choice sense, of (more) people
getting (more) of what they want. I'm not committing myself to benefit in
this sense as being identical to the good, but only to the weaker claim
that in practise, if something is a benefit in this sense, that is a good
prima facie ethical reason for being in favor of it. (In fact, I'm
attracted to the dispositional theory of value, developed e.g. by David
Lewis, which I mention earlier in the paper).
Thanks for your comments!
Nick Bostrom
Department of Philosophy, Yale University
New Haven, CT 06520 | Phone: (203) 500-0021 | Fax: (203) 432-7950
Homepage: http://www.nickbostrom.com
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