From: Mark Walker (mdwalker@quickclic.net)
Date: Wed Apr 03 2002 - 12:50:07 MST
----- Original Message -----
From: "Nick Bostrom" <nick@nickbostrom.com>
To: <wta-talk@yahoogroups.com>
Sent: Tuesday, April 02, 2002 10:16 PM
Subject: [wta-talk] A Transhumanist Perspective on Genetic Enhancements
> A first draft of a new paper, "A Transhumanist Perspective on Genetic
> Enhancements". > http://www.nickbostrom.com/ethics/enhancements.html
> http://www.nickbostrom.com/ethics/enhancements.pdf
>
>
A few small points:
1. Between the extremes of saying that we should never genetically enhance
and those (like us) who say we should enhance today, there is a moderate
position that says that we should proceed very, very cautiously. Suppose
someone agreed with you that there are potentially great benefits for
genetic enhancements, but the serious risks indicate that we should study
this in extensive detail before proceeding. Some might think that a dozen or
more generations using animal models might be appropriate. If one of the
animal models is the chimp then this will take us into the next century.
Along time by impatient transhumanist standards. I have had this sort of
objection raised by audiences at a couple of papers that I have given so it
might be worth distinguishing a bit more between those against it in
principle, and those that say, maybe, but not just yet. I realize you flag
the difference with 'ban' and 'moratorium' but strategically it might help
to say a bit more.
2. Is your discussion limited to genetic enhancements of humans? (See 3
below). If so, it might help to say what sorts of genetic manipulations are
not covered by your discussion.
3. I see how the issue of personal identity comes into it, if you are
talking about in vivo enhancements. But isn't another central issue 'species
identity'? Genetic manipulation of a human zygote raises the possibility of
a speciation event. (I discuss the possibility of such a speciation event in
"Prolegomena to Any Future Philosophy", specifically, the creation of Homo
Bigheadus).
4. In ibid. I suggest that it is quite possible that a few genetic changes
might lead to a speciation event. (See the discussion of homeobox genes). I
think that some might fear that allowing enhancements will lead down the
slippery slope to a speciation event. If you are attempting just to discuss
enhancements then you might need to say something about the speciation
possibility. If you intend to cover the speciation possibility you might
need to say a bit more about this. (I take the proverbial bull by the horns
in "Absolute Perfectionism" and argue that it is our ethical duty to
speciate).
5. I realize that you are attempting to confine the discussion to the realm
of practical ethics, I wonder whether this is ultimately possible. But a
single example: You say, "But at least we can conclude that an enhancement
that has both intrinsic benefits for the enhanced individual and significant
net positive externalities for the rest of society - health and intelligence
enhancements, for instance, seem to belong to this category - should not be
banned; the question, rather, is how strongly they should be encouraged, and
by what means." The idea, I take it, is to evaluate in part in terms of
raising the total good--is the question of the nature of this good besides
the point for your purposes? It seems that if we plugged different values
into this equation, e.g., 'pleasure', 'happiness', or 'perfection we might
get quite different recommendations about how to proceed, i.e., about which
enhancements to encourage and which to discourage.
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