From: Jason Joel Thompson (jasonjthompson@home.com)
Date: Mon Sep 04 2000 - 17:47:32 MDT
----- Original Message -----
From: "Technotranscendence" <neptune@mars.superlink.net>
> On Monday, September 04, 2000 1:30 PM Jason Joel Thompson
> jasonjthompson@home.com wrote:
> > Let us say that I look at an orange pen. There a few claims that I am
> able
> > to make about that orangeness, and each claim can be rated by degree of
> > certainty.
> >
> > 1.) The pen is orange. (appeal to the reality of existence)
> >
> > This is a problematic statement for deeper reasons I've already given,
but
> > let's simply deal with the basics: perhaps a light source is altering
the
> > appearance of the pen, perhaps it's virtual reality, or perhaps a piece
of
> > orange gel has been placed between me and the pen. In any case I cannot
> > have absolute certainty regarding such a statement.
>
> What degree of certainty can you ascribe to it? Note, all the examples
you
> use to cast doubt on this example are sensory. Knowledge of them -- your
> reasons to doubt -- comes from the senses. One, e.g., finds out about an
> orange filter (my example originally:) by knowing about such filters. How
> does one know about them? Generally, one sees them.:)
Hmm... I'm not sure what you're getting at here. It doesn't matter the
means by which doubt is cast. The point is simply that I cannot have
absolute certainty in the above statement.
>
> > 2.) I see the color orange. (appeal to the reality of the senses)
> >
> > This has much greater certainty. You can't say to me: "Aha, no, the pen
> is
> > really blue! I was just bouncing orange light off of it!" because I
> wasn't
> > claiming that the pen was orange, I was claiming that I perceived the
> color
> > orange. This statement is -almost- 100% absolutely true.
>
> Where do you derive the number 100 from? (My pet peeve: putting numbers
> alongside things to make yourself and others think you have more knowledge
> than you do.)
Huh?
Do you believe that I am using the term 100% to represent that I have
greater knowledge regarding this scenario? If so, let me put your mind at
ease-- I am merely using it as (unnecessary) emphasis. I will refrain in
the future if you wish.
> How do you distinguish between hallucinations and perceptions? Generally,
> there are lots of ways to tell between the two, including consistency and
> context. (If there was no way to tell, then, I submit, no one would ever
> come up with a concept of "hallucination." We would just assume they were
> real.)
Exactly. I accept this difference, thus the third example.
> > It is possible to have absolute, 100% certainty regarding the realm of
the
> > mind.
>
> I disagree here. The "realm of the mind" is no less prone to error. This
> can be easily shown. E.g., errors of reasoning and logic. E.g., false
> memories. E.g., imagining with whatever degree of realism things that
don't
> exist, such as unicorns or characters in a novel. If you are willing to
> disregard the evidence of the senses (to allude again to David Kelley's
> book), then the evidence of other parts of the mind should not get a free
> pass.
Sorry, I should have been more clear. I'm actually referring to a specific
process of the mind (which I thought I was making clear in context here.)
Your 'disagreement' above actually makes my point-- you're talking about
ways in which the mind can be shown to be wrong in the context of an
external reality. One can make definitive statements regarding mental
processes which have absolute authority in context. As I've already pointed
out, these definitive statements are necessarily separate from an external
reality. I can say "I'm imagining a unicorn," and be absolutely correct.
You see Daniel, this is why I didn't really want to wade into the
conversation-- there's so much work required just to make clear what it is
precisely that I'm talking about-- and apparently I'm not doing a very good
job of it.
> > If you were
> > hallucinating, if it was virtual reality, if the image was placed there
by
> > aliens from another planet, you are still 100% correct to state that you
> > experienced a particular brain state. Currently this is the only realm
in
> > which we are able to make absolute statements of reality.
>
> I would caution using "brain state." If you're going to discount the
> evidence of the senses, remember, knowledge of "brain states" comes from
> sensory evidence. In fact, the notion that the brain is intimately
> connected with mental activity is one based on a long chain of sense data
> and abstraction from it. X-rays, PET and CAT scans, experiments with
brain
> damaged animals (human or no) all come to us as sense data. Even reading
> this, you must rely on your eyes.
This is absolutely true. The realm I am talking about is necessarily
subjective, and this creates real problems for the objective reality crew.
>
> > I -do- believe in the mind.
>
> What is your evidence for the existence of the mind?
Very good question. Descartes, of course, thought it was sufficient merely
to be able to ask the question-- a perfect bootstrap-- what can question the
existence of the mind if not the mind itself?
>
> > I link the reality of my mind functionally to my external environment--
> this
> > way I don't bump into sharp objects.
>
> If you are skeptical about sense perception, then how do you know sharp
> objects exist?
As I've been saying, I don't require absolute certainty to proceed. I
merely admit the possibility that my senses are incorrect.
I'll quote myself, to re-iterate the point:
"Essentially I have complete functional acceptance of the construct of
reality, but maintain mental skepticism. Currently this has no impact on my
life other than to make for interesting discussion. Despite what you were
hinting at earlier, this doesn't result in me swerving out in traffic."
>
> > Also, the mere fact that there is a possibility that I can be incorrect
in
> > the first two statements doesn't mean that I am. I'm simply recognizing
> > that there is a possibility-- and that these are not absolute reality
> > states.
>
> This is a point I bring up in my dialogue. The possibility for error does
> not mean one is in error. However, you seem to hold sense perception to
the
> standard of being corrigible because of such possibilities, while ignoring
> that sense perception is not the only place the mind might err.
I hope I've successfully addressed this above.
>
> > And this sword cuts both ways: Having absolute certainty regarding a
> mental
> > state does not always translate into something useful in the external
> > environment.
>
> Here you hint, again, that somehow external reality matters. I think it
> does, but I come from the Aristotelean-Objectivist tradition, which does
not
> deny sense perception. In fact, I see sense perception as the
foundation --
> in fact, the only possible foundation -- for knowledge. However, if sense
> perception is flawed and flawed in the way you hint -- which leads,
> ultimately, to skepticism -- then no statements about external reality
> should matter. After all, its very existence, by your reckoning, is
called
> into question. Ergo, arguments about mental states being useful or about
> them helping one to survive or even about the evolution of mind are thrown
> similarly into doubt.
Yes. Again, I am comfortable proceeding in the face of ambiguity. Since I
don't hold to an absolute view of reality, it makes perfect sense for there
to be existence in the face of doubt.
Damn it Daniel, ya got me talking about this again! :)
I'm going to try a little thought example, try this on for size:
We have two boxes: A) existence, and B) the mind.
Imagine if you will, an arrow in motion from A to B. This is an arrow of
increasing certainty (I'm basing this on previous arguments that you appear
to have objections to, but let us proceed in any case:) The arrow passes
through a sensory state and delivers information to its destination, B, the
mind. The arrow is possessed of the property of absolute certainty only
once it has reached its destination, but the nature of that certainty has
been in a state of change. Having certainty that there is an image of an
orange pen in your mind does not directly translate back into the object you
are looking at.
To restate: as that little arrow moves from A to B its degree of certainty
approaches 100%, while simultaneously the subject of that certainty becomes
altered. In fact, the subject of that certainty has less and less to do
with A and more and more to do with B. This means that you're attaining
certainty over something that doesn't exist in the world of A.
B, after all, is where certainty exists. (Certainty = the mind knowing
something)
There is a reverse arrow to the arrow of certainty. I'm going to call it
the arrow of functionality. This arrow moves from B to A and as it moves,
its degree of functionality increases.
A, after all, is where functionality exists. (Functionality = something
happening in existence)
Essentially, existence sends signals to my mind, where they increase in
certainty, but decrease in functionality, and in reverse, my mind sends
signals to existence (taking action) that decrease in certainty (did I
really pick up the pen, or was it VR?) but increase in functionality
(something actually changes in the external world.)
Notice, however, in this model, you do not get absolute functionality and
absolute certainty at the same time. This is the model of reality that I am
challenging-- that there is a real real world and we can be certain of it
and it 'works,' both at the same time. Instead I see reality as an arrow,
pointing at the mind.
Many arrows in fact-- perhaps, if you'd like, in our universe, many arrows
pointing from the same A, to different Bs. The certainty of that reality
lives in the Bs (and so there are many realities,) but the source of those
realities lives in A (and so there is one reality.) The Bs communicate
action back to A and have a common realm into which they all interface.
I probably haven't done a very good job of describing this, so I've probably
lost you already, but I just don't have the time to apply greater rigor to
this. Argh.
If you have followed me this far, however, I'd like to add a wrinkle:
There's doesn't really need to be an A to make this model work.
All you need are the arrows.
Consider, for instance, the possibility that 'reality' is just mind. It's
simpler actually. If I want to build a world for a computer mind to
inhabit, why bother to create the physical universe?
Yes, but what is the software running on? (Again, an appeal to a physical
universe-- throw it out for a minute!)
Okay, I'm going to stop this 'insanity' here-- people seem to get mad when I
suggest there's actual rational thought behind this.
I don't suppose you live in the Greater Vancouver area? This is definitely
a sit down conversation. It's easier to convince people I'm not a total
lunatic in person.
Mm, no, scratch that, that's clearly not the case, otherwise my friends
wouldn't look at me so weird.
I think you're probably going to say lots of good things that refute the
above, but I really -really- have to stop talking about this now.
Thanks.
(You have a second post in which you make lots of good comments that
generally lead me to believe that we disagree less than we think we do.
That is to say-- in some cases the flaws you point out in my arguments
generally have more to do with the way in which I have phrased them and less
to do with the actual idea that I'm pointing at.)
--
::jason.joel.thompson::
::founder::
www.wildghost.com
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