From: Technotranscendence (neptune@mars.superlink.net)
Date: Mon Sep 04 2000 - 19:26:19 MDT
On Monday, September 04, 2000 1:30 PM Jason Joel Thompson
jasonjthompson@home.com wrote:
> Let us say that I look at an orange pen. There a few claims that I am
able
> to make about that orangeness, and each claim can be rated by degree of
> certainty.
>
> 1.) The pen is orange. (appeal to the reality of existence)
>
> This is a problematic statement for deeper reasons I've already given, but
> let's simply deal with the basics: perhaps a light source is altering the
> appearance of the pen, perhaps it's virtual reality, or perhaps a piece of
> orange gel has been placed between me and the pen. In any case I cannot
> have absolute certainty regarding such a statement.
What degree of certainty can you ascribe to it? Note, all the examples you
use to cast doubt on this example are sensory. Knowledge of them -- your
reasons to doubt -- comes from the senses. One, e.g., finds out about an
orange filter (my example originally:) by knowing about such filters. How
does one know about them? Generally, one sees them.:)
> 2.) I see the color orange. (appeal to the reality of the senses)
>
> This has much greater certainty. You can't say to me: "Aha, no, the pen
is
> really blue! I was just bouncing orange light off of it!" because I
wasn't
> claiming that the pen was orange, I was claiming that I perceived the
color
> orange. This statement is -almost- 100% absolutely true.
Where do you derive the number 100 from? (My pet peeve: putting numbers
alongside things to make yourself and others think you have more knowledge
than you do.)
Also, a blue pen probably would not reflect orange light exactly.:)
> Why 'almost?'
> Well, it -is- possible that I was hallucinating-- that the pen was a
mental
> construct and my eyes were actually perceiving nothing at all.
How do you distinguish between hallucinations and perceptions? Generally,
there are lots of ways to tell between the two, including consistency and
context. (If there was no way to tell, then, I submit, no one would ever
come up with a concept of "hallucination." We would just assume they were
real.)
> 3.) I have a mental construct of the color orange. (appeal to the
reality
> of the mind)
>
> It is possible to have absolute, 100% certainty regarding the realm of the
> mind.
I disagree here. The "realm of the mind" is no less prone to error. This
can be easily shown. E.g., errors of reasoning and logic. E.g., false
memories. E.g., imagining with whatever degree of realism things that don't
exist, such as unicorns or characters in a novel. If you are willing to
disregard the evidence of the senses (to allude again to David Kelley's
book), then the evidence of other parts of the mind should not get a free
pass.
> You cannot be shown to have been in error.
See above.
> If you were
> hallucinating, if it was virtual reality, if the image was placed there by
> aliens from another planet, you are still 100% correct to state that you
> experienced a particular brain state. Currently this is the only realm in
> which we are able to make absolute statements of reality.
I would caution using "brain state." If you're going to discount the
evidence of the senses, remember, knowledge of "brain states" comes from
sensory evidence. In fact, the notion that the brain is intimately
connected with mental activity is one based on a long chain of sense data
and abstraction from it. X-rays, PET and CAT scans, experiments with brain
damaged animals (human or no) all come to us as sense data. Even reading
this, you must rely on your eyes.
> I -do- believe in the mind.
What is your evidence for the existence of the mind?
> I link the reality of my mind functionally to my external environment--
this
> way I don't bump into sharp objects.
If you are skeptical about sense perception, then how do you know sharp
objects exist?
> Also, the mere fact that there is a possibility that I can be incorrect in
> the first two statements doesn't mean that I am. I'm simply recognizing
> that there is a possibility-- and that these are not absolute reality
> states.
This is a point I bring up in my dialogue. The possibility for error does
not mean one is in error. However, you seem to hold sense perception to the
standard of being corrigible because of such possibilities, while ignoring
that sense perception is not the only place the mind might err.
> And this sword cuts both ways: Having absolute certainty regarding a
mental
> state does not always translate into something useful in the external
> environment.
Here you hint, again, that somehow external reality matters. I think it
does, but I come from the Aristotelean-Objectivist tradition, which does not
deny sense perception. In fact, I see sense perception as the foundation --
in fact, the only possible foundation -- for knowledge. However, if sense
perception is flawed and flawed in the way you hint -- which leads,
ultimately, to skepticism -- then no statements about external reality
should matter. After all, its very existence, by your reckoning, is called
into question. Ergo, arguments about mental states being useful or about
them helping one to survive or even about the evolution of mind are thrown
similarly into doubt.
After all, you can't claim not to know external reality, then without
contradiction maintain the mind often gets it right. (I'm not saying you go
this far, but your statements lead me to believe you have no argument to
brake you from going that far.)
Daniel Ust
http://uweb.superlink.net/neptune/
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