From: Brent Allsop (allsop@fc.hp.com)
Date: Thu Mar 02 2000 - 16:44:33 MST
Max More <max@maxmore.com> posted:
> (Since I'm a functionalist, I'd agree that we could experience the
> same things with functionally-equivalent but physically different
> hardware.)
To me, talking about emotions is much to complex or "squishy"
or hard to pin down. I prefer something much simpler and more precise
like the color red, or the taste of salt.
Another advantage of these is we have, today, simple machines
that can resolve color far more accurately (and perceive much more of
the electromagnetic spectrum) than we can.
The reason I can't accept the "functionalist" position is that
it seams that the functionalist is arguing that the paint color
machine at the local hard ware store, since it is color wise, much
more than I am, color wise.
Often times the functionalists seems to try to pull the
argument back into the complexity, emotional, "squishy" stuff and
argues that since we do more stuff like "wiggle" more when we see red
while a paint machine doesn't do these kinds of things, the machine is
less than we are. But I think this is a categorical error and missing
the entire point of all this. Everyone seems sidtracked with all this
stuff that is completely unrelated to the real issue. I think the
color machine is, as far as this discussion is concerned, far more
"intelligent" or far more capable of "knowing" than we are.
Even more than this, I believe that all "wiggles", or all
other "emotional" differences can be functionally "modeled" or
"represented" with any sufficiently complex abstract representation.
So, in a way I am a functionalist. I will argue with anyone that a
paint machine, color wise, is more functional than we are, color wise.
But, I argue very strongly that, for the paint machine's
representations, that are abstract, it doesn't matter what they are
"like". But to me, my representation of "red" is most definitely like
something, and if you use any other physical phenomenon to represent
"red" knowledge, you can accomplish similar things functionally, but
it is most definitely not the same.
> What else do you think emotions are?
I think emotions are complex sets of qualia. I believe that
Scientific observation of "brain stuff" to date has only been
concerned with abstract "cause and effect" of the chemistry that is
going on. I.E. we're only interested in it's abstract "functional"
behavior. But this is entirely missing the whole point of what
consciousness, emotions... really are and what they are phenomenally
like.
Once we turn our science to start looking for more than just
the "function" of this electrochemical phenomenon inside our brain,
when we start looking for what it is like, that is when we will
discover what "emotions" really are.
The other part of this is being able to eff. What does
"ineffible" mean to a "functionalist"? To me, the important thing
will be when a color detecting machine can say: "Oh that's what red or
salty, or... is like". Since we will really know what red is, we will
know if it is lying or not. (Today's abstract machines would
obviously be lying since it would simply look up and produce the
response from some abstract table rather than honestly saying it is
really experiencing red and now knows what it is like.) I think that
when science finally discoverers what red is like and why it is like
that, this will give us the ability to engineer effing abilities. Do
any functionallist care about being able to eff qualia, emotions, and
so on and so forth? Rather than do this, Dennett and others seems to
just argue that they don't exist, and therefore it doesn't matter?
Just give the paint machine a few more "wiggles" or whatever and it
will be the same? This doesn't seem right to me.
> I'm curious since I'm currently discussing this very topic in two of
> my classes right now.
Cool, what classes are these?
Brent Allsop
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