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From: Matt Whitlock <bip@mattwhitlock.name>
To: Aaron Voisine <voisine@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 25 Sep 2014 22:16:43 -0400
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Cc: Bitcoin Development <bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net>
Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] SPV clients and relaying double spends
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Probably the first double-spend attempt (i.e., the second transaction to spend the same output(s) as another tx already in the mempool) would still need to be relayed. A simple "double-spend alert" wouldn't work because it could be forged. But after there have been two attempts to spend the same output, no further transactions spending that same output should be relayed, in order to prevent flooding the network.
On Thursday, 25 September 2014, at 7:12 pm, Aaron Voisine wrote:
> Something like that would be a great help for SPV clients that can't
> detect double spends on their own. (still limited of course to sybil
> attack concerns)
>
> Aaron Voisine
> breadwallet.com
>
>
> On Thu, Sep 25, 2014 at 7:07 PM, Matt Whitlock <bip@mattwhitlock.name> wrote:
> > What's to stop an attacker from broadcasting millions of spends of the same output(s) and overwhelming nodes with slower connections? Might it be a better strategy not to relay the actual transactions (after the first) but rather only propagate (once) some kind of double-spend alert?
> >
> >
> > On Thursday, 25 September 2014, at 7:02 pm, Aaron Voisine wrote:
> >> There was some discussion of having nodes relay double-spends in order
> >> to alert the network about double spend attempts.
> >>
> >> A lot more users will be using SPV wallets in the future, and one of
> >> the techniques SPV clients use to judge how likely a transaction is to
> >> be confirmed is if it propagates across the network. I wonder if and
> >> when double-spend relaying is introduced, if nodes should also send
> >> BIP61 reject messages or something along those lines to indicate which
> >> transactions those nodes believe to be invalid, but are relaying
> >> anyway.
> >>
> >> This would be subject to sybil attacks, as is monitoring propagation,
> >> however it does still increase the cost of performing a 0 confirmation
> >> double spend attack on an SPV client above just relaying double-spends
> >> without indicating if a node believes the transaction to be valid.
> >>
> >> Aaron Voisine
> >> breadwallet.com
> >
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