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From: Billy Tetrud <billy.tetrud@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 24 May 2021 15:52:51 -1000
Message-ID: <CAGpPWDY4KgNVEoMDAJkWReX4zUUjDuB5SwB0Ap6OU98fuK4DxA@mail.gmail.com>
To: Erik Aronesty <erik@q32.com>
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Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Opinion on proof of stake in future
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Is this <https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Proof_of_burn> the kind of proof of
burn you're talking about?

>   if i have a choice between two chains, one longer and one shorter, i
can only choose one... deterministically

What prevents you from attempting to mine block 553 on both chains?

> miners have a very strong, long-term, investment in the stability of the
chain.

Yes, but the same can be said of any coin, even ones that do have the
nothing at stake problem. This isn't sufficient tho because the chain is a
common good, and the tragedy of the commons holds for it.

> you burn them to be used at a future particular block height

This sounds exploitable. It seems like an attacker could simply focus all
their burns on a particular set of 6 blocks to double spend, minimizing
their cost of attack.

> i can imagine scenarios where large stakeholders can collude to punish
smaller stakeholders simply to drive them out of business, for example

Are you talking about a 51% attack? This is possible in any decentralized
cryptocurrency.


On Mon, May 24, 2021 at 11:49 AM Erik Aronesty <erik@q32.com> wrote:

> > > your burn investment is always "at stake", any redaction can result i=
n
> a loss-of-burn, because burns can be tied, precisely, to block-heights
> > I'm fuzzy on how proof of burn works.
>
> when you burn coins, you burn them to be used at a future particular
> block height: so if i'm burning for block 553, i can only use them to
> mine block 553.   if i have a choice between two chains, one longer
> and one shorter, i can only choose one... deterministically, for that
> burn: the chain with the height 553.   if we fix the "lead time" for
> burned coins to be weeks or even months in advance, miners have a very
> strong, long-term, investment in the stability of the chain.
>
> therefore there is no "nothing at stake" problem.   it's
> deterministic, so miners have no choice.  they can *only* choose the
> transactions that go into the block.  they cannot choose which chain
> to mine, and it's time-locked, so rollbacks and instability always
> hurt miners the most.
>
> the "punishment" systems of PoS are "weird at best", certainly
> unproven.   i can imagine scenarios where large stakeholders can
> collude to punish smaller stakeholders simply to drive them out of
> business, for example.   and then you have to put checks in place to
> prevent that, and more checks for those prevention system...
>
> in PoB, there is no complexity.  simpler systems like this are
> typically more secure.
>
> PoB also solves problems caused by "energy dependence", which could
> lead to state monopolies on mining (like the new Bitcoin Mining
> Council).   these consortiums, if state sanctioned, could become a
> source of censorship, for example.   Since PoB doesn't require you to
> have a live, well-connected node, it's harder to censor & harder to
> trace.
>
> Eliminating this weakness seems to be in the best interests of
> existing stakeholders
>
>
>
>
> On Mon, May 24, 2021 at 4:44 PM Billy Tetrud <billy.tetrud@gmail.com>
> wrote:
> >
> > >  proof of burn clearly solves this, since nothing is held online
> >
> > Well.. the coins to be burned need to be online when they're burned. Bu=
t
> yes, only a small fraction of the total coins need to be online.
> >
> > > your burn investment is always "at stake", any redaction can result i=
n
> a loss-of-burn, because burns can be tied, precisely, to block-heights
> >
> > So you're saying that if say someone tries to mine a block on a shorter
> chain, that requires them to send a transaction burning their coins, and
> that transaction could also be spent on the longest chain, which means
> their coins are burned even if the chain they tried to mine on doesn't wi=
n?
> I'm fuzzy on how proof of burn works.
> >
> > > proof of burn can be more secure than proof-of-stake
> >
> > FYI, proof of stake can be done without the "nothing at stake" problem.
> You can simply punish people who mint on shorter chains (by rewarding
> people who publish proofs of this happening on the main chain). In
> quorum-based PoS, you can punish people in the quorum that propose or sig=
n
> multiple blocks for the same height. The "nothing at stake" problem is a
> solved problem at this point for PoS.
> >
> >
> >
> > On Mon, May 24, 2021 at 3:47 AM Erik Aronesty <erik@q32.com> wrote:
> >>
> >> > I don't see a way to get around the conflicting requirement that the
> keys for large amounts of coins should be kept offline but those are
> exactly the coins we need online to make the scheme secure.
> >>
> >> proof of burn clearly solves this, since nothing is held online
> >>
> >> >  how does proof of burn solve the "nothing at stake" problem in your
> view?
> >>
> >> definition of nothing at stake: in the event of a fork, whether the
> >> fork is accidental or a malicious, the optimal strategy for any miner
> >> is to mine on every chain, so that the miner gets their reward no
> >> matter which fork wins.   indeed in proof-of-stake, the proofs are
> >> published on the very chains mines, so the incentive is magnified.
> >>
> >> in proof-of-burn, your burn investment is always "at stake", any
> >> redaction can result in a loss-of-burn, because burns can be tied,
> >> precisely, to block-heights
> >>
> >> as a result, miners no longer have an incentive to mine all chains
> >>
> >> in this way proof of burn can be more secure than proof-of-stake, and
> >> even more secure than proof of work
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> >
> >>
> >> On Sun, May 23, 2021 at 3:52 AM Lloyd Fournier via bitcoin-dev
> >> <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> >> >
> >> > Hi Billy,
> >> >
> >> > I was going to write a post which started by dismissing many of the
> weak arguments that are made against PoS made in this thread and elsewher=
e.
> >> > Although I don't agree with all your points you have done a decent
> job here so I'll focus on the second part: why I think Proof-of-Stake is
> inappropriate for a Bitcoin-like system.
> >> >
> >> > Proof of stake is not fit for purpose for a global settlement layer
> in a pure digital asset (i.e. "digital gold") which is what Bitcoin is
> trying to be.
> >> > PoS necessarily gives responsibilities to the holders of coins that
> they do not want and cannot handle.
> >> > In Bitcoin, large unsophisticated coin holders can put their coins i=
n
> cold storage without a second thought given to the health of the underlyi=
ng
> ledger.
> >> > As much as hardcore Bitcoiners try to convince them to run their own
> node, most don't, and that's perfectly acceptable.
> >> > At no point do their personal decisions affect the underlying
> consensus -- it only affects their personal security assurance (not that =
of
> the system itself).
> >> > In PoS systems this clean separation of responsibilities does not
> exist.
> >> >
> >> > I think that the more rigorously studied PoS protocols will work fin=
e
> within the security claims made in their papers.
> >> > People who believe that these protocols are destined for catastrophi=
c
> consensus failure are certainly in for a surprise.
> >> > But the devil is in the detail.
> >> > Let's look at what the implications of using the leading proof of
> stake protocols would have on Bitcoin:
> >> >
> >> > ### Proof of SquareSpace (Cardano, Polkdadot)
> >> >
> >> > Cardano is a UTXO based PoS coin based on Ouroboros Praos[3] with an
> inbuilt on-chain delegation system[5].
> >> > In these protocols, coin holders who do not want to run their node
> with their hot keys in it delegate it to a "Stake Pool".
> >> > I call the resulting system Proof-of-SquareSpace since most will
> choose a pool by looking around for one with a nice website and offering
> the largest share of the block reward.
> >> > On the surface this might sound no different than someone with an
> mining rig shopping around for a good mining pool but there are crucial
> differences:
> >> >
> >> > 1. The person making the decision is forced into it just because the=
y
> own the currency -- someone with a mining rig has purchased it with the
> intent to make profit by participating in consensus.
> >> >
> >> > 2. When you join a mining pool your systems are very much still
> online. You are just partaking in a pool to reduce your profit variance.
> You still see every block that you help create and *you never help create=
 a
> block without seeing it first*.
> >> >
> >> > 3. If by SquareSpace sybil attack you gain a dishonest majority and
> start censoring transactions how are the users meant to redelegate their
> stake to honest pools?
> >> > I guess they can just send a transaction delegating to another
> pool...oh wait I guess that might be censored too! This seems really real=
ly
> bad.
> >> > In Bitcoin, miners can just join a different pool at a whim. There i=
s
> nothing the attacker can do to stop them. A temporary dishonest majority
> heals relatively well.
> >> >
> >> > There is another severe disadvantage to this on-chain delegation
> system: every UTXO must indicate which staking account this UTXO belongs =
to
> so the appropriate share of block rewards can be transferred there.
> >> > Being able to associate every UTXO to an account ruins one of the
> main privacy advantages of the UTXO model.
> >> > It also grows the size of the blockchain significantly.
> >> >
> >> > ### "Pure" proof of stake (Algorand)
> >> >
> >> > Algorand's[4] approach is to only allow online stake to participate
> in the protocol.
> >> > Theoretically, This means that keys holding funds have to be online
> in order for them to author blocks when they are chosen.
> >> > Of course in reality no one wants to keep their coin holding keys
> online so in Alogorand you can authorize a set of "participation keys"[1]
> that will be used to create blocks on your coin holding key's behalf.
> >> > Hopefully you've spotted the problem.
> >> > You can send your participation keys to any malicious party with a
> nice website (see random example [2]) offering you a good return.
> >> > Damn it's still Proof-of-SquareSpace!
> >> > The minor advantage is that at least the participation keys expire
> after a certain amount of time so eventually the SquareSpace attacker wil=
l
> lose their hold on consensus.
> >> > Importantly there is also less junk on the blockchain because the
> participation keys are delegated off-chain and so are not making as much =
of
> a mess.
> >> >
> >> > ### Conclusion
> >> >
> >> > I don't see a way to get around the conflicting requirement that the
> keys for large amounts of coins should be kept offline but those are
> exactly the coins we need online to make the scheme secure.
> >> > If we allow delegation then we open up a new social attack surface
> and it degenerates to Proof-of-SquareSpace.
> >> >
> >> > For a "digital gold" like system like Bitcoin we optimize for
> simplicity and desperately want to avoid extraneous responsibilities for
> the holder of the coin.
> >> > After all, gold is an inert element on the periodic table that
> doesn't confer responsibilities on the holder to maintain the quality of
> all the other bars of gold out there.
> >> > Bitcoin feels like this too and in many ways is more inert and
> beautifully boring than gold.
> >> > For Bitcoin to succeed I think we need to keep it that way and
> Proof-of-Stake makes everything a bit too exciting.
> >> >
> >> > I suppose in the end the market will decide what is real digital gol=
d
> and whether these bad technical trade offs are worth being able to say it
> uses less electricity. It goes without saying that making bad technical
> decisions to appease the current political climate is an anathema to
> Bitcoin.
> >> >
> >> > Would be interested to know if you or others think differently on
> these points.
> >> >
> >> > [1]:
> https://developer.algorand.org/docs/run-a-node/participate/generate_keys/
> >> > [2]: https://staking.staked.us/algorand-staking
> >> > [3]: https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/573.pdf
> >> > [4]:
> https://algorandcom.cdn.prismic.io/algorandcom%2Fece77f38-75b3-44de-bc7f-=
805f0e53a8d9_theoretical.pdf
> >> > [5]:
> https://hydra.iohk.io/build/790053/download/1/delegation_design_spec.pdf
> >> >
> >> > Cheers,
> >> >
> >> > LL
> >> >
> >> > On Fri, 21 May 2021 at 19:21, Billy Tetrud via bitcoin-dev <
> bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> >> >>
> >> >> I think there is a lot of misinformation and bias against Proof of
> Stake. Yes there have been lots of shady coins that use insecure PoS
> mechanisms. Yes there have been massive issues with distribution of PoS
> coins (of course there have also been massive issues with PoW coins as
> well). However, I want to remind everyone that there is a difference
> between "proved to be impossible" and "have not achieved recognized succe=
ss
> yet". Most of the arguments levied against PoS are out of date or rely on
> unproven assumptions or extrapolation from the analysis of a particular P=
oS
> system. I certainly don't think we should experiment with bitcoin by
> switching to PoS, but from my research, it seems very likely that there i=
s
> a proof of stake consensus protocol we could build that has substantially
> higher security (cost / capital required to execute an attack) while at t=
he
> same time costing far less resources (which do translate to fees on the
> network) *without* compromising any of the critical security properties
> bitcoin relies on. I think the critical piece of this is the disagreement=
s
> around hardcoded checkpoints, which is a critical piece solving attacks
> that could be levied on a PoS chain, and how that does (or doesn't) affec=
t
> the security model.
> >> >>
> >> >> @Eric Your proof of stake fallacy seems to be saying that PoS is
> worse when a 51% attack happens. While I agree, I think that line of
> thinking omits important facts:
> >> >> * The capital required to 51% attack a PoS chain can be made
> substantially greater than on a PoS chain.
> >> >> * The capital the attacker stands to lose can be substantially
> greater as well if the attack is successful.
> >> >> * The effectiveness of paying miners to raise the honest fraction o=
f
> miners above 50% may be quite bad.
> >> >> * Allowing a 51% attack is already unacceptable. It should be
> considered whether what happens in the case of a 51% may not be
> significantly different. The currency would likely be critically damaged =
in
> a 51% attack regardless of consensus mechanism.
> >> >>
> >> >> > Proof-of-stake tends towards oligopolistic control
> >> >>
> >> >> People repeat this often, but the facts support this. There is no
> centralization pressure in any proof of stake mechanism that I'm aware of=
.
> IE if you have 10 times as much coin that you use to mint blocks, you
> should expect to earn 10x as much minting revenue - not more than 10x. By
> contrast, proof of work does in fact have clear centralization pressure -
> this is not disputed. Our goal in relation to that is to ensure that the
> centralization pressure remains insignifiant. Proof of work also clearly
> has a lot more barriers to entry than any proof of stake system does. Bot=
h
> of these mean the tendency towards oligopolistic control is worse for PoW=
.
> >> >>
> >> >> > Energy usage, in-and-of-itself, is nothing to be ashamed of!!
> >> >>
> >> >> I certainly agree. Bitcoin's energy usage at the moment is I think
> quite warranted. However, the question is: can we do substantially better=
.
> I think if we can, we probably should... eventually.
> >> >>
> >> >> > Proof of Stake is only resilient to =E2=85=93 of the network demo=
nstrating
> a Byzantine Fault, whilst Proof of Work is resilient up to the =C2=BD thr=
eshold
> >> >>
> >> >> I see no mention of this in the pos.pdf you linked to. I'm not awar=
e
> of any proof that all PoS systems have a failure threshold of 1/3. I know
> that staking systems like Casper do in fact have that 1/3 requirement.
> However there are PoS designs that should exceed that up to nearly 50% as
> far as I'm aware. Proof of work is not in fact resilient up to the 1/2
> threshold in the way you would think. IE, if 100% of miners are currently
> honest and have a collective 100 exahashes/s hashpower, an attacker does
> not need to obtain 100 exahashes/s, but actually only needs to accumulate
> 50 exahashes/s. This is because as the attacker accumulates hashpower, it
> drives honest miners out of the market as the difficulty increases to
> beyond what is economically sustainable. Also, its been shown that the be=
st
> proof of work can do is require an attacker to obtain 33% of the hashpowe=
r
> because of the selfish mining attack discussed in depth in this paper:
> https://arxiv.org/abs/1311.0243. Together, both of these things reduce
> PoW's security by a factor of about 83% (1 - 50%*33%).
> >> >>
> >> >>  > Proof of Stake requires other trade-offs which are incompatible
> with Bitcoin's objective (to be a trustless digital cash) =E2=80=94 speci=
fically
> the famous "security vs. liveness" guarantee
> >> >>
> >> >> Do you have a good source that talks about why you think proof of
> stake cannot be used for a trustless digital cash?
> >> >>
> >> >> > You cannot gain tokens without someone choosing to give up those
> coins - a form of permission.
> >> >>
> >> >> This is not a practical constraint. Just like in mining, some nodes
> may reject you, but there will likely be more that will accept you, some
> sellers may reject you, but most would accept your money as payment for
> bitcoins. I don't think requiring the "permission" of one of millions of
> people in the market can be reasonably considered a "permissioned currenc=
y".
> >> >>
> >> >> > 2. Proof of stake must have a trusted means of timestamping to
> regulate overproduction of blocks
> >> >>
> >> >> Both PoW and PoS could mine/mint blocks twice as fast if everyone
> agreed to double their clock speeds. Both systems rely on an honest
> majority sticking to standard time.
> >> >>
> >> >>
> >> >> On Wed, May 19, 2021 at 5:32 AM Michael Dubrovsky via bitcoin-dev <
> bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> >> >>>
> >> >>> Ah sorry, I didn't realize this was, in fact, a different thread! =
:)
> >> >>>
> >> >>> On Wed, May 19, 2021 at 10:07 AM Michael Dubrovsky <mike@powx.org>
> wrote:
> >> >>>>
> >> >>>> Folks, I suggest we keep the discussion to PoW, oPoW, and the BIP
> itself. PoS, VDFs, and so on are interesting but I guess there are other
> threads going on these topics already where they would be relevant.
> >> >>>>
> >> >>>> Also, it's important to distinguish between oPoW and these other
> "alternatives" to Hashcash. oPoW is a true Proof of Work that doesn't alt=
er
> the core game theory or security assumptions of Hashcash and actually
> contains SHA (can be SHA3, SHA256, etc hash is interchangeable).
> >> >>>>
> >> >>>> Cheers,
> >> >>>> Mike
> >> >>>>
> >> >>>> On Tue, May 18, 2021 at 4:55 PM Erik Aronesty via bitcoin-dev <
> bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> >> >>>>>
> >> >>>>> 1. i never suggested vdf's to replace pow.
> >> >>>>>
> >> >>>>> 2. my suggestion was specifically *in the context of* a working
> >> >>>>> proof-of-burn protocol
> >> >>>>>
> >> >>>>> - vdfs used only for timing (not block height)
> >> >>>>> - blind-burned coins of a specific age used to replace proof of
> work
> >> >>>>> - the required "work" per block would simply be a competition to
> >> >>>>> acquire rewards, and so miners would have to burn coins, well in
> >> >>>>> advance, and hope that their burned coins got rewarded in some f=
ar
> >> >>>>> future
> >> >>>>> - the point of burned coins is to mimic, in every meaningful way=
,
> the
> >> >>>>> value gained from proof of work... without some of the security
> >> >>>>> drawbacks
> >> >>>>> - the miner risks losing all of his burned coins (like all miner=
s
> risk
> >> >>>>> losing their work in each block)
> >> >>>>> - new burns can't be used
> >> >>>>> - old burns age out (like ASICs do)
> >> >>>>> - other requirements on burns might be needed to properly mirror
> the
> >> >>>>> properties of PoW and the incentives Bitcoin uses to mine
> honestly.
> >> >>>>>
> >> >>>>> 3. i do believe it is *possible* that a "burned coin + vdf syste=
m"
> >> >>>>> might be more secure in the long run, and that if the entire spa=
ce
> >> >>>>> agreed that such an endeavor was worthwhile, a test net could be
> spun
> >> >>>>> up, and a hard-fork could be initiated.
> >> >>>>>
> >> >>>>> 4. i would never suggest such a thing unless i believed it was
> >> >>>>> possible that consensus was possible.  so no, this is not an "al=
t
> >> >>>>> coin"
> >> >>>>>
> >> >>>>> On Tue, May 18, 2021 at 10:02 AM Zac Greenwood <zachgrw@gmail.co=
m>
> wrote:
> >> >>>>> >
> >> >>>>> > Hi ZmnSCPxj,
> >> >>>>> >
> >> >>>>> > Please note that I am not suggesting VDFs as a means to save
> energy, but solely as a means to make the time between blocks more consta=
nt.
> >> >>>>> >
> >> >>>>> > Zac
> >> >>>>> >
> >> >>>>> >
> >> >>>>> > On Tue, 18 May 2021 at 12:42, ZmnSCPxj <ZmnSCPxj@protonmail.co=
m>
> wrote:
> >> >>>>> >>
> >> >>>>> >> Good morning Zac,
> >> >>>>> >>
> >> >>>>> >> > VDFs might enable more constant block times, for instance b=
y
> having a two-step PoW:
> >> >>>>> >> >
> >> >>>>> >> > 1. Use a VDF that takes say 9 minutes to resolve (VDF being
> subject to difficulty adjustments similar to the as-is). As per the
> property of VDFs, miners are able show proof of work.
> >> >>>>> >> >
> >> >>>>> >> > 2. Use current PoW mechanism with lower difficulty so
> finding a block takes 1 minute on average, again subject to as-is
> difficulty adjustments.
> >> >>>>> >> >
> >> >>>>> >> > As a result, variation in block times will be greatly
> reduced.
> >> >>>>> >>
> >> >>>>> >> As I understand it, another weakness of VDFs is that they are
> not inherently progress-free (their sequential nature prevents that; they
> are inherently progress-requiring).
> >> >>>>> >>
> >> >>>>> >> Thus, a miner which focuses on improving the amount of energy
> that it can pump into the VDF circuitry (by overclocking and freezing the
> circuitry), could potentially get into a winner-takes-all situation,
> possibly leading to even *worse* competition and even *more* energy
> consumption.
> >> >>>>> >> After all, if you can start mining 0.1s faster than the
> competition, that is a 0.1s advantage where *only you* can mine *in the
> entire world*.
> >> >>>>> >>
> >> >>>>> >> Regards,
> >> >>>>> >> ZmnSCPxj
> >> >>>>> _______________________________________________
> >> >>>>> bitcoin-dev mailing list
> >> >>>>> bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org
> >> >>>>> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
> >> >>>>
> >> >>>>
> >> >>>>
> >> >>>> --
> >> >>>> Michael Dubrovsky
> >> >>>> Founder; PoWx
> >> >>>> www.PoWx.org
> >> >>>
> >> >>>
> >> >>>
> >> >>> --
> >> >>> Michael Dubrovsky
> >> >>> Founder; PoWx
> >> >>> www.PoWx.org
> >> >>> _______________________________________________
> >> >>> bitcoin-dev mailing list
> >> >>> bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org
> >> >>> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
> >> >>
> >> >> _______________________________________________
> >> >> bitcoin-dev mailing list
> >> >> bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org
> >> >> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
> >> >
> >> > _______________________________________________
> >> > bitcoin-dev mailing list
> >> > bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org
> >> > https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
>

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div>Is <a href=3D"https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Proof_of_bur=
n">this</a> the kind of proof of burn you&#39;re talking about?</div><div><=
br></div>&gt;=C2=A0

=C2=A0if i have a choice between two chains, one longer and one shorter, i =
can only choose one... deterministically<div><br></div><div>What prevents y=
ou from attempting to mine block 553 on both chains?=C2=A0</div><div><br></=
div><div>&gt; miners have a very strong, long-term, investment in the stabi=
lity of the chain.</div><div><br></div><div>Yes, but the same can be said o=
f any coin, even ones that do have the nothing at stake problem. This isn&#=
39;t sufficient tho because the chain is a common good, and the tragedy=C2=
=A0of the commons holds for it.=C2=A0</div><div><br></div><div>&gt; you bur=
n them to be used at a future particular block height</div><div><br></div><=
div>This sounds exploitable. It seems like an attacker could simply focus a=
ll their burns on a particular set of 6 blocks to double spend, minimizing =
their cost of attack.=C2=A0</div><div><br></div><div>&gt; i can imagine sce=
narios where large stakeholders can collude to punish smaller stakeholders =
simply to drive them out of business, for example</div><div><br></div><div>=
Are you talking about a 51% attack? This is possible in any decentralized c=
ryptocurrency.=C2=A0</div><div><br></div></div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quot=
e"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Mon, May 24, 2021 at 11:49 AM E=
rik Aronesty &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:erik@q32.com">erik@q32.com</a>&gt; wrote=
:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.=
8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">&gt; &gt; your=
 burn investment is always &quot;at stake&quot;, any redaction can result i=
n a loss-of-burn, because burns can be tied, precisely, to block-heights<br=
>
&gt; I&#39;m fuzzy on how proof of burn works.<br>
<br>
when you burn coins, you burn them to be used at a future particular<br>
block height: so if i&#39;m burning for block 553, i can only use them to<b=
r>
mine block 553.=C2=A0 =C2=A0if i have a choice between two chains, one long=
er<br>
and one shorter, i can only choose one... deterministically, for that<br>
burn: the chain with the height 553.=C2=A0 =C2=A0if we fix the &quot;lead t=
ime&quot; for<br>
burned coins to be weeks or even months in advance, miners have a very<br>
strong, long-term, investment in the stability of the chain.<br>
<br>
therefore there is no &quot;nothing at stake&quot; problem.=C2=A0 =C2=A0it&=
#39;s<br>
deterministic, so miners have no choice.=C2=A0 they can *only* choose the<b=
r>
transactions that go into the block.=C2=A0 they cannot choose which chain<b=
r>
to mine, and it&#39;s time-locked, so rollbacks and instability always<br>
hurt miners the most.<br>
<br>
the &quot;punishment&quot; systems of PoS are &quot;weird at best&quot;, ce=
rtainly<br>
unproven.=C2=A0 =C2=A0i can imagine scenarios where large stakeholders can<=
br>
collude to punish smaller stakeholders simply to drive them out of<br>
business, for example.=C2=A0 =C2=A0and then you have to put checks in place=
 to<br>
prevent that, and more checks for those prevention system...<br>
<br>
in PoB, there is no complexity.=C2=A0 simpler systems like this are<br>
typically more secure.<br>
<br>
PoB also solves problems caused by &quot;energy dependence&quot;, which cou=
ld<br>
lead to state monopolies on mining (like the new Bitcoin Mining<br>
Council).=C2=A0 =C2=A0these consortiums, if state sanctioned, could become =
a<br>
source of censorship, for example.=C2=A0 =C2=A0Since PoB doesn&#39;t requir=
e you to<br>
have a live, well-connected node, it&#39;s harder to censor &amp; harder to=
<br>
trace.<br>
<br>
Eliminating this weakness seems to be in the best interests of<br>
existing stakeholders<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
On Mon, May 24, 2021 at 4:44 PM Billy Tetrud &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:billy.te=
trud@gmail.com" target=3D"_blank">billy.tetrud@gmail.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; &gt;=C2=A0 proof of burn clearly solves this, since nothing is held on=
line<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Well.. the coins to be burned need to be online when they&#39;re burne=
d. But yes, only a small fraction of the total coins need to be online.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; your burn investment is always &quot;at stake&quot;, any redactio=
n can result in a loss-of-burn, because burns can be tied, precisely, to bl=
ock-heights<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; So you&#39;re saying that if say someone tries to mine a block on a sh=
orter chain, that requires them to send a transaction burning their coins, =
and that transaction could also be spent on the longest chain, which means =
their coins are burned even if the chain they tried to mine on doesn&#39;t =
win? I&#39;m fuzzy on how proof of burn works.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; proof of burn can be more secure than proof-of-stake<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; FYI, proof of stake can be done without the &quot;nothing at stake&quo=
t; problem. You can simply punish people who mint on shorter chains (by rew=
arding people who publish proofs of this happening on the main chain). In q=
uorum-based PoS, you can punish people in the quorum that propose or sign m=
ultiple blocks for the same height. The &quot;nothing at stake&quot; proble=
m is a solved problem at this point for PoS.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; On Mon, May 24, 2021 at 3:47 AM Erik Aronesty &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:er=
ik@q32.com" target=3D"_blank">erik@q32.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt; I don&#39;t see a way to get around the conflicting requireme=
nt that the keys for large amounts of coins should be kept offline but thos=
e are exactly the coins we need online to make the scheme secure.<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; proof of burn clearly solves this, since nothing is held online<br=
>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;=C2=A0 how does proof of burn solve the &quot;nothing at stake=
&quot; problem in your view?<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; definition of nothing at stake: in the event of a fork, whether th=
e<br>
&gt;&gt; fork is accidental or a malicious, the optimal strategy for any mi=
ner<br>
&gt;&gt; is to mine on every chain, so that the miner gets their reward no<=
br>
&gt;&gt; matter which fork wins.=C2=A0 =C2=A0indeed in proof-of-stake, the =
proofs are<br>
&gt;&gt; published on the very chains mines, so the incentive is magnified.=
<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; in proof-of-burn, your burn investment is always &quot;at stake&qu=
ot;, any<br>
&gt;&gt; redaction can result in a loss-of-burn, because burns can be tied,=
<br>
&gt;&gt; precisely, to block-heights<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; as a result, miners no longer have an incentive to mine all chains=
<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; in this way proof of burn can be more secure than proof-of-stake, =
and<br>
&gt;&gt; even more secure than proof of work<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; On Sun, May 23, 2021 at 3:52 AM Lloyd Fournier via bitcoin-dev<br>
&gt;&gt; &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org" targe=
t=3D"_blank">bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt; Hi Billy,<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt; I was going to write a post which started by dismissing many =
of the weak arguments that are made against PoS made in this thread and els=
ewhere.<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt; Although I don&#39;t agree with all your points you have done=
 a decent job here so I&#39;ll focus on the second part: why I think Proof-=
of-Stake is inappropriate for a Bitcoin-like system.<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt; Proof of stake is not fit for purpose for a global settlement=
 layer in a pure digital asset (i.e. &quot;digital gold&quot;) which is wha=
t Bitcoin is trying to be.<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt; PoS necessarily gives responsibilities to the holders of coin=
s that they do not want and cannot handle.<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt; In Bitcoin, large unsophisticated coin holders can put their =
coins in cold storage without a second thought given to the health of the u=
nderlying ledger.<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt; As much as hardcore Bitcoiners try to convince them to run th=
eir own node, most don&#39;t, and that&#39;s perfectly acceptable.<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt; At no point do their personal decisions affect the underlying=
 consensus -- it only affects their personal security assurance (not that o=
f the system itself).<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt; In PoS systems this clean separation of responsibilities does=
 not exist.<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt; I think that the more rigorously studied PoS protocols will w=
ork fine within the security claims made in their papers.<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt; People who believe that these protocols are destined for cata=
strophic consensus failure are certainly in for a surprise.<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt; But the devil is in the detail.<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt; Let&#39;s look at what the implications of using the leading =
proof of stake protocols would have on Bitcoin:<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt; ### Proof of SquareSpace (Cardano, Polkdadot)<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt; Cardano is a UTXO based PoS coin based on Ouroboros Praos[3] =
with an inbuilt on-chain delegation system[5].<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt; In these protocols, coin holders who do not want to run their=
 node with their hot keys in it delegate it to a &quot;Stake Pool&quot;.<br=
>
&gt;&gt; &gt; I call the resulting system Proof-of-SquareSpace since most w=
ill choose a pool by looking around for one with a nice website and offerin=
g the largest share of the block reward.<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt; On the surface this might sound no different than someone wit=
h an mining rig shopping around for a good mining pool but there are crucia=
l differences:<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt; 1. The person making the decision is forced into it just beca=
use they own the currency -- someone with a mining rig has purchased it wit=
h the intent to make profit by participating in consensus.<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt; 2. When you join a mining pool your systems are very much sti=
ll online. You are just partaking in a pool to reduce your profit variance.=
 You still see every block that you help create and *you never help create =
a block without seeing it first*.<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt; 3. If by SquareSpace sybil attack you gain a dishonest majori=
ty and start censoring transactions how are the users meant to redelegate t=
heir stake to honest pools?<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt; I guess they can just send a transaction delegating to anothe=
r pool...oh wait I guess that might be censored too! This seems really real=
ly bad.<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt; In Bitcoin, miners can just join a different pool at a whim. =
There is nothing the attacker can do to stop them. A temporary dishonest ma=
jority heals relatively well.<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt; There is another severe disadvantage to this on-chain delegat=
ion system: every UTXO must indicate which staking account this UTXO belong=
s to so the appropriate share of block rewards can be transferred there.<br=
>
&gt;&gt; &gt; Being able to associate every UTXO to an account ruins one of=
 the main privacy advantages of the UTXO model.<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt; It also grows the size of the blockchain significantly.<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt; ### &quot;Pure&quot; proof of stake (Algorand)<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt; Algorand&#39;s[4] approach is to only allow online stake to p=
articipate in the protocol.<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt; Theoretically, This means that keys holding funds have to be =
online in order for them to author blocks when they are chosen.<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt; Of course in reality no one wants to keep their coin holding =
keys online so in Alogorand you can authorize a set of &quot;participation =
keys&quot;[1] that will be used to create blocks on your coin holding key&#=
39;s behalf.<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt; Hopefully you&#39;ve spotted the problem.<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt; You can send your participation keys to any malicious party w=
ith a nice website (see random example [2]) offering you a good return.<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt; Damn it&#39;s still Proof-of-SquareSpace!<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt; The minor advantage is that at least the participation keys e=
xpire after a certain amount of time so eventually the SquareSpace attacker=
 will lose their hold on consensus.<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt; Importantly there is also less junk on the blockchain because=
 the participation keys are delegated off-chain and so are not making as mu=
ch of a mess.<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt; ### Conclusion<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt; I don&#39;t see a way to get around the conflicting requireme=
nt that the keys for large amounts of coins should be kept offline but thos=
e are exactly the coins we need online to make the scheme secure.<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt; If we allow delegation then we open up a new social attack su=
rface and it degenerates to Proof-of-SquareSpace.<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt; For a &quot;digital gold&quot; like system like Bitcoin we op=
timize for simplicity and desperately want to avoid extraneous responsibili=
ties for the holder of the coin.<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt; After all, gold is an inert element on the periodic table tha=
t doesn&#39;t confer responsibilities on the holder to maintain the quality=
 of all the other bars of gold out there.<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt; Bitcoin feels like this too and in many ways is more inert an=
d beautifully boring than gold.<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt; For Bitcoin to succeed I think we need to keep it that way an=
d Proof-of-Stake makes everything a bit too exciting.<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt; I suppose in the end the market will decide what is real digi=
tal gold and whether these bad technical trade offs are worth being able to=
 say it uses less electricity. It goes without saying that making bad techn=
ical decisions to appease the current political climate is an anathema to B=
itcoin.<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt; Would be interested to know if you or others think differentl=
y on these points.<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt; [1]: <a href=3D"https://developer.algorand.org/docs/run-a-nod=
e/participate/generate_keys/" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://=
developer.algorand.org/docs/run-a-node/participate/generate_keys/</a><br>
&gt;&gt; &gt; [2]: <a href=3D"https://staking.staked.us/algorand-staking" r=
el=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://staking.staked.us/algorand-stak=
ing</a><br>
&gt;&gt; &gt; [3]: <a href=3D"https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/573.pdf" rel=3D"=
noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/573.pdf</a><br>
&gt;&gt; &gt; [4]: <a href=3D"https://algorandcom.cdn.prismic.io/algorandco=
m%2Fece77f38-75b3-44de-bc7f-805f0e53a8d9_theoretical.pdf" rel=3D"noreferrer=
" target=3D"_blank">https://algorandcom.cdn.prismic.io/algorandcom%2Fece77f=
38-75b3-44de-bc7f-805f0e53a8d9_theoretical.pdf</a><br>
&gt;&gt; &gt; [5]: <a href=3D"https://hydra.iohk.io/build/790053/download/1=
/delegation_design_spec.pdf" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://h=
ydra.iohk.io/build/790053/download/1/delegation_design_spec.pdf</a><br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt; Cheers,<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt; LL<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt; On Fri, 21 May 2021 at 19:21, Billy Tetrud via bitcoin-dev &l=
t;<a href=3D"mailto:bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org" target=3D"_blank=
">bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt; I think there is a lot of misinformation and bias against=
 Proof of Stake. Yes there have been lots of shady coins that use insecure =
PoS mechanisms. Yes there have been massive issues with distribution of PoS=
 coins (of course there have also been massive issues with PoW coins as wel=
l). However, I want to remind everyone that there is a difference between &=
quot;proved to be impossible&quot; and &quot;have not achieved recognized s=
uccess yet&quot;. Most of the arguments levied against PoS are out of date =
or rely on unproven assumptions or extrapolation from the analysis of a par=
ticular PoS system. I certainly don&#39;t think we should experiment with b=
itcoin by switching to PoS, but from my research, it seems very likely that=
 there is a proof of stake consensus protocol we could build that has subst=
antially higher security (cost / capital required to execute an attack) whi=
le at the same time costing far less resources (which do translate to fees =
on the network) *without* compromising any of the critical security propert=
ies bitcoin relies on. I think the critical piece of this is the disagreeme=
nts around hardcoded checkpoints, which is a critical piece solving attacks=
 that could be levied on a PoS chain, and how that does (or doesn&#39;t) af=
fect the security model.<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt; @Eric Your proof of stake fallacy seems to be saying that=
 PoS is worse when a 51% attack happens. While I agree, I think that line o=
f thinking omits important facts:<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt; * The capital required to 51% attack a PoS chain can be m=
ade substantially greater than on a PoS chain.<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt; * The capital the attacker stands to lose can be substant=
ially greater as well if the attack is successful.<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt; * The effectiveness of paying miners to raise the honest =
fraction of miners above 50% may be quite bad.<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt; * Allowing a 51% attack is already unacceptable. It shoul=
d be considered whether what happens in the case of a 51% may not be signif=
icantly different. The currency would likely be critically damaged in a 51%=
 attack regardless of consensus mechanism.<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt; &gt; Proof-of-stake tends towards oligopolistic control<b=
r>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt; People repeat this often, but the facts support this. The=
re is no centralization pressure in any proof of stake mechanism that I&#39=
;m aware of. IE if you have 10 times as much coin that you use to mint bloc=
ks, you should expect to earn 10x as much minting revenue - not more than 1=
0x. By contrast, proof of work does in fact have clear centralization press=
ure - this is not disputed. Our goal in relation to that is to ensure that =
the centralization pressure remains insignifiant. Proof of work also clearl=
y has a lot more barriers to entry than any proof of stake system does. Bot=
h of these mean the tendency towards oligopolistic control is worse for PoW=
.<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt; &gt; Energy usage, in-and-of-itself, is nothing to be ash=
amed of!!<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt; I certainly agree. Bitcoin&#39;s energy usage at the mome=
nt is I think quite warranted. However, the question is: can we do substant=
ially better. I think if we can, we probably should... eventually.<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt; &gt; Proof of Stake is only resilient to =E2=85=93 of the=
 network demonstrating a Byzantine Fault, whilst Proof of Work is resilient=
 up to the =C2=BD threshold<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt; I see no mention of this in the pos.pdf you linked to. I&=
#39;m not aware of any proof that all PoS systems have a failure threshold =
of 1/3. I know that staking systems like Casper do in fact have that 1/3 re=
quirement. However there are PoS designs that should exceed that up to near=
ly 50% as far as I&#39;m aware. Proof of work is not in fact resilient up t=
o the 1/2 threshold in the way you would think. IE, if 100% of miners are c=
urrently honest and have a collective 100 exahashes/s hashpower, an attacke=
r does not need to obtain 100 exahashes/s, but actually only needs to accum=
ulate 50 exahashes/s. This is because as the attacker accumulates hashpower=
, it drives honest miners out of the market as the difficulty increases to =
beyond what is economically sustainable. Also, its been shown that the best=
 proof of work can do is require an attacker to obtain 33% of the hashpower=
 because of the selfish mining attack discussed in depth in this paper: <a =
href=3D"https://arxiv.org/abs/1311.0243" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blan=
k">https://arxiv.org/abs/1311.0243</a>. Together, both of these things redu=
ce PoW&#39;s security by a factor of about 83% (1 - 50%*33%).<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt;=C2=A0 &gt; Proof of Stake requires other trade-offs which=
 are incompatible with Bitcoin&#39;s objective (to be a trustless digital c=
ash) =E2=80=94 specifically the famous &quot;security vs. liveness&quot; gu=
arantee<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt; Do you have a good source that talks about why you think =
proof of stake cannot be used for a trustless digital cash?<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt; &gt; You cannot gain tokens without someone choosing to g=
ive up those coins - a form of permission.<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt; This is not a practical constraint. Just like in mining, =
some nodes may reject you, but there will likely be more that will accept y=
ou, some sellers may reject you, but most would accept your money as paymen=
t for bitcoins. I don&#39;t think requiring the &quot;permission&quot; of o=
ne of millions of people in the market can be reasonably considered a &quot=
;permissioned currency&quot;.<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt; &gt; 2. Proof of stake must have a trusted means of times=
tamping to regulate overproduction of blocks<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt; Both PoW and PoS could mine/mint blocks twice as fast if =
everyone agreed to double their clock speeds. Both systems rely on an hones=
t majority sticking to standard time.<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt; On Wed, May 19, 2021 at 5:32 AM Michael Dubrovsky via bit=
coin-dev &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org" targe=
t=3D"_blank">bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt; Ah sorry, I didn&#39;t realize this was, in fact, a d=
ifferent thread! :)<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt; On Wed, May 19, 2021 at 10:07 AM Michael Dubrovsky &l=
t;<a href=3D"mailto:mike@powx.org" target=3D"_blank">mike@powx.org</a>&gt; =
wrote:<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; Folks, I suggest we keep the discussion to PoW, o=
PoW, and the BIP itself. PoS, VDFs, and so on are interesting but I guess t=
here are other threads going on these topics already where they would be re=
levant.<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; Also, it&#39;s important to distinguish between o=
PoW and these other &quot;alternatives&quot; to Hashcash. oPoW is a true Pr=
oof of Work that doesn&#39;t alter the core game theory or security assumpt=
ions of Hashcash and actually contains SHA (can be SHA3, SHA256, etc hash i=
s interchangeable).<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; Cheers,<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; Mike<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; On Tue, May 18, 2021 at 4:55 PM Erik Aronesty via=
 bitcoin-dev &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org" t=
arget=3D"_blank">bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; 1. i never suggested vdf&#39;s to replace pow=
.<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; 2. my suggestion was specifically *in the con=
text of* a working<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; proof-of-burn protocol<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; - vdfs used only for timing (not block height=
)<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; - blind-burned coins of a specific age used t=
o replace proof of work<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; - the required &quot;work&quot; per block wou=
ld simply be a competition to<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; acquire rewards, and so miners would have to =
burn coins, well in<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; advance, and hope that their burned coins got=
 rewarded in some far<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; future<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; - the point of burned coins is to mimic, in e=
very meaningful way, the<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; value gained from proof of work... without so=
me of the security<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; drawbacks<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; - the miner risks losing all of his burned co=
ins (like all miners risk<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; losing their work in each block)<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; - new burns can&#39;t be used<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; - old burns age out (like ASICs do)<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; - other requirements on burns might be needed=
 to properly mirror the<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; properties of PoW and the incentives Bitcoin =
uses to mine honestly.<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; 3. i do believe it is *possible* that a &quot=
;burned coin + vdf system&quot;<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; might be more secure in the long run, and tha=
t if the entire space<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; agreed that such an endeavor was worthwhile, =
a test net could be spun<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; up, and a hard-fork could be initiated.<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; 4. i would never suggest such a thing unless =
i believed it was<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; possible that consensus was possible.=C2=A0 s=
o no, this is not an &quot;alt<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; coin&quot;<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; On Tue, May 18, 2021 at 10:02 AM Zac Greenwoo=
d &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:zachgrw@gmail.com" target=3D"_blank">zachgrw@gmail.=
com</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; Hi ZmnSCPxj,<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; Please note that I am not suggesting VDF=
s as a means to save energy, but solely as a means to make the time between=
 blocks more constant.<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; Zac<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; On Tue, 18 May 2021 at 12:42, ZmnSCPxj &=
lt;<a href=3D"mailto:ZmnSCPxj@protonmail.com" target=3D"_blank">ZmnSCPxj@pr=
otonmail.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt; Good morning Zac,<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt; &gt; VDFs might enable more constant=
 block times, for instance by having a two-step PoW:<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt; &gt; 1. Use a VDF that takes say 9 m=
inutes to resolve (VDF being subject to difficulty adjustments similar to t=
he as-is). As per the property of VDFs, miners are able show proof of work.=
<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt; &gt; 2. Use current PoW mechanism wi=
th lower difficulty so finding a block takes 1 minute on average, again sub=
ject to as-is difficulty adjustments.<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt; &gt; As a result, variation in block=
 times will be greatly reduced.<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt; As I understand it, another weakness=
 of VDFs is that they are not inherently progress-free (their sequential na=
ture prevents that; they are inherently progress-requiring).<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt; Thus, a miner which focuses on impro=
ving the amount of energy that it can pump into the VDF circuitry (by overc=
locking and freezing the circuitry), could potentially get into a winner-ta=
kes-all situation, possibly leading to even *worse* competition and even *m=
ore* energy consumption.<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt; After all, if you can start mining 0=
.1s faster than the competition, that is a 0.1s advantage where *only you* =
can mine *in the entire world*.<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt; Regards,<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt; ZmnSCPxj<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; _____________________________________________=
__<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; bitcoin-dev mailing list<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; <a href=3D"mailto:bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoun=
dation.org" target=3D"_blank">bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org</a><br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; <a href=3D"https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/=
mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://=
lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev</a><br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; --<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; Michael Dubrovsky<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; Founder; PoWx<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; <a href=3D"http://www.PoWx.org" rel=3D"noreferrer=
" target=3D"_blank">www.PoWx.org</a><br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt; --<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt; Michael Dubrovsky<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt; Founder; PoWx<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt; <a href=3D"http://www.PoWx.org" rel=3D"noreferrer" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">www.PoWx.org</a><br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt; _______________________________________________<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt; bitcoin-dev mailing list<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt; <a href=3D"mailto:bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.o=
rg" target=3D"_blank">bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org</a><br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt;&gt; <a href=3D"https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/=
listinfo/bitcoin-dev" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://lists.li=
nuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev</a><br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt; _______________________________________________<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt; bitcoin-dev mailing list<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt; <a href=3D"mailto:bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org" =
target=3D"_blank">bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org</a><br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;&gt; <a href=3D"https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/list=
info/bitcoin-dev" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://lists.linuxf=
oundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev</a><br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt; _______________________________________________<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt; bitcoin-dev mailing list<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt; <a href=3D"mailto:bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org" targ=
et=3D"_blank">bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org</a><br>
&gt;&gt; &gt; <a href=3D"https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo=
/bitcoin-dev" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://lists.linuxfound=
ation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev</a><br>
</blockquote></div>

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