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Cc: Bitcoin Dev <bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net>
Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] User vote in blocksize through fees
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This is a misguided idea, to say the least. If such a mechanism of of
user input would be possible, one would use it for transaction
verification in the first place. In proof-of-stake outcomes are
determined by vote by stake (that vote has very different
characteristics than vote by compute power). There is no such thing as
making it possible to determine what "users want". That's what the
proof-of-work mechanism does in the first place, only that it is now
unfortunately skewed/corrupted/(whatever you want to call it). Before
centralization the concept of "miners" didn't exist in Bitcoin and
miners were roughly identical to users. Peer-to-Peer implies only one
class of users.
A big problem with such a vote (in PoW and PoS): miners get paid for
their work and have incentives to raise fees. Those who pay fees would
have no say in whether those fees are fair or not. Transaction
verification has to be roughly profitable, but there is no fixed
formula for determining profitability.
On Fri, Jun 12, 2015 at 8:26 PM, Matt Whitlock <bip@mattwhitlock.name> wrot=
e:
> On Friday, 12 June 2015, at 11:20 am, Mark Friedenbach wrote:
>> Peter it's not clear to me that your described protocol is free of miner
>> influence over the vote, by artificially generating transactions which t=
hey
>> claim in their own blocks
>
> Miners could fill their blocks with garbage transactions that agree with =
their vote, but this wouldn't bring them any real income, as they'd be payi=
ng their own money as fees to themselves. To get real income, miners would =
have to vote in accordance with real users.
>
> -------------------------------------------------------------------------=
-----
> _______________________________________________
> Bitcoin-development mailing list
> Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net
> https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development
On Fri, Jun 12, 2015 at 8:34 PM, Peter Todd <pete@petertodd.org> wrote:
> On Fri, Jun 12, 2015 at 02:22:36PM -0400, Matt Whitlock wrote:
>> Why should miners only be able to vote for "double the limit" or "halve"=
the limit? If you're going to use bits, I think you need to use two bits:
>>
>> 0 0 =3D no preference ("wildcard" vote)
>> 0 1 =3D vote for the limit to remain the same
>> 1 0 =3D vote for the limit to be halved
>> 1 1 =3D vote for the limit to be doubled
>>
>> User transactions would follow the same usage. In particular, a user vot=
e of "0 0" (no preference) could be included in a block casting any vote, b=
ut a block voting "0 0" (no preference) could only contain transactions vot=
ing "0 0" as well.
>
> Sounds like a good encoding to me. Taking the median of the three
> options, and throwing away "don't care" votes entirely, makes sense.
>
>> Incidentally, I love this idea, as it addresses a concern I immediately =
had with Jeff's proposal, which is that it hands control exclusively to the=
miners. And your proposal here fixes that shortcoming in a economically po=
werful way: miners lose out on fees if they don't represent the wishes of t=
he users.
>
> Thanks! I personally expect disaster to ensue with this kind of
> proposal, but I'm less concerned if the disaster is something users
> explicitly allowed to happen in a consensual way.
>
> --
> 'peter'[:-1]@petertodd.org
> 0000000000000000127ab1d576dc851f374424f1269c4700ccaba2c42d97e778
>
> -------------------------------------------------------------------------=
-----
>
> _______________________________________________
> Bitcoin-development mailing list
> Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net
> https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development
>
On Fri, Jun 12, 2015 at 8:36 PM, Peter Todd <pete@petertodd.org> wrote:
> On Fri, Jun 12, 2015 at 02:26:20PM -0400, Matt Whitlock wrote:
>> On Friday, 12 June 2015, at 11:20 am, Mark Friedenbach wrote:
>> > Peter it's not clear to me that your described protocol is free of min=
er
>> > influence over the vote, by artificially generating transactions which=
they
>> > claim in their own blocks
>>
>> Miners could fill their blocks with garbage transactions that agree with=
their vote, but this wouldn't bring them any real income, as they'd be pay=
ing their own money as fees to themselves. To get real income, miners would=
have to vote in accordance with real users.
>
> Exactly. I very explicitly am proposing that we consider giving users a
> mechanism to pay for votes to give them a way to directly influence the
> outcome.
>
> --
> 'peter'[:-1]@petertodd.org
> 0000000000000000127ab1d576dc851f374424f1269c4700ccaba2c42d97e778
>
> -------------------------------------------------------------------------=
-----
>
> _______________________________________________
> Bitcoin-development mailing list
> Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net
> https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development
>
On Fri, Jun 12, 2015 at 8:36 PM, Matt Whitlock <bip@mattwhitlock.name> wrot=
e:
> On Friday, 12 June 2015, at 7:34 pm, Peter Todd wrote:
>> On Fri, Jun 12, 2015 at 02:22:36PM -0400, Matt Whitlock wrote:
>> > Why should miners only be able to vote for "double the limit" or "halv=
e" the limit? If you're going to use bits, I think you need to use two bits=
:
>> >
>> > 0 0 =3D no preference ("wildcard" vote)
>> > 0 1 =3D vote for the limit to remain the same
>> > 1 0 =3D vote for the limit to be halved
>> > 1 1 =3D vote for the limit to be doubled
>> >
>> > User transactions would follow the same usage. In particular, a user v=
ote of "0 0" (no preference) could be included in a block casting any vote,=
but a block voting "0 0" (no preference) could only contain transactions v=
oting "0 0" as well.
>>
>> Sounds like a good encoding to me. Taking the median of the three
>> options, and throwing away "don't care" votes entirely, makes sense.
>
> I hope you mean the *plurality* of the three options after throwing away =
the "don't cares," not the *median*.
>
> -------------------------------------------------------------------------=
-----
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> Bitcoin-development mailing list
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