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From: Alexander Leishman <leishman3@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 18 Jun 2018 11:47:40 -0700
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Bitcoin Protocol Discussion <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org>
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Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Miner dilution attack on Bitcoin - is that
something plausible?
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Well miners already regularly mine empty blocks. However, it is usually in
the economic interest of the miners to collect transaction fees. This
incentive should hopefully be enough to prevent miners from choosing to
produce many empty blocks.
If a nation state attacker decides to allocate billions in resources to
attack Bitcoin, then that is a bigger discussion. The risk there is
double-spends, not empty blocks.
-Alex
On Mon, Jun 18, 2018 at 11:39 AM =D0=90=D1=80=D1=82=D1=91=D0=BC =D0=9B=D0=
=B8=D1=82=D0=B2=D0=B8=D0=BD=D0=BE=D0=B2=D0=B8=D1=87 via bitcoin-dev <
bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> Dilution is a potential attack i randomly came up with in a Twitter
> arguement and couldn't find any references to or convincing arguments of =
it
> being implausible.
>
> Suppose a malicious actor were to acquire a majority of hash power, and
> proceed to use that hash power to produce valid, but empty blocks.
>
> As far as i understand it, this would effectively reduce the block rate b=
y
> half or more and since nodes can't differentiate block relay and block
> production there would be nothing they can do to adjust difficulty or bla=
ck
> list the attacker.
>
> At a rough estimate of $52 per TH equipment cost (Antminer pricing) and
> 12.5 BTC per 10 minutes power cost we are looking at an order of $2 billi=
on
> of equipment and $0.4 billion a month of power costs (ignoring block
> reward) to maintain an attack - easily within means of even a minor
> government-scale actor.
>
> Is that a plausible scenario, or am i chasing a mirage? If it is
> plausible, what could be done to mitigate it?
>
>
> -Artem
> _______________________________________________
> bitcoin-dev mailing list
> bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org
> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
>
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<div dir=3D"ltr">Well miners already regularly mine empty blocks. However, =
it is usually in the economic interest of the miners to collect transaction=
fees. This incentive should hopefully be enough to prevent miners from cho=
osing to produce many empty blocks.<div><br></div><div>If a nation state at=
tacker decides to allocate billions in resources to attack Bitcoin, then th=
at is a bigger discussion. The risk there is double-spends, not empty block=
s.</div><div><br></div><div>-Alex<br><div><div><br></div><div><br></div></d=
iv></div></div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr">On Mon, Jun =
18, 2018 at 11:39 AM =D0=90=D1=80=D1=82=D1=91=D0=BC =D0=9B=D0=B8=D1=82=D0=
=B2=D0=B8=D0=BD=D0=BE=D0=B2=D0=B8=D1=87 via bitcoin-dev <<a href=3D"mail=
to:bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org">bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation=
.org</a>> wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"mar=
gin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr=
"><div><div><div><div><div>Dilution is a potential attack i randomly came u=
p with in a Twitter arguement and couldn't find any references to or co=
nvincing arguments of it being implausible.<br><br></div>Suppose a maliciou=
s actor were to acquire a majority of hash power, and proceed to use that h=
ash power to produce valid, but empty blocks.<br><br></div>As far as i unde=
rstand it, this would effectively reduce the block rate by half or more and=
since nodes can't differentiate block relay and block production there=
would be nothing they can do to adjust difficulty or black list the attack=
er.<br><br></div>At a rough estimate of $52 per TH equipment cost (Antminer=
pricing) and 12.5 BTC per 10 minutes power cost we are looking at an order=
of $2 billion of equipment and $0.4 billion a month of power costs (ignori=
ng block reward) to maintain an attack - easily within means of even a mino=
r government-scale actor.<br><br></div>Is that a plausible scenario, or am =
i chasing a mirage? If it is plausible, what could be done to mitigate it?<=
br><br><br></div>-Artem<br></div>
_______________________________________________<br>
bitcoin-dev mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org" target=3D"_blank">=
bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev" =
rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mail=
man/listinfo/bitcoin-dev</a><br>
</blockquote></div>
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