summaryrefslogtreecommitdiff
path: root/b3/78e70a5d0769235104ede6ef7a6ea600eaf431
blob: 2334f6835c0ddd44fa85baf3639bbf03d13aaef0 (plain)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159
160
161
162
163
164
165
166
167
168
169
170
171
172
173
174
175
176
177
178
179
180
181
182
183
184
185
186
187
188
189
190
191
192
193
194
195
196
197
198
199
200
201
202
203
204
205
206
207
208
209
210
211
212
213
214
215
216
217
218
219
220
221
222
223
224
225
226
227
228
229
230
231
232
233
234
235
236
237
238
239
240
241
242
243
244
245
246
247
248
249
250
251
252
253
254
255
256
257
258
259
260
261
262
263
264
265
266
267
268
269
270
271
272
273
274
275
276
277
278
279
280
281
282
283
284
285
286
287
288
289
290
291
292
293
294
295
296
297
298
299
300
301
302
303
304
305
306
307
308
309
310
311
312
313
314
315
316
317
318
319
320
321
322
323
324
325
326
327
328
329
330
331
332
333
334
Return-Path: <contact@taoeffect.com>
Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org
	[172.17.192.35])
	by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 274436C
	for <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org>;
	Wed, 12 Jul 2017 19:24:31 +0000 (UTC)
X-Greylist: from auto-whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6
Received: from homiemail-a3.g.dreamhost.com (homie.mail.dreamhost.com
	[208.97.132.208])
	by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 63F761F2
	for <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org>;
	Wed, 12 Jul 2017 19:24:30 +0000 (UTC)
Received: from homiemail-a3.g.dreamhost.com (localhost [127.0.0.1])
	by homiemail-a3.g.dreamhost.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id D8DF3284087;
	Wed, 12 Jul 2017 12:24:29 -0700 (PDT)
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha1; c=relaxed; d=taoeffect.com; h=
	content-type:mime-version:subject:from:in-reply-to:date:cc
	:message-id:references:to; s=taoeffect.com; bh=Tk9RN7E5UswILc9YK
	qryH/+dBrU=; b=SbzuAApWbWfcJQzO6eF7fQzYo8zgdL9wOAZyUWvHUyLybqI+N
	4weHF324oEPH5K3NKjPVmho+m/H4XhdmxbGVMoZ6EY9cleRJXsqpDRjo2EGZuaPE
	qObo30zp9j863dq0G3TOi3FpbffuGCkyiucgCtj5cDhQlu82pKmv0bBXYQ=
Received: from [192.168.42.67] (184-23-252-118.fiber.dynamic.sonic.net
	[184.23.252.118])
	(using TLSv1 with cipher DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits))
	(No client certificate requested)
	(Authenticated sender: contact@taoeffect.com)
	by homiemail-a3.g.dreamhost.com (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 85874284078; 
	Wed, 12 Jul 2017 12:24:29 -0700 (PDT)
Content-Type: multipart/signed;
	boundary="Apple-Mail=_30B1E1D8-DC1E-4AA8-B749-A2AAA02879B5";
	protocol="application/pgp-signature"; micalg=pgp-sha512
Mime-Version: 1.0 (Mac OS X Mail 10.3 \(3273\))
From: Tao Effect <contact@taoeffect.com>
In-Reply-To: <CAGL6+mHNMF9-v_6_ruvvhOenXCCsVhoG3aHkGvioOb-a9fokCQ@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 12 Jul 2017 12:24:28 -0700
X-Mao-Original-Outgoing-Id: 521580268.087857-b34895a95886c626c48881606dcd349d
Message-Id: <26FE0468-7049-4BE0-948F-D5E40FE2CBAC@taoeffect.com>
References: <0119661e-a11a-6d4b-c9ec-fd510bd4f144@gmail.com>
	<CAAS2fgRDVgdMYZo776iLwbm23aGNDWL85YgD=yF=M-0_vqJ5nQ@mail.gmail.com>
	<1c1d06a9-2e9f-5b2d-42b7-d908ada4b09e@gmail.com>
	<A030CDEA-CB0F-40BF-9404-6BD091537BE1@taoeffect.com>
	<08078429-089f-9315-2f76-a08121c5378c@gmail.com>
	<D30D8852-EFF4-4AB3-9B97-53D622A1440A@taoeffect.com>
	<CAGL6+mHNMF9-v_6_ruvvhOenXCCsVhoG3aHkGvioOb-a9fokCQ@mail.gmail.com>
To: Chris Stewart <chris@suredbits.com>
X-Mailer: Apple Mail (2.3273)
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.0 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED,
	DKIM_VALID, DKIM_VALID_AU, HTML_MESSAGE,
	RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE autolearn=ham version=3.3.1
X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on
	smtp1.linux-foundation.org
X-Mailman-Approved-At: Wed, 12 Jul 2017 19:27:04 +0000
Cc: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org>
Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Updating the Scaling Roadmap
X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion <bitcoin-dev.lists.linuxfoundation.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/options/bitcoin-dev>,
	<mailto:bitcoin-dev-request@lists.linuxfoundation.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/>
List-Post: <mailto:bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org>
List-Help: <mailto:bitcoin-dev-request@lists.linuxfoundation.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev>,
	<mailto:bitcoin-dev-request@lists.linuxfoundation.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Wed, 12 Jul 2017 19:24:31 -0000


--Apple-Mail=_30B1E1D8-DC1E-4AA8-B749-A2AAA02879B5
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
	boundary="Apple-Mail=_2DDDFBFD-2A3C-485A-BA09-D6BD09394C92"


--Apple-Mail=_2DDDFBFD-2A3C-485A-BA09-D6BD09394C92
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Content-Type: text/plain;
	charset=us-ascii

Dear Chris,

> I think this is an unfair characterization. You have to opt into using =
drivechains.

I have heard this nonsense repeated countless times in order to justify =
adopting Drivechain.

This is not how security works.

A child can "opt-in" to using a loaded gun, but is it a good idea to =
make it easy for them to do that?

No.

This is effectively the same thing Drivechains is doing.

It is a request to modify the Bitcoin protocol to make it easy for =
Bitcoin users to give their Bitcoins to miners.

Does that sound like a good idea to anyone?

If so, please leave, you are compromising Bitcoin's security.

Security is about making it difficult to shoot yourself in the face.

If I design a car that has a button that randomly causes the brakes to =
give out if pressed, is that a good idea? Can I justify pushing for such =
a "feature" just because it's "opt-in"?

No. That is fallacy.

It is not how secure systems are designed.

It is how *insecure* systems are designed.

> Care to share? I'm unaware if there is.


Sure, happy to, as soon as I have it written up in detail.

Kind regards,
Greg Slepak

--
Please do not email me anything that you are not comfortable also =
sharing with the NSA.

> On Jul 12, 2017, at 12:19 PM, Chris Stewart <chris@suredbits.com =
<mailto:chris@suredbits.com>> wrote:
>=20
> Hi Greg,
>=20
> >Here, you admit that the security of the sidechains allows miners to =
steal bitcoins, something they cannot do currently.
>=20
> If I put my coins in an anyone can spend output, a miner will take =
them. They can do this today. I suggest you try it if you don't believe =
me :-). You have to be more specific with contract types instead of =
generically talking about 'all contracts ever'.
>=20
> > Drivechain is an unmistakeable weakening of Bitcoin's security =
guarantees. This you have not denied.
>=20
> I think this is an unfair characterization. You have to opt into using =
drivechains. Other outputs such as P2PKH/Multisig etc are unaffected by =
a drivechain output. As Pieter Wuille stated earlier in this thread (and =
Paul has stated all along), drivechain outputs have a different security =
model than other contracts. Namely they are controlled by miners. I =
think we can all agree this is unfortunate, but it is the current =
reality we live in. I look forward to the day we can solve the =
'ownership' problem so we can have trustless interoperable blockchains, =
but that day is not today.
>=20
> As a reminder, most users will not have to go through the drivechain =
withdrawal process. Most withdrawals will be done via atomic swaps.
>=20
> >There is no reason to weaken Bitcoin's security in such a dramatic =
fashion. Better options are being worked on, they just take time.
>=20
> Care to share? I'm unaware if there is.
>=20
> =
>https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2017-June/014600.=
html =
<https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2017-June/014600.=
html>
>=20
> Everyone should re-read this email though, this is something that =
could happen. Paul's design makes it so that if this occurs it is *VERY* =
obvious. I guess we can argue if there is any difference between an =
obvious robbery vs a hidden robbery, but I think if we have to pick one =
or the other the choice is clear to me. Other designs (that I'm aware =
of) for sidechains had attack vectors that weren't so obvious.
>=20
> -Chris
>=20
>=20
>=20


--Apple-Mail=_2DDDFBFD-2A3C-485A-BA09-D6BD09394C92
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Content-Type: text/html;
	charset=us-ascii

<html><head><meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html =
charset=3Dus-ascii"><meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html=
 charset=3Dus-ascii"></head><body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; =
-webkit-nbsp-mode: space; -webkit-line-break: after-white-space;" =
class=3D"">Dear Chris,<div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div =
class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D""><div dir=3D"ltr" =
class=3D"">I think this is an unfair characterization. You have to opt =
into using drivechains.</div></blockquote><br class=3D""></div><div =
class=3D"">I have heard this nonsense repeated countless times in order =
to justify adopting Drivechain.</div><div class=3D""><br =
class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">This is not how security =
works.</div><div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">A child =
can "opt-in" to using a loaded gun, but is it a good idea to make it =
easy for them to do that?</div><div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div =
class=3D"">No.</div><div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div =
class=3D"">This is effectively the same thing Drivechains is =
doing.</div><div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">It is a =
request to modify the Bitcoin protocol to make it easy for Bitcoin users =
to give their Bitcoins to miners.</div><div class=3D""><br =
class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">Does that sound like a good idea to =
anyone?</div><div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">If so, =
please leave, you are compromising Bitcoin's security.</div><div =
class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">Security is about making =
it difficult to shoot yourself in the face.</div><div class=3D""><br =
class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">If I design a car that has a button =
that randomly causes the brakes to give out if pressed, is that a good =
idea? Can I justify pushing for such a "feature" just because it's =
"opt-in"?</div><div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">No. =
That is fallacy.</div><div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div =
class=3D"">It is not how secure systems are designed.</div><div =
class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">It is how *insecure* =
systems are designed.</div><div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div =
class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D""><div dir=3D"ltr" =
class=3D""><div class=3D""><div class=3D"">Care to share? I'm unaware if =
there is.&nbsp;</div></div></div></blockquote></div><div class=3D""><br =
class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">Sure, happy to, as soon as I have it =
written up in detail.</div><div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div =
class=3D"">Kind regards,</div><div class=3D"">Greg Slepak</div><div =
class=3D""><div class=3D"">
<span style=3D"color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: Helvetica; font-size: =
14px; font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: =
normal; letter-spacing: normal; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; =
text-transform: none; white-space: normal; word-spacing: 0px; =
-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; font-variant-ligatures: normal; =
font-variant-position: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; =
font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; =
line-height: normal; orphans: 2; widows: 2;" class=3D""><br =
class=3D"Apple-interchange-newline">--</span><br style=3D"color: rgb(0, =
0, 0); font-family: Helvetica; font-size: 14px; font-style: normal; =
font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; =
text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: =
normal; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; =
font-variant-ligatures: normal; font-variant-position: normal; =
font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; =
font-variant-east-asian: normal; line-height: normal; orphans: 2; =
widows: 2;" class=3D""><span style=3D"color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: =
Helvetica; font-size: 14px; font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: =
normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; text-align: start; =
text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal; =
word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; =
font-variant-ligatures: normal; font-variant-position: normal; =
font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; =
font-variant-east-asian: normal; line-height: normal; orphans: 2; =
widows: 2;" class=3D"">Please do not email me anything that you are not =
comfortable also sharing</span><span style=3D"color: rgb(0, 0, 0); =
font-family: Helvetica; font-size: 14px; font-style: normal; =
font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; =
text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: =
normal; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; =
font-variant-ligatures: normal; font-variant-position: normal; =
font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; =
font-variant-east-asian: normal; line-height: normal; orphans: 2; =
widows: 2;" class=3D"">&nbsp;with the NSA.</span>
</div>
<br class=3D""><div><blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D""><div =
class=3D"">On Jul 12, 2017, at 12:19 PM, Chris Stewart &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:chris@suredbits.com" class=3D"">chris@suredbits.com</a>&gt;=
 wrote:</div><br class=3D"Apple-interchange-newline"><div class=3D""><div =
dir=3D"ltr" class=3D""><div class=3D"">Hi Greg,<br class=3D""><br =
class=3D"">&gt;Here, you admit that the security of the sidechains =
allows miners to steal bitcoins, something they cannot do currently.<br =
class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">If I put my coins in an =
anyone can spend output, a miner will take them. They can do this today. =
I suggest you try it if you don't believe me :-). You have to be more =
specific with contract types instead of generically talking about 'all =
contracts ever'. <br class=3D""></div><div class=3D""><br class=3D"">&gt; =
Drivechain is an unmistakeable weakening of Bitcoin's security =
guarantees. This you have not denied.<br class=3D""><br class=3D""></div>I=
 think this is an unfair characterization. You have to opt into using =
drivechains. Other outputs such as P2PKH/Multisig etc are unaffected by =
a drivechain output. As Pieter Wuille stated earlier in this thread (and =
Paul has stated all along), drivechain outputs have a different security =
model than other contracts. Namely they are controlled by miners. I =
think we can all agree this is unfortunate, but it is the current =
reality we live in. I look forward to the day we can solve the =
'ownership' problem so we can have trustless interoperable blockchains, =
but that day is not today.<br class=3D""><div class=3D""><div =
class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">As a reminder, most =
users will not have to go through the drivechain withdrawal process. =
Most withdrawals will be done via atomic swaps. <br class=3D""><br =
class=3D"">&gt;There is no reason to weaken Bitcoin's security in such a =
dramatic=20
fashion. Better options are being worked on, they just take time.<br =
class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">Care to share? I'm =
unaware if there is. <br class=3D""><br class=3D"">&gt;<a =
href=3D"https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2017-June/=
014600.html" =
class=3D"">https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2017-Ju=
ne/014600.html</a><br class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div =
class=3D"">Everyone should re-read this email though, this is something =
that could happen. Paul's design makes it so that if this occurs it is =
*VERY* obvious. I guess we can argue if there is any difference between =
an obvious robbery vs a hidden robbery, but I think if we have to pick =
one or the other the choice is clear to me. Other designs (that I'm =
aware of) for sidechains had attack vectors that weren't so obvious.<br =
class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">-Chris<br =
class=3D""></div><div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div class=3D""><br =
class=3D""></div></div></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br =
class=3D""></div>
</div></blockquote></div><br class=3D""></div></body></html>=

--Apple-Mail=_2DDDFBFD-2A3C-485A-BA09-D6BD09394C92--

--Apple-Mail=_30B1E1D8-DC1E-4AA8-B749-A2AAA02879B5
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Content-Disposition: attachment;
	filename=signature.asc
Content-Type: application/pgp-signature;
	name=signature.asc
Content-Description: Message signed with OpenPGP

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
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=A7CG
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

--Apple-Mail=_30B1E1D8-DC1E-4AA8-B749-A2AAA02879B5--