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From: Luke Dashjr <luke@dashjr.org>
To: Christian Decker <decker.christian@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 22 Oct 2015 09:05:26 +0000
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Cc: Bitcoin Dev <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org>
Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] [BIP] Normalized transaction IDs
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On Thursday, October 22, 2015 8:26:58 AM Christian Decker wrote:
> I think the scenario of the single signer re-ordering the outputs and
> inputs and then re-signing the transaction is in the same category of
> simple double-spends. The signer could just as well sign a completely
> different transaction spending the same coins to somewhere else, so I don't
> think there is a lot we can do about it even if we instate a canonical
> ordering. Even if we order the inputs and outputs the signer can just add a
> new input and output and we would have a different transaction.
> 
> Normalized transaction IDs do help in the case that the single signer wants
> to immediately follow up its transaction with another transaction spending
> the first one's change output, and it prevents any modification in the
> multi-signer scenario.

Except that unlike malicious double spending, adding more outputs to 
unconfirmed transactions is what wallets *should ideally be doing every time 
they send another transaction*. Spending unconfirmed change is the wrong 
approach. So half-fixing malleability as this PR would, encourages 
inefficient behaviour in multiple ways (first, by not making it malleability-
safe; second, by encouraging spending unconfirmed change).

Luke