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Cc: Bitcoin Development <bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net>
Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] F2Pool has enabled full replace-by-fee
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> What retail needs is escrowed microchannel hubs (what lightning provides,
for example), which enable untrusted instant payments. Not reliance on
single-signer zeroconf transactions that can never be made safe.

They don't need to be made cryptographically safe, they just have to be
safer than, for instance, credit card payments that can be charged back. As
long as it's reasonably good in practice, that's fine.


Aaron Voisine
co-founder and CEO
breadwallet.com

On Fri, Jun 19, 2015 at 6:09 PM, Mark Friedenbach <mark@friedenbach.org>
wrote:

> What retail needs is escrowed microchannel hubs (what lightning provides,
> for example), which enable untrusted instant payments. Not reliance on
> single-signer zeroconf transactions that can never be made safe.
>
> On Fri, Jun 19, 2015 at 5:47 PM, Andreas Petersson <andreas@petersson.at>
> wrote:
>
>> I have some experience here. If you are seriously suggesting these
>> measures, you might as well kill retail transactions altogether.
>>
>> In practice, if a retail place starts to accept bitcoin they have a
>> similar situation as with cash, only that the fraud potential is much
>> lower. (e.g. 100-dollar bill for a sandwich might turn out fake later)
>> and the fraud frequency is also much lower.
>>
>> 0-conf concerns were never a problem in practice. except for 2-way atms
>> i have never heard of a problem that was caused by double spends.
>> while adding these measures is generally positive, requiring them means
>> excluding 99.9% of the potential users. so you might as well not do it.
>>
>> RBF as implemented by F2Pool just flat out lowers Bitcoins utility
>> value. So it's a bad thing.
>>
>> for any online or automated system, waiting for a handful of
>> confirmations was always recommended practice.
>>
>> Am 19.06.2015 um 22:39 schrieb Matt Whitlock:
>> > Retail POS merchants probably should not be accepting vanilla Bitcoin
>> > payments, as Bitcoin alone does not (and cannot) guarantee the
>> > irreversibility of a transaction until it has been buried several
>> > blocks deep in the chain. Retail merchants should be requiring a
>> > co-signature from a mutually trusted co-signer that vows never to sign
>> > a double-spend.
>>
>>
>>
>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> Bitcoin-development mailing list
>> Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net
>> https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development
>>
>>
>
>
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>
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<div dir=3D"ltr">&gt;=C2=A0<span style=3D"font-size:13px">What retail needs=
 is escrowed microchannel hubs (what lightning provides, for example), whic=
h enable untrusted instant payments. Not reliance on single-signer zeroconf=
 transactions that can never be made safe.</span><div><span style=3D"font-s=
ize:13px"><br></span></div><div>They don&#39;t need to be made cryptographi=
cally safe, they just have to be safer than, for instance, credit card paym=
ents that can be charged back. As long as it&#39;s reasonably good in=C2=A0=
practice, that&#39;s fine.</div></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br clear=
=3D"all"><div><div class=3D"gmail_signature"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div><div dir=
=3D"ltr"><div><br>Aaron Voisine</div><div>co-founder and CEO<br><a href=3D"=
http://breadwallet.com" target=3D"_blank">breadwallet.com</a></div></div></=
div></div></div></div>
<br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Fri, Jun 19, 2015 at 6:09 PM, Mark Friede=
nbach <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:mark@friedenbach.org" target=
=3D"_blank">mark@friedenbach.org</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=
=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padd=
ing-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr">What retail needs is escrowed microchannel h=
ubs (what lightning provides, for example), which enable untrusted instant =
payments. Not reliance on single-signer zeroconf transactions that can neve=
r be made safe.<br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail=
_quote"><div><div class=3D"h5">On Fri, Jun 19, 2015 at 5:47 PM, Andreas Pet=
ersson <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:andreas@petersson.at" target=
=3D"_blank">andreas@petersson.at</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br></div></div><bloc=
kquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #cc=
c solid;padding-left:1ex"><div><div class=3D"h5">I have some experience her=
e. If you are seriously suggesting these<br>
measures, you might as well kill retail transactions altogether.<br>
<br>
In practice, if a retail place starts to accept bitcoin they have a<br>
similar situation as with cash, only that the fraud potential is much<br>
lower. (e.g. 100-dollar bill for a sandwich might turn out fake later)<br>
and the fraud frequency is also much lower.<br>
<br>
0-conf concerns were never a problem in practice. except for 2-way atms<br>
i have never heard of a problem that was caused by double spends.<br>
while adding these measures is generally positive, requiring them means<br>
excluding 99.9% of the potential users. so you might as well not do it.<br>
<br>
RBF as implemented by F2Pool just flat out lowers Bitcoins utility<br>
value. So it&#39;s a bad thing.<br>
<br>
for any online or automated system, waiting for a handful of<br>
confirmations was always recommended practice.<br>
<div><div><br>
Am 19.06.2015 um 22:39 schrieb Matt Whitlock:<br>
&gt; Retail POS merchants probably should not be accepting vanilla Bitcoin<=
br>
&gt; payments, as Bitcoin alone does not (and cannot) guarantee the<br>
&gt; irreversibility of a transaction until it has been buried several<br>
&gt; blocks deep in the chain. Retail merchants should be requiring a<br>
&gt; co-signature from a mutually trusted co-signer that vows never to sign=
<br>
&gt; a double-spend.<br>
<br>
</div></div><br></div></div><span class=3D"">------------------------------=
------------------------------------------------<br>
<br>_______________________________________________<br>
Bitcoin-development mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net" target=3D"_bla=
nk">Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net</a><br>
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" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/=
listinfo/bitcoin-development</a><br>
<br></span></blockquote></div><br></div>
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<br></blockquote></div><br></div>

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