1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
|
Received: from sog-mx-2.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com ([172.29.43.192]
helo=mx.sourceforge.net)
by sfs-ml-2.v29.ch3.sourceforge.com with esmtp (Exim 4.76)
(envelope-from <mh.in.england@gmail.com>) id 1YLu49-000290-VH
for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net;
Thu, 12 Feb 2015 13:44:25 +0000
Received-SPF: pass (sog-mx-2.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com: domain of gmail.com
designates 74.125.82.53 as permitted sender)
client-ip=74.125.82.53; envelope-from=mh.in.england@gmail.com;
helo=mail-wg0-f53.google.com;
Received: from mail-wg0-f53.google.com ([74.125.82.53])
by sog-mx-2.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com with esmtps (TLSv1:RC4-SHA:128)
(Exim 4.76) id 1YLu48-0002vL-Rc
for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net;
Thu, 12 Feb 2015 13:44:25 +0000
Received: by mail-wg0-f53.google.com with SMTP id x13so10121374wgg.12
for <bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net>;
Thu, 12 Feb 2015 05:44:18 -0800 (PST)
MIME-Version: 1.0
X-Received: by 10.194.93.134 with SMTP id cu6mr7588666wjb.79.1423748658750;
Thu, 12 Feb 2015 05:44:18 -0800 (PST)
Sender: mh.in.england@gmail.com
Received: by 10.194.188.11 with HTTP; Thu, 12 Feb 2015 05:44:18 -0800 (PST)
In-Reply-To: <CAAt2M19UinurnQQVJWbR_UcSmCBsdFyksnhTfL4ESDMfny+UQQ@mail.gmail.com>
References: <20150212064719.GA6563@savin.petertodd.org>
<CANEZrP2uVT_UqJbzyQcEbiS78T68Jj2cH7OGXv5QtYiCwArDdA@mail.gmail.com>
<CAAt2M1-eogn58zC_eAs4qD4-1GaY4wtuXLoSJ-UEZGKgdXGFyg@mail.gmail.com>
<CANEZrP2YJxwVEocNXjc5cadcq6Wwed7vTLh_4zEX2ct7bTCz5g@mail.gmail.com>
<CAAt2M19UinurnQQVJWbR_UcSmCBsdFyksnhTfL4ESDMfny+UQQ@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 12 Feb 2015 14:44:18 +0100
X-Google-Sender-Auth: PR22O3ZJ0cCzZo_Ak6HoCl18ArE
Message-ID: <CANEZrP3+zpMsccnR1e48iwMyQFtP2yNZwseRvCmHrhZFQymycA@mail.gmail.com>
From: Mike Hearn <mike@plan99.net>
To: Natanael <natanael.l@gmail.com>
Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=047d7bb7092c0decf1050ee4515d
X-Spam-Score: -0.5 (/)
X-Spam-Report: Spam Filtering performed by mx.sourceforge.net.
See http://spamassassin.org/tag/ for more details.
-1.5 SPF_CHECK_PASS SPF reports sender host as permitted sender for
sender-domain
0.0 FREEMAIL_FROM Sender email is commonly abused enduser mail provider
(mh.in.england[at]gmail.com)
-0.0 SPF_PASS SPF: sender matches SPF record
1.0 HTML_MESSAGE BODY: HTML included in message
0.1 DKIM_SIGNED Message has a DKIM or DK signature,
not necessarily valid
-0.1 DKIM_VALID Message has at least one valid DKIM or DK signature
0.0 AWL AWL: Adjusted score from AWL reputation of From: address
X-Headers-End: 1YLu48-0002vL-Rc
Cc: Bitcoin Dev <bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net>
Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] replace-by-fee v0.10.0rc4
X-BeenThere: bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9
Precedence: list
List-Id: <bitcoin-development.lists.sourceforge.net>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development>,
<mailto:bitcoin-development-request@lists.sourceforge.net?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://sourceforge.net/mailarchive/forum.php?forum_name=bitcoin-development>
List-Post: <mailto:bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net>
List-Help: <mailto:bitcoin-development-request@lists.sourceforge.net?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development>,
<mailto:bitcoin-development-request@lists.sourceforge.net?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 12 Feb 2015 13:44:26 -0000
--047d7bb7092c0decf1050ee4515d
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
>
> You can prove a doublespend instantly by showing two conflicting
> transactions both signed by thar party. This pair can be distributed as a
> proof of malice globally in seconds via a push messaging mechanism.
>
There have been lots of e-cash schemes proposed in the academic literature
that work like this, or variants of it. Schemes where participants are
anonymous until they double spend are popular.
Let's re-write your proposal but substituting the word notary for miner:
To profit, the *miner* would have to be sure the payout from agreeing on
collusion (or to perform the doublespend themselves) would pay out better
than acting honestly for a given amount of time info the future. This means
transactions for small sums are secure.
That's the exact argument we're having. The assertion is that a "rational"
notary would kill his own business to increase his profits in the next few
hours. So you're just arguing that a notary is different to a miner,
without spelling out exactly why.
Does the notary have to make a big up front investment? If so, why is that
different to mining investment?
Is the notary non-anonymous and afraid of being charged with payment fraud?
If so, note that big miners do lots of non-anonymous things too, like
renting warehouses and importing specialised equipment.
Is it because of the big up front collateral they're meant to have lying
around? If so, how do you ensure a fluid market for notaries?
--047d7bb7092c0decf1050ee4515d
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
<div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><blo=
ckquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left=
-width:1px;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-style:solid;paddi=
ng-left:1ex"><p dir=3D"ltr">You can prove a doublespend instantly by showin=
g two conflicting transactions both signed by thar party. This pair can be =
distributed as a proof of malice globally in seconds via a push messaging m=
echanism.<br></p></blockquote><div>There have been lots of e-cash schemes p=
roposed in the academic literature that work like this, or variants of it. =
Schemes where participants are anonymous until they double spend are popula=
r.</div><div><br></div><div>Let's re-write your proposal but substituti=
ng the word notary for miner:</div><div><br></div></div></div><blockquote s=
tyle=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 40px;border:none;padding:0px"><div class=3D"gmai=
l_extra"><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div><span style=3D"font-size:12.800000=
1907349px">To profit, the <u>miner</u> would have to be sure the payout fro=
m agreeing on collusion (or to perform the doublespend themselves) would pa=
y out better than acting honestly for a given amount of time info the futur=
e. This means transactions for small sums are secure.</span><br></div></div=
></div></blockquote><span style=3D"font-size:12.8000001907349px"><div><span=
style=3D"font-size:12.8000001907349px"><br></span></div>That's the exa=
ct argument we're having. The assertion is that a "rational" =
notary would kill his own business to increase his profits in the next few =
hours. So you're just arguing that a notary is different to a miner, wi=
thout spelling out exactly why.</span><div><span style=3D"font-size:12.8000=
001907349px"><br></span></div><div><span style=3D"font-size:12.800000190734=
9px">Does the notary have to make a big up front investment? If so, why is =
that different to mining investment?</span></div><div><span style=3D"font-s=
ize:12.8000001907349px"><br></span></div><div><span style=3D"font-size:12.8=
000001907349px">Is the notary non-anonymous and afraid of being charged wit=
h payment fraud? If so, note that big miners do lots of non-anonymous thing=
s too, like renting warehouses and importing specialised equipment.=C2=A0</=
span></div><div><span style=3D"font-size:12.8000001907349px"><br></span></d=
iv><div><span style=3D"font-size:12.8000001907349px">Is it because of the b=
ig up front collateral they're meant to have lying around? If so, how d=
o you ensure a fluid market for notaries?</span></div><div><span style=3D"f=
ont-size:12.8000001907349px"><br></span></div><div><span style=3D"font-size=
:12.8000001907349px"><br></span></div></div>
--047d7bb7092c0decf1050ee4515d--
|
