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From: Kalle Rosenbaum <kalle@rosenbaum.se>
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Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] BIP for Proof of Payment
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Another thing worth mentioning is that an SPV wallet cannot validate a
PoP without fetching the input transactions of the PoP from an
external (not bitcoin network) source, for example chain.com or some
other trusted full node's API.

The validation of the PoP depends on the external source(s) being
honest. It can make a valid pop look invalid, but it cannot make an
invalid pop look valid.

/Kalle



2015-06-16 14:12 GMT+02:00 Kalle Rosenbaum <kalle@rosenbaum.se>:
> 2015-06-16 7:26 GMT+02:00 Tom Harding <tomh@thinlink.com>:
>>
>> Kalle goes to some trouble to describe how merchants need to ensure that
>> they only accept a PoP provided as a response to their challenge.
>>
>
> Do you mean that it will be hard to explain to merchants that they
> must check the nonce in the PoP so that it matches the nonce in the
> pop request? I think not, this is a commonly used pattern that anyone
> should be able to grasp. Anyway, merchants will probably use a library
> (though yet non-existing) for PoP, that will hide the gory details. I
> also think that payment providers may want to add PoP to their
> offering to customers (merchants).
>
> Regards,
> /Kalle
>
>>
>>
>> On 6/15/2015 3:00 AM, Pieter Wuille wrote:
>>
>> I did misunderstand that. That changes things significantly.
>>
>> However, having paid is not the same as having had access to the input
>> coins. What about shared wallets or coinjoin?
>>
>> Also, if I understand correctly, there is no commitment to anything you'=
re
>> trying to say about the sender? So once I obtain a proof-of-payment from=
 you
>> about something you paid, I can go claim that it's mine?
>>
>> Why does anyone care who paid? This is like walking into a coffeshop,
>> noticing I don't have money with me, let me friend pay for me, and then =
have
>> the shop insist that I can't drink it because I'm not the buyer.
>>
>> Track payments, don't try to assign identities to payers.
>>
>> On Jun 15, 2015 11:35 AM, "Kalle Rosenbaum" <kalle@rosenbaum.se> wrote:
>>>
>>> Hi Pieter!
>>>
>>> It is intended to be a proof that you *have paid* for something. Not
>>> that you have the intent to pay for something. You cannot use PoP
>>> without a transaction to prove.
>>>
>>> So, yes, it's just a proof of access to certain coins that you no longe=
r
>>> have.
>>>
>>> Maybe I don't understand you correctly?
>>>
>>> /Kalle
>>>
>>> 2015-06-15 11:27 GMT+02:00 Pieter Wuille <pieter.wuille@gmail.com>:
>>> > Now that you have removed the outputs, I don't think it's even a inte=
nt
>>> > of
>>> > payment, but just a proof of access to certain coins.
>>> >
>>> > On Jun 15, 2015 11:24 AM, "Kalle Rosenbaum" <kalle@rosenbaum.se> wrot=
e:
>>> >>
>>> >> Hi all!
>>> >>
>>> >> I have made the discussed changes and updated my implementation
>>> >> (https://github.com/kallerosenbaum/poppoc) accordingly. These are th=
e
>>> >> changes:
>>> >>
>>> >> * There is now only one output, the "pop output", of value 0.
>>> >> * The sequence number of all inputs of the PoP must be set to 0. I
>>> >> chose to set it to 0 for all inputs for simplicity.
>>> >> * The lock_time of the PoP must be set to 499999999 (max block heigh=
t
>>> >> lock
>>> >> time).
>>> >>
>>> >> The comments so far has been mainly positive or neutral. Are there a=
ny
>>> >> major objections against any of the two proposals? If not, I will as=
k
>>> >> Gregory Maxwell to assign them BIP numbers.
>>> >>
>>> >> The two BIP proposals can be found at
>>> >> https://github.com/kallerosenbaum/poppoc/wiki/Proof-of-Payment-BIP a=
nd
>>> >> https://github.com/kallerosenbaum/poppoc/wiki/btcpop-scheme-BIP. The
>>> >> source
>>> >> for the Proof of Payment BIP proposal is also in-lined below.
>>> >>
>>> >> A number of alternative names have been proposed:
>>> >>
>>> >> * Proof of Potential
>>> >> * Proof of Control
>>> >> * Proof of Signature
>>> >> * Signatory Proof
>>> >> * Popo: Proof of payment origin
>>> >> * Pots: Proof of transaction signer
>>> >> * proof of transaction intent
>>> >> * Declaration of intent
>>> >> * Asset-access-and-action-affirmation, AAaAA, or A5
>>> >> * VeriBit
>>> >> * CertiBTC
>>> >> * VBit
>>> >> * PayID
>>> >>
>>> >> Given this list, I still think "Proof of Payment" is the most
>>> >> descriptive
>>> >> to non-technical people.
>>> >>
>>> >> Regards,
>>> >> Kalle
>>> >>
>>> >>
>>> >> #################################################
>>> >> <pre>
>>> >>   BIP: <BIP number>
>>> >>   Title: Proof of Payment
>>> >>   Author: Kalle Rosenbaum <kalle@rosenbaum.se>
>>> >>   Status: Draft
>>> >>   Type: Standards Track
>>> >>   Created: <date created on, in ISO 8601 (yyyy-mm-dd) format>
>>> >> </pre>
>>> >>
>>> >> =3D=3D Abstract =3D=3D
>>> >>
>>> >> This BIP describes how a wallet can prove to a server that it has th=
e
>>> >> ability to sign a certain transaction.
>>> >>
>>> >> =3D=3D Motivation =3D=3D
>>> >>
>>> >> There are several scenarios in which it would be useful to prove tha=
t
>>> >> you
>>> >> have paid for something. For example:
>>> >>
>>> >> * A pre-paid hotel room where your PoP functions as a key to the doo=
r.
>>> >> * An online video rental service where you pay for a video and watch=
 it
>>> >> on
>>> >> any device.
>>> >> * An ad-sign where you pay in advance for e.g. 2 weeks exclusivity.
>>> >> During
>>> >> this period you can upload new content to the sign whenever you like
>>> >> using
>>> >> PoP.
>>> >> * Log in to a pay site using a PoP.
>>> >> * A parking lot you pay for monthly and the car authenticates itself
>>> >> using
>>> >> PoP.
>>> >> * A lottery where all participants pay to the same address, and the
>>> >> winner
>>> >> is selected among the transactions to that address. You exchange the
>>> >> prize
>>> >> for a PoP for the winning transaction.
>>> >>
>>> >> With Proof of Payment, these use cases can be achieved without any
>>> >> personal information (user name, password, e-mail address, etc) bein=
g
>>> >> involved.
>>> >>
>>> >> =3D=3D Rationale =3D=3D
>>> >>
>>> >> Desirable properties:
>>> >>
>>> >> # A PoP should be generated on demand.
>>> >> # It should only be usable once to avoid issues due to theft.
>>> >> # It should be able to create a PoP for any payment, regardless of
>>> >> script
>>> >> type (P2SH, P2PKH, etc.).
>>> >> # It should prove that you have enough credentials to unlock all the
>>> >> inputs of the proven transaction.
>>> >> # It should be easy to implement by wallets and servers to ease
>>> >> adoption.
>>> >>
>>> >> Current methods of proving a payment:
>>> >>
>>> >> * In BIP0070, the PaymentRequest together with the transactions
>>> >> fulfilling
>>> >> the request makes some sort of proof. However, it does not meet 1, 2=
 or
>>> >> 4
>>> >> and it obviously only meets 3 if the payment is made through BIP0070=
.
>>> >> Also,
>>> >> there's no standard way to request/provide the proof. If standardize=
d
>>> >> it
>>> >> would probably meet 5.
>>> >> * Signing messages, chosen by the server, with the private keys used=
 to
>>> >> sign the transaction. This could meet 1 and 2 but probably not 3. Th=
is
>>> >> is
>>> >> not standardized either. 4 Could be met if designed so.
>>> >>
>>> >> If an input script type is P2SH, any satisfying script should do, ju=
st
>>> >> as
>>> >> if it was a payment. For M-of-N multisig scripts, that would mean th=
at
>>> >> any
>>> >> set of M keys should be sufficient, not neccesarily the same set of =
M
>>> >> keys
>>> >> that signed the transaction. This is important because strictly
>>> >> demanding
>>> >> the same set of M keys would defeat the purpose of a multisig addres=
s.
>>> >>
>>> >> =3D=3D Specification =3D=3D
>>> >>
>>> >> =3D=3D=3D Data structure =3D=3D=3D
>>> >>
>>> >> A proof of payment for a transaction T, here called PoP(T), is used =
to
>>> >> prove that one has ownership of the credentials needed to unlock all
>>> >> the
>>> >> inputs of T. It has the exact same structure as a bitcoin transactio=
n
>>> >> with
>>> >> the same inputs as T and in the same order as in T, but with each
>>> >> sequence
>>> >> number set to 0. There is exactly one output, here called the pop
>>> >> output,
>>> >> with value 0. The pop output must have the following format:
>>> >>
>>> >>  OP_RETURN <version> <txid> <nonce>
>>> >>
>>> >> {|
>>> >> ! Field        !! Size [B] !! Description
>>> >> |-
>>> >> | &lt;version> || 2        || Version, little endian, currently 0x01
>>> >> 0x00
>>> >> |-
>>> >> | &lt;txid>    || 32       || The transaction to prove
>>> >> |-
>>> >> | &lt;nonce>   || 6        || Random data
>>> >> |}
>>> >>
>>> >> The lock_time of the PoP must be set to 499999999 to prevent the PoP
>>> >> from
>>> >> being included in a block, should it appear on the bitcoin p2p netwo=
rk.
>>> >> This
>>> >> is also the reason for setting the sequence numbers to 0, since
>>> >> sequence
>>> >> number of ffffffff would make lock_time ineffective. This specificat=
ion
>>> >> demands that all input sequence numbers are 0, not just one of them,
>>> >> which
>>> >> would be sufficient to make lock_time effective. This is for simplic=
ity
>>> >> reasons.
>>> >>
>>> >> An illustration of the PoP data structure and its original payment i=
s
>>> >> shown below.
>>> >>
>>> >> <pre>
>>> >>   T
>>> >>  +------------------------------------------------+
>>> >>  |inputs                | outputs                 |
>>> >>  |       Value,Sequence | Value,Script            |
>>> >>  +------------------------------------------------+
>>> >>  |input0 1,ffffffff     | 0,pay to A              |
>>> >>  |input1 3,ffffffff     | 2,OP_RETURN <some data> |
>>> >>  |input2 4,ffffffff     | 1,pay to B              |
>>> >>  |                      | 4,pay to C              |
>>> >>  +------------------------------------------------+
>>> >>
>>> >>   PoP(T)
>>> >>  +-------------------------------------------------------------+
>>> >>  | inputs               | outputs                              |
>>> >>  |       Value,Sequence | Value,Script                         |
>>> >>  +-------------------------------------------------------------+
>>> >>  |input0 1,00000000     | 0,OP_RETURN <version> <txid> <nonce> |
>>> >>  |input1 3,00000000     |                                      |
>>> >>  |input2 4,00000000     |                                      |
>>> >>  +-------------------------------------------------------------+
>>> >>  | lock_time=3D499999999                                         |
>>> >>  +-------------------------------------------------------------+
>>> >> </pre>
>>> >>
>>> >> The PoP is signed using the same signing process that is used for
>>> >> bitcoin
>>> >> transactions.
>>> >>
>>> >> The purpose of the nonce is to make it harder to use a stolen PoP; O=
nce
>>> >> the PoP has reached the server, that PoP is useless since the server
>>> >> will
>>> >> generate a new nonce for every PoP request.
>>> >>
>>> >> =3D=3D=3D Process =3D=3D=3D
>>> >>
>>> >> # A proof of payment request is sent from the server to the wallet. =
The
>>> >> PoP request contains:
>>> >> ## a random nonce
>>> >> ## a destination where to send the PoP, for example a https URL
>>> >> ## data hinting the wallet which transaction to create a proof for. =
For
>>> >> example:
>>> >> ##* txid, if known by the server
>>> >> ##* PaymentRequest.PaymentDetails.merchant_data (in case of a BIP007=
0
>>> >> payment)
>>> >> ##* amount, label, message or other information from a BIP0021 URI
>>> >> # The wallet identifies a transaction T, if possible. Otherwise it a=
sks
>>> >> the user to select among the ones that match the hints in 1.iii.
>>> >> # The wallet creates an unsigned PoP (UPoP) for T, and asks the user=
 to
>>> >> sign it.
>>> >> # The user confirms
>>> >> # The UPoP(T) is signed by the wallet, creating PoP(T).
>>> >> # The PoP is sent to the destination in 1.ii.
>>> >> # The server receiving the PoP validates it and responds with =E2=80=
=9Cvalid=E2=80=9D
>>> >> or
>>> >> =E2=80=9Cinvalid=E2=80=9D.
>>> >> # The wallet displays the response in some way to the user.
>>> >>
>>> >> '''Remarks:'''
>>> >>
>>> >> * The method of transferring the PoP request at step 1 is not specif=
ied
>>> >> here. Instead that is specified in separate specifications. See [btc=
pop
>>> >> scheme BIP](btcpop scheme BIP).
>>> >> * The nonce must be randomly generated by the server for every new P=
oP
>>> >> request.
>>> >>
>>> >> =3D=3D=3D Validating a PoP =3D=3D=3D
>>> >>
>>> >> The server needs to validate the PoP and reply with "valid" or
>>> >> "invalid".
>>> >> That process is outlined below. If any step fails, the validation is
>>> >> aborted
>>> >> and "invalid" is returned:
>>> >>
>>> >> # Check the format of the PoP. It must pass normal transaction check=
s,
>>> >> except that the inputs may already be spent.
>>> >> # Check that lock_time is 499999999.
>>> >> # Check that there is exactly one output. This output must have valu=
e 0
>>> >> and conform to the OP_RETURN output format outlined above.
>>> >> # Check that the nonce is the same as the one requested.
>>> >> # Check that the inputs of the PoP are exactly the same as in
>>> >> transaction
>>> >> T, except that the sequence numbers must all be 0. The ordering of t=
he
>>> >> inputs must also be the same as in T.
>>> >> # Run the scripts of all the inputs. All scipts must return true.
>>> >> # Check that the txid in the PoP output is the transaction you actua=
lly
>>> >> want proof for. If you don=E2=80=99t know exactly what transaction y=
ou want
>>> >> proof
>>> >> for, check that the transaction actually pays for the product/servic=
e
>>> >> you
>>> >> deliver.
>>> >> # Return "valid".
>>> >>
>>> >> =3D=3D Security considerations =3D=3D
>>> >>
>>> >> * Someone can intercept the PoP-request and change any parameter in =
it.
>>> >> These can be mitigated by using secure connections. For example:
>>> >> ** Pop destination - Stealing your PoP.
>>> >> ** label - Trick you to sign an unintended pop or set a label that y=
our
>>> >> wallet doesn't have any record for, resulting in a broken service.
>>> >> Always
>>> >> check the PoP before signing.
>>> >> ** nonce - Your pop will not validate on server.
>>> >> * Someone can steal a PoP, for example by tampering with the PoP
>>> >> request,
>>> >> and try to use the service hoping to get a matching nonce. Probabili=
ty
>>> >> per
>>> >> try: 1/(2^48). The server should have a mechanism for detecting a br=
ute
>>> >> force attack of this kind, or at least slow down the process by
>>> >> delaying the
>>> >> PoP request by some 100 ms or so.
>>> >> * Even if a wallet has no funds it might still be valuable as a
>>> >> generator
>>> >> for PoPs. This makes it important to keep the security of the wallet
>>> >> after
>>> >> it has been emptied.
>>> >> * Transaction malleability may cause the server to have another
>>> >> transaction id for a payment than the client's wallet. In that case =
the
>>> >> wallet will not be able to prove the transaction to the server. Wall=
ets
>>> >> should not rely on the transaction id of the outgoing transaction.
>>> >> Instead
>>> >> it should listen for the transaction on the network and put that in =
its
>>> >> list
>>> >> of transactions.
>>> >>
>>> >> =3D=3D Reference implementation =3D=3D
>>> >>
>>> >> [https://github.com/kallerosenbaum/poppoc poppoc on GitHub]
>>> >>
>>> >> [https://github.com/kallerosenbaum/wallet Mycelium fork on GitHub]
>>> >>
>>> >> =3D=3D References =3D=3D
>>> >>
>>> >> [https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0021.mediawiki
>>> >> BIP0021]:
>>> >> URI Scheme
>>> >>
>>> >> [https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0070.mediawiki
>>> >> BIP0070]:
>>> >> Payment Protocol
>>> >>
>>> >> [[btcpop scheme BIP]]
>>> >>
>>> >> #########################################################
>>> >>
>>> >> 2015-06-06 23:25 GMT+02:00 Kalle Rosenbaum <kalle@rosenbaum.se>:
>>> >> > Thank you all for the feedback.
>>> >> >
>>> >> > I will change the data structure as follows:
>>> >> >
>>> >> > * There will be only one output, the "pop output", and no outputs
>>> >> > from
>>> >> > T will be copied to the PoP.
>>> >> > * The pop output will have value 0.
>>> >> > * The sequence number of all inputs of the PoP will be set to 0. I
>>> >> > chose to set it to 0 for all inputs for simplicity.
>>> >> > * The lock_time of the PoP is always set to 499999999.
>>> >> >
>>> >> > Any comments on this?
>>> >> >
>>> >> > /Kalle
>>> >> >
>>> >> > 2015-06-06 19:00 GMT+02:00 Kalle Rosenbaum <kalle@rosenbaum.se>:
>>> >> >> 2015-06-06 18:10 GMT+02:00 Tom Harding <tomh@thinlink.com>:
>>> >> >>> On Jun 6, 2015 8:05 AM, "Kalle Rosenbaum" <kalle@rosenbaum.se>
>>> >> >>> wrote:
>>> >> >>>
>>> >> >>>> I'm open to changes here.
>>> >> >>>
>>> >> >>> I suggest:
>>> >> >>>
>>> >> >>> - Don't include any real outputs.   They are redundant because t=
he
>>> >> >>> txid is
>>> >> >>> already referenced.
>>> >> >>
>>> >> >> with the nLocktime solution, the copied outputs are not needed.
>>> >> >>
>>> >> >>>
>>> >> >>> - Start the proof script, which should be invalid, with a magic
>>> >> >>> constant and
>>> >> >>> include space for future expansion.  This makes PoP's easy to
>>> >> >>> identify
>>> >> >>> and
>>> >> >>> extend.
>>> >> >>
>>> >> >> I did remore the constant (a "PoP" literal ascii encoded string)
>>> >> >> because it didn't add much. The recipient will expect a pop, so i=
t
>>> >> >> will simply treat it as one. I did add a 2 byte version field to
>>> >> >> make
>>> >> >> it extendable.
>>> >> >>
>>> >> >>>
>>> >> >>> - "Proof of Potential"
>>> >> >>
>>> >> >> Noted :-)
>>> >> >>
>>> >> >> Thank you
>>> >> >> /Kalle
>>> >>
>>> >>
>>> >>
>>> >> --------------------------------------------------------------------=
----------
>>> >>
>>> >> _______________________________________________
>>> >> Bitcoin-development mailing list
>>> >> Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net
>>> >> https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development
>>> >>
>>> >
>>
>>
>>
>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------=
------
>>
>>
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> Bitcoin-development mailing list
>> Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net
>> https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development
>>
>>
>>
>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------=
------
>>
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>>