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From: Johnson Lau <jl2012@xbt.hk>
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Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] cleanstack alt stack & softfork improvements
(Was: Merkle branch verification & tail-call semantics for generalized
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> On 21 Sep 2017, at 12:11 PM, Luke Dashjr <luke@dashjr.org> wrote:
>=20
> On Wednesday 20 September 2017 5:13:04 AM Johnson Lau wrote:
>> 2. OP_RETURNTRUE does not work well with signature aggregation. =
Signature
>> aggregation will collect (pubkey, message) pairs in a tx, combine =
them,
>> and verify with one signature. However, consider the following case:
>>=20
>> OP_RETURNTRUE OP_IF <pubkey> OP_CHECKSIGVERIFY OP_ENDIF OP_TRUE
>>=20
>> For old nodes, the script terminates at OP_RETURNTRUE, and it will =
not
>> collect the (pubkey, message) pair.
>>=20
>> If we use a softfork to transform OP_RETURNTRUE into OP_17 (pushing =
the
>> number 17 to the stack), new nodes will collect the (pubkey, message) =
pair
>> and try to aggregate with other pairs. This becomes a hardfork.
>=20
> This seems like a problem for signature aggregation to address, not a =
problem=20
> for OP_RETURNTRUE... In any case, I don't think it's insurmountable. =
Signature=20
> aggregation can simply be setup upfront, and have the Script verify =
inclusion=20
> of keys in the aggregation?
I think it=E2=80=99s possible only if you spend more witness space to =
store the (pubkey, message) pairs, so that old clients could understand =
the aggregation produced by new clients. But this completely defeats the =
purpose of doing aggregation.
We use different skills to save space. For example, we use 1-byte =
SIGHASH flag to imply the 32-byte message. For maximal space saving, sig =
aggregation will also rely on such skills. However, the assumption is =
that all signatures aggregated must follow exactly the same set of =
rules.
>=20
>> Technically, we could create ANY op code with an OP_NOP. For example, =
if we
>> want OP_MUL, we could have OP_MULVERIFY, which verifies if the 3rd =
stack
>> item is the product of the top 2 stack items. Therefore, OP_MULVERIFY
>> OP_2DROP is functionally same as OP_MUL, which removes the top 2 =
items and
>> returns the product. The problem is it takes more witness space.
>=20
> This is another approach, and one that seems like a good idea in =
general. I'm=20
> not sure it actually needs to take more witness space - in theory, =
such stack=20
> items could be implied if the Script engine is designed for it =
upfront. Then=20
> it would behave as if it were non-verify, while retaining backward=20
> compatibility.
Sounds interesting but I don=E2=80=99t get it. For example, how could =
you make a OP_MUL out of OP_NOP?
>=20
> Luke
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