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From: Daniel Rice <drice@greenmangosystems.com>
To: Mike Hearn <mike@plan99.net>
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Cc: Bitcoin Dev <bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net>,
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Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] instant confirmation via payment protocol
 backwards compatible proto buffer extension
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--047d7b672d324d251e04fc1e59fe
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> I'm not sure this is actually important or useful; trusting someone not
to double spend is a pretty binary thing

I think that's true if you assume that the instant provider list is based
on a by hand created list of accepted instant providers. That's how VISA
works now and that's why I was asking for an approach where the
trusted_instant_providers list is scalable because that seems very
dangerous.

Since you can detect when a double spend happens, the entire instant
provider list could be automatically generated based on a 3rd party network
that shares information between vendors and also monitors double spends. In
that scenario, there is no hand written exclusive list of accepted instant
providers. There is just a database of past history on all instant
providers. That database can be used to give a confidence score for a
specific instant provider for a given transaction amount. In this scenario,
a new wallet company would be able to earn trust over time. If the list is
made by hand, "Bitpay accepts Circle, Coinbase, and GreenAddress for
instant transactions", then new wallet providers have to go around bribing
Bitpay and the other large merchant transaction providers to get on their
instant provider list.

Allowing more than one instant signature on a transaction is supposed to
help avoid that scenario. For example, lets say I want to establish my own
instant signature. I use a wallet that already has an accepted instant
signature, but it also allows me to add my own instant signature. I do this
so that I can start establishing trust in my own instant signature while
relying on their instant signature.


On Wed, Jun 18, 2014 at 6:25 AM, Mike Hearn <mike@plan99.net> wrote:

> - allowing multiple signatures ?
>
>
> I'm not sure this is actually important or useful; trusting someone not to
> double spend is a pretty binary thing. I'm not sure saying "you need to get
> three independent parties to sign off on this" is worth the hassle,
> especially because the first signature is obvious (your risk analysis
> provider or hardware) but the second and third are ..... who? Special
> purpose services you have to sign up for? Seems like a hassle.
>
> But it's up to you.
>
>
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
> HPCC Systems Open Source Big Data Platform from LexisNexis Risk Solutions
> Find What Matters Most in Your Big Data with HPCC Systems
> Open Source. Fast. Scalable. Simple. Ideal for Dirty Data.
> Leverages Graph Analysis for Fast Processing & Easy Data Exploration
> http://p.sf.net/sfu/hpccsystems
> _______________________________________________
> Bitcoin-development mailing list
> Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net
> https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development
>
>

--047d7b672d324d251e04fc1e59fe
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr">&gt;=C2=A0<span style=3D"font-family:arial,sans-serif;font=
-size:13px">I&#39;m not sure this is actually important or useful; trusting=
 someone not to double spend is a pretty binary thing</span><div><span styl=
e=3D"font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:13px"><br>
</span></div><div><font face=3D"arial, sans-serif">I think that&#39;s true =
if you assume that the instant provider list is based on a by hand created =
list of accepted instant providers. That&#39;s how VISA works now and that&=
#39;s why I was asking for an approach where the trusted_instant_providers =
list is scalable because that seems very dangerous.</font></div>
<div><font face=3D"arial, sans-serif"><br></font></div><div><font face=3D"a=
rial, sans-serif">Since you can detect when a double spend happens, the ent=
ire instant provider list could be automatically generated based on a 3rd p=
arty network that shares information between vendors and also monitors doub=
le spends. In that scenario, there is no hand written exclusive list of acc=
epted instant providers. There is just a database of past history on all in=
stant providers. That database can be used to give a confidence score for a=
 specific instant provider for a given transaction amount. In this scenario=
, a new wallet company would be able to earn trust over time. If the list i=
s made by hand, &quot;Bitpay accepts Circle, Coinbase, and GreenAddress for=
 instant transactions&quot;, then new wallet providers have to go around br=
ibing Bitpay and the other large merchant transaction providers to get on t=
heir instant provider list.</font></div>
<div><font face=3D"arial, sans-serif"><br></font></div><div><font face=3D"a=
rial, sans-serif">Allowing more than one instant signature on a transaction=
 is supposed to help avoid that scenario. For example, lets say I want to e=
stablish my own instant signature. I use a wallet that already has an accep=
ted instant signature, but it also allows me to add my own instant signatur=
e. I do this so that I can start establishing trust in my own instant signa=
ture while relying on their instant signature.</font></div>
<div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Wed, Jun 1=
8, 2014 at 6:25 AM, Mike Hearn <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:mike=
@plan99.net" target=3D"_blank">mike@plan99.net</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><bl=
ockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #=
ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><blo=
ckquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #c=
cc solid;padding-left:1ex">- allowing multiple signatures ?</blockquote><di=
v><br>
</div>
<div>I&#39;m not sure this is actually important or useful; trusting someon=
e not to double spend is a pretty binary thing. I&#39;m not sure saying &qu=
ot;you need to get three independent parties to sign off on this&quot; is w=
orth the hassle, especially because the first signature is obvious (your ri=
sk analysis provider or hardware) but the second and third are ..... who? S=
pecial purpose services you have to sign up for? Seems like a hassle.</div>

<div><br></div><div>But it&#39;s up to you.</div></div></div></div>
<br>-----------------------------------------------------------------------=
-------<br>
HPCC Systems Open Source Big Data Platform from LexisNexis Risk Solutions<b=
r>
Find What Matters Most in Your Big Data with HPCC Systems<br>
Open Source. Fast. Scalable. Simple. Ideal for Dirty Data.<br>
Leverages Graph Analysis for Fast Processing &amp; Easy Data Exploration<br=
>
<a href=3D"http://p.sf.net/sfu/hpccsystems" target=3D"_blank">http://p.sf.n=
et/sfu/hpccsystems</a><br>_______________________________________________<b=
r>
Bitcoin-development mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net">Bitcoin-develo=
pment@lists.sourceforge.net</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development=
" target=3D"_blank">https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-de=
velopment</a><br>
<br></blockquote></div><br></div></div>

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