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Subject: [bitcoin-dev] On adaptor security (in protocols)
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Hi list,
I was motivated to look more carefully at the question of the security of u=
sing signature adaptors after recently getting quite enthused about the ide=
a of using adaptors across N signing sessions to do a kind of multiparty sw=
ap. But of course security analysis is also much more important for the bas=
e case of 2 party swapping, which is of .. some considerable practical impo=
rtance :)
There is work (referenced in Section 3 here) that's pretty substantial on "=
how secure are adaptors" (think in terms of security reductions) already fr=
om I guess the 2019-2021 period. But I wanted to get into scenarios of mult=
iple adaptors at once or multiple signing sessions at once with the *same* =
adaptor (as mentioned above, probably this is the most important scenario).
To be clear this is the work of an amateur and is currently unreviewed - he=
nce (a) me posting it here and (b) putting the paper on github so people ca=
n easily add specific corrections or comments if they like:
https://github.com/AdamISZ/AdaptorSecurityDoc/blob/main/adaptorsecurity.pdf
I'll note that I did the analysis only around MuSig, not MuSig2.
The penultimate ("third case"), that as mentioned, of "multiple signing ses=
sions, same adaptor" proved to be the most interesting: in trying to reduce=
this to ECDLP I found an issue around sequencing. It may just be irrelevan=
t but I'd be curious to hear what others think about that.
If nothing else, I'd be very interested to hear what experts in the field h=
ave to say about security reductions for this primitive in the case of mult=
iple concurrent signing sessions (which of course has been analyzed very ca=
refully already for base MuSig(2)).
Cheers,
AdamISZ/waxwing
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