summaryrefslogtreecommitdiff
path: root/95/54fff98a39994b5ce219cb64804314df58fe5b
blob: a44248feb730d73a640785e3254c93ea24aa4411 (plain)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
Return-Path: <luke@dashjr.org>
Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org
	[172.17.192.35])
	by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id CF27F8EE
	for <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org>;
	Tue, 28 Mar 2017 17:46:28 +0000 (UTC)
X-Greylist: from auto-whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6
Received: from zinan.dashjr.org (zinan.dashjr.org [192.3.11.21])
	by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 0F4DFD4
	for <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org>;
	Tue, 28 Mar 2017 17:46:27 +0000 (UTC)
Received: from ishibashi.localnet (unknown
	[IPv6:2001:470:5:265:a45d:823b:2d27:961c])
	(Authenticated sender: luke-jr)
	by zinan.dashjr.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 916BA38ABED2;
	Tue, 28 Mar 2017 17:46:21 +0000 (UTC)
X-Hashcash: 1:25:170328:bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org::x8Khl5OzgPUlsT9I:kL+r
X-Hashcash: 1:25:170328:jl2012@xbt.hk::bs9X208YfJdqME5f:kr3c
X-Hashcash: 1:25:170328:1240902@gmail.com::Jtt3lP/dx4bLbWCc:FhSP
From: Luke Dashjr <luke@dashjr.org>
To: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org,
 Johnson Lau <jl2012@xbt.hk>
Date: Tue, 28 Mar 2017 17:46:20 +0000
User-Agent: KMail/1.13.7 (Linux/4.9.16-gentoo; KDE/4.14.29; x86_64; ; )
References: <CAFzgq-xizPMNqfvW11nUhd6HmfZu8aGjcR9fshEsf6o5HOt_dA@mail.gmail.com>
	<B93DE8AA-AA01-4E0E-88B6-B788B03282E0@xbt.hk>
In-Reply-To: <B93DE8AA-AA01-4E0E-88B6-B788B03282E0@xbt.hk>
X-PGP-Key-Fingerprint: E463 A93F 5F31 17EE DE6C 7316 BD02 9424 21F4 889F
X-PGP-Key-ID: BD02942421F4889F
X-PGP-Keyserver: hkp://pgp.mit.edu
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: Text/Plain;
  charset="utf-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Message-Id: <201703281746.20709.luke@dashjr.org>
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.9 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,RP_MATCHES_RCVD
	autolearn=ham version=3.3.1
X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on
	smtp1.linux-foundation.org
Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Hard fork proposal from last week's meeting
X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion <bitcoin-dev.lists.linuxfoundation.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/options/bitcoin-dev>,
	<mailto:bitcoin-dev-request@lists.linuxfoundation.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/>
List-Post: <mailto:bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org>
List-Help: <mailto:bitcoin-dev-request@lists.linuxfoundation.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev>,
	<mailto:bitcoin-dev-request@lists.linuxfoundation.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 28 Mar 2017 17:46:28 -0000

On Tuesday, March 28, 2017 5:34:23 PM Johnson Lau via bitcoin-dev wrote:
> You are probably not the first one nor last one with such idea. Actually,
> Luke wrote up a BIP with similar idea in mind:
>=20
> https://github.com/luke-jr/bips/blob/bip-hfprep/bip-hfprep.mediawiki
> <https://github.com/luke-jr/bips/blob/bip-hfprep/bip-hfprep.mediawiki>
>=20
> Instead of just lifting the block size limit, he also suggested to remove
> many other rules. I think he has given up this idea because it=E2=80=99s =
just too
> complicated.
> ...
> So if we really want to get prepared for a potential HF with unknown
> parameters, I=E2=80=99d suggest to set a time bomb in the client, which w=
ill stop
> processing of transactions with big warning in GUI. The user may still
> have an option to continue with old rules at their own risks.

Indeed, actually implementing hfprep proved to be overly complicated.

I like the idea of a time bomb that just shuts down the client after it=20
determine it's stale and refuses to start without an explicit override.
That should work no matter what the hardfork is, and gives us a good=20
expectation for hardfork timeframes.

> Or, instead of increasing the block size, we make a softfork to decrease
> the block size to 1kB and block reward to 0, activating far in the future.
> This is similar to the difficulty bomb in ETH, which will freeze the
> network.

I don't like this idea. It leaves the node open to attack from blocks actua=
lly=20
meeting the criteria. Maybe the absolute minimum as Jeremy suggested.

Luke