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To: Erik Aronesty <erik@q32.com>
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From: Paul Sztorc <truthcoin@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Drivechain RfD -- Follow Up
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On 6/23/2017 10:19 AM, Erik Aronesty wrote:
> > They would certainly not be cheap, because they are relatively more expensive due to the
> extra depreciation cost.
>
> If you design the inflation schedule correctly, it should be balance
> transaction costs *precisely*.
You have not explained how your scheme would cause a relative decrease
in transaction costs. The way I see it, tx costs would be exactly the
same, so it would in fact be impossible to design an inflation schedule
to "balance" these costs (other than inflation of zero as I suggest).
>
> > I don't think that blind merged mining messes with the main chain's
> incentive structure
>
> Miners who are able to deal with the bandwidth caused by drivechain
> coffee transactions
There is no additional bandwidth requirement. That is the point of BMM.
They do not even need to run a sidechain node (to be paid just as much
as if they had).
--Paul
>
> On Thu, Jun 22, 2017 at 4:30 PM, Paul Sztorc <truthcoin@gmail.com
> <mailto:truthcoin@gmail.com>> wrote:
>
> Responses inline.
>
> On 6/22/2017 9:45 AM, Erik Aronesty wrote:
>> Users would tolerate depreciation because the intention is to
>> have a cheap way of transacting using a two-way pegged chain that
>> isn't controlled by miners. Who cares about some minor
>> depreciation when the purpose of the chain is to do cheap secure
>> transactions forever?
>
> Thus far you've claimed that these transactions would be "cheap",
> "[not] controlled by miners", and "secure".
>
> They would certainly not be cheap, because they are relatively
> more expensive due to the extra depreciation cost.
>
> I also doubt that they would be free of control by miners. 51%
> hashrate can always filter out any message they want from anywhere.
>
> For the same reason, I don't understand why they would be any more
> or less secure.
>
> So I think your way is just a more expensive way of accomplishing
> basically the same result.
>
>>
>> Add in UTXO commitments and you've got a system that is cheap and
>> secure-enough for transfer. storage and accumulation of a
>> ledger... before moving in to the main chain.
>
> As I posted to bitcoin-discuss last week, I support UTXO
> commitments for sidechains.
>
>> Seems better to me than messing with the main chain's incentive
>> structure via merged mining.
>
> I don't think that blind merged mining messes with the main
> chain's incentive structure. Miners are free to ignore the
> sidechain (and yet still get paid the same as other miners), as
> are all mainchain users.
>
> Paul
>>
>> On Thu, Jun 22, 2017 at 9:27 AM, Paul Sztorc <truthcoin@gmail.com
>> <mailto:truthcoin@gmail.com>> wrote:
>>
>> Hi Erik,
>>
>> I don't think that your design is competitive. Why would
>> users tolerate a depreciation of X% per year, when there are
>> alternatives which do not require such depreciation? It seems
>> to me that none would.
>>
>> Paul
>>
>> On 6/20/2017 9:38 AM, Erik Aronesty wrote:
>>> - a proof-of-burn sidechain is the ultimate two-way peg.
>>> you have to burn bitcoin *or* side-chain tokens to mine the
>>> side chain. the size of the burn is the degree of
>>> security. i actually wrote code to do randomized blind
>>> burns where you have a poisson distribution
>>> (non-deterministic selected burn). there is no way to
>>> game it... it's very similar to algorand - but it uses burns
>>> instead of staking
>>>
>>> - you can then have a secure sidechain that issues a mining
>>> reward in sidechain tokens, which can be aggrregated and
>>> redeemed for bitcoins. the result of this is that any
>>> bitcoins held in the sidechain depreciate in value at a rate
>>> of X% per year. this deflation rate pays for increased
>>> security
>>>
>>> - logically this functions like an alt coin, with high
>>> inflation and cheap transactions. but the altcoin is
>>> pegged to bitcoin's price because of the pool of unredeemed
>>> bitcoins held within the side chain.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Tue, Jun 20, 2017 at 7:54 AM, Paul Sztorc
>>> <truthcoin@gmail.com <mailto:truthcoin@gmail.com>> wrote:
>>>
>>> Hi Erik,
>>>
>>> As you know:
>>>
>>> 1. If a sidechain is merged mined it basically grows out
>>> of the existing Bitcoin mining network. If it has a
>>> different PoW algorithm it is a new mining network.
>>> 2. The security (ie, hashrate) of any mining network
>>> would be determined by the total economic value of the
>>> block. In Bitcoin this is (subsidy+tx_fees)*price, but
>>> since a sidechain cannot issue new tokens it would only
>>> be (tx_fees)*price.
>>>
>>> Unfortunately the two have a nasty correlation which can
>>> lead to a disastrous self-fulfilling prophecy: users
>>> will avoid a network that is too insecure; and if users
>>> avoid using a network, they will stop paying txn fees
>>> and so the quantity (tx_fees)*price falls toward zero,
>>> erasing the network's security. So it is quite
>>> problematic and I recommend just biting the bullet and
>>> going with merged mining instead.
>>>
>>> And, the point may be moot. Bitcoin miners may decide
>>> that, given their expertise in seeking out cheap sources
>>> of power/cooling, they might as well mine both/all
>>> chains. So your suggestion may not achieve your desired
>>> result (and would, meanwhile, consume more of the
>>> economy's resources -- some of these would not
>>> contribute even to a higher hashrate).
>>>
>>> Paul
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 6/19/2017 1:11 PM, Erik Aronesty wrote:
>>>> It would be nice to be able to enforce that a
>>>> drivechain *not* have the same POW as bitcoin.
>>>>
>>>> I suspect this is the only way to be sure that a
>>>> drivechain doesn't destabilize the main chain and push
>>>> more power to miners that already have too much power.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>
>>>
>>
>>
>
>
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<div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 6/23/2017 10:19 AM, Erik Aronesty
wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote type="cite"
cite="mid:CAJowKg+GLDmOexa89etFep7H1hNEGbqkm_mk79xby7Ka0znS-g@mail.gmail.com">
<div dir="ltr">
<div><span style="font-size:12.8px">> They would certainly
not be cheap, because they are relatively more expensive due
to the extra depreciation cost.<br>
</span><br>
If you design the inflation schedule correctly, it should be
balance transaction costs *precisely*.<span class="gmail-im"
style="font-size:12.8px"><br>
</span></div>
</div>
</blockquote>
<br>
You have not explained how your scheme would cause a relative
decrease in transaction costs. The way I see it, tx costs would be
exactly the same, so it would in fact be impossible to design an
inflation schedule to "balance" these costs (other than inflation of
zero as I suggest).<br>
<br>
<blockquote type="cite"
cite="mid:CAJowKg+GLDmOexa89etFep7H1hNEGbqkm_mk79xby7Ka0znS-g@mail.gmail.com">
<div dir="ltr">
<div><span class="gmail-im" style="font-size:12.8px"><br>
</span>> <span style="font-size:12.8px">I don't think that
blind merged mining messes with the main chain's incentive
structure <br>
</span><br>
Miners who are able to deal with the bandwidth caused by
drivechain coffee transactions<br>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
There is no additional bandwidth requirement. That is the point of
BMM. They do not even need to run a sidechain node (to be paid just
as much as if they had).<br>
<br>
--Paul<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<blockquote type="cite"
cite="mid:CAJowKg+GLDmOexa89etFep7H1hNEGbqkm_mk79xby7Ka0znS-g@mail.gmail.com">
<div class="gmail_extra"><br>
<div class="gmail_quote">On Thu, Jun 22, 2017 at 4:30 PM, Paul
Sztorc <span dir="ltr"><<a
href="mailto:truthcoin@gmail.com" target="_blank"
moz-do-not-send="true">truthcoin@gmail.com</a>></span>
wrote:<br>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0
.8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<div text="#000000" bgcolor="#FFFFFF">
<div class="m_-1820278609258644758moz-cite-prefix">Responses
inline.<span class=""><br>
<br>
On 6/22/2017 9:45 AM, Erik Aronesty wrote:<br>
</span></div>
<span class="">
<blockquote type="cite">
<div dir="ltr">
<div>Users would tolerate depreciation because the
intention is to have a cheap way of transacting
using a two-way pegged chain that isn't controlled
by miners. Who cares about some minor
depreciation when the purpose of the chain is to
do cheap secure transactions forever?<br>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
<br>
</span> Thus far you've claimed that these transactions
would be "cheap", "[not] controlled by miners", and
"secure".<br>
<br>
They would certainly not be cheap, because they are
relatively more expensive due to the extra depreciation
cost.<br>
<br>
I also doubt that they would be free of control by miners.
51% hashrate can always filter out any message they want
from anywhere.<br>
<br>
For the same reason, I don't understand why they would be
any more or less secure.<br>
<br>
So I think your way is just a more expensive way of
accomplishing basically the same result.<span class=""><br>
<br>
<blockquote type="cite">
<div dir="ltr">
<div><br>
Add in UTXO commitments and you've got a system
that is cheap and secure-enough for transfer.
storage and accumulation of a ledger... before
moving in to the main chain. </div>
</div>
</blockquote>
<br>
</span> As I posted to bitcoin-discuss last week, I
support UTXO commitments for sidechains.<span class=""><br>
<br>
<blockquote type="cite">
<div dir="ltr">
<div>Seems better to me than messing with the main
chain's incentive structure via merged mining.<br>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
<br>
</span> I don't think that blind merged mining messes with
the main chain's incentive structure. Miners are free to
ignore the sidechain (and yet still get paid the same as
other miners), as are all mainchain users.<span
class="HOEnZb"><font color="#888888"><br>
<br>
Paul</font></span><span class=""><br>
<blockquote type="cite"><br>
<div class="gmail_extra">
<div class="gmail_quote">On Thu, Jun 22, 2017 at
9:27 AM, Paul Sztorc <span dir="ltr"><<a
href="mailto:truthcoin@gmail.com"
target="_blank" moz-do-not-send="true">truthcoin@gmail.com</a>></span>
wrote:<br>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0
0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc
solid;padding-left:1ex">
<div text="#000000" bgcolor="#FFFFFF">
<div
class="m_-1820278609258644758m_3722835584705217683moz-cite-prefix">Hi
Erik,<br>
<br>
I don't think that your design is
competitive. Why would users tolerate a
depreciation of X% per year, when there are
alternatives which do not require such
depreciation? It seems to me that none
would.<span
class="m_-1820278609258644758HOEnZb"><font
color="#888888"><br>
<br>
Paul</font></span><span><br>
<br>
On 6/20/2017 9:38 AM, Erik Aronesty wrote:<br>
</span></div>
<span>
<blockquote type="cite">
<div dir="ltr">
<div>- a proof-of-burn sidechain is the
ultimate two-way peg. you have to
burn bitcoin *or* side-chain tokens to
mine the side chain. the size of the
burn is the degree of security. i
actually wrote code to do randomized
blind burns where you have a poisson
distribution (non-deterministic
selected burn). there is no way to
game it... it's very similar to
algorand - but it uses burns instead
of staking<br>
</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>- you can then have a secure
sidechain that issues a mining reward
in sidechain tokens, which can be
aggrregated and redeemed for bitcoins.
the result of this is that any
bitcoins held in the sidechain
depreciate in value at a rate of X%
per year. this deflation rate pays
for increased security</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>- logically this functions like an
alt coin, with high inflation and
cheap transactions. but the altcoin
is pegged to bitcoin's price because
of the pool of unredeemed bitcoins
held within the side chain.</div>
<div><br>
<br>
</div>
</div>
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<div class="gmail_quote">On Tue, Jun 20,
2017 at 7:54 AM, Paul Sztorc <span
dir="ltr"><<a
href="mailto:truthcoin@gmail.com"
target="_blank"
moz-do-not-send="true">truthcoin@gmail.com</a>></span>
wrote:<br>
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<div
class="m_-1820278609258644758m_3722835584705217683m_-7917178296017049299moz-cite-prefix">Hi
Erik,<br>
<br>
As you know:<br>
<br>
1. If a sidechain is merged
mined it basically grows out of
the existing Bitcoin mining
network. If it has a different
PoW algorithm it is a new mining
network.<br>
2. The security (ie, hashrate)
of any mining network would be
determined by the total economic
value of the block. In Bitcoin
this is (subsidy+tx_fees)*price,
but since a sidechain cannot
issue new tokens it would only
be (tx_fees)*price.<br>
<br>
Unfortunately the two have a
nasty correlation which can lead
to a disastrous self-fulfilling
prophecy: users will avoid a
network that is too insecure;
and if users avoid using a
network, they will stop paying
txn fees and so the quantity
(tx_fees)*price falls toward
zero, erasing the network's
security. So it is quite
problematic and I recommend just
biting the bullet and going with
merged mining instead.<br>
<br>
And, the point may be moot.
Bitcoin miners may decide that,
given their expertise in seeking
out cheap sources of
power/cooling, they might as
well mine both/all chains. So
your suggestion may not achieve
your desired result (and would,
meanwhile, consume more of the
economy's resources -- some of
these would not contribute even
to a higher hashrate).<span
class="m_-1820278609258644758m_3722835584705217683HOEnZb"><font
color="#888888"><br>
<br>
Paul</font></span>
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<br>
<br>
<br>
On 6/19/2017 1:11 PM, Erik
Aronesty wrote:<br>
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<div>It would be nice to
be able to enforce that
a drivechain *not* have
the same POW as bitcoin.
<br>
<br>
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<div>I suspect this is the
only way to be sure that
a drivechain doesn't
destabilize the main
chain and push more
power to miners that
already have too much
power.<br>
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