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To: Erik Aronesty <erik@q32.com>
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From: Paul Sztorc <truthcoin@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Drivechain RfD -- Follow Up
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On 6/23/2017 10:19 AM, Erik Aronesty wrote:
> > They would certainly not be cheap, because they are relatively more expensive due to the
> extra depreciation cost.
>
> If you design the inflation schedule correctly, it should be balance
> transaction costs *precisely*.

You have not explained how your scheme would cause a relative decrease
in transaction costs. The way I see it, tx costs would be exactly the
same, so it would in fact be impossible to design an inflation schedule
to "balance" these costs (other than inflation of zero as I suggest).

>
> > I don't think that blind merged mining messes with the main chain's
> incentive structure 
>
> Miners who are able to deal with the bandwidth caused by drivechain
> coffee transactions
There is no additional bandwidth requirement. That is the point of BMM.
They do not even need to run a sidechain node (to be paid just as much
as if they had).

--Paul



>
> On Thu, Jun 22, 2017 at 4:30 PM, Paul Sztorc <truthcoin@gmail.com
> <mailto:truthcoin@gmail.com>> wrote:
>
>     Responses inline.
>
>     On 6/22/2017 9:45 AM, Erik Aronesty wrote:
>>     Users would tolerate depreciation because the intention is to
>>     have a cheap way of transacting using a two-way pegged chain that
>>     isn't controlled by miners.  Who cares about some minor
>>     depreciation when the purpose of the chain is to do cheap secure
>>     transactions forever?
>
>     Thus far you've claimed that these transactions would be "cheap",
>     "[not] controlled by miners", and "secure".
>
>     They would certainly not be cheap, because they are relatively
>     more expensive due to the extra depreciation cost.
>
>     I also doubt that they would be free of control by miners. 51%
>     hashrate can always filter out any message they want from anywhere.
>
>     For the same reason, I don't understand why they would be any more
>     or less secure.
>
>     So I think your way is just a more expensive way of accomplishing
>     basically the same result.
>
>>
>>     Add in UTXO commitments and you've got a system that is cheap and
>>     secure-enough for transfer. storage and accumulation of a
>>     ledger... before moving in to the main chain.
>
>     As I posted to bitcoin-discuss last week, I support UTXO
>     commitments for sidechains.
>
>>     Seems better to me than messing with the main chain's incentive
>>     structure via merged mining.
>
>     I don't think that blind merged mining messes with the main
>     chain's incentive structure. Miners are free to ignore the
>     sidechain (and yet still get paid the same as other miners), as
>     are all mainchain users.
>
>     Paul
>>
>>     On Thu, Jun 22, 2017 at 9:27 AM, Paul Sztorc <truthcoin@gmail.com
>>     <mailto:truthcoin@gmail.com>> wrote:
>>
>>         Hi Erik,
>>
>>         I don't think that your design is competitive. Why would
>>         users tolerate a depreciation of X% per year, when there are
>>         alternatives which do not require such depreciation? It seems
>>         to me that none would.
>>
>>         Paul
>>
>>         On 6/20/2017 9:38 AM, Erik Aronesty wrote:
>>>         - a proof-of-burn sidechain is the ultimate two-way peg.  
>>>         you have to burn bitcoin *or* side-chain tokens to mine the
>>>         side chain.   the size of the burn is the degree of
>>>         security.    i actually wrote code to do randomized blind
>>>         burns where you have a poisson distribution
>>>         (non-deterministic selected burn).    there is no way to
>>>         game it... it's very similar to algorand - but it uses burns
>>>         instead of staking
>>>
>>>         - you can then have a secure sidechain that issues a mining
>>>         reward in sidechain tokens, which can be aggrregated and
>>>         redeemed for bitcoins.   the result of this is that any
>>>         bitcoins held in the sidechain depreciate in value at a rate
>>>         of X% per year.   this deflation rate pays for increased
>>>         security
>>>
>>>         - logically this functions like an alt coin, with high
>>>         inflation and cheap transactions.   but the altcoin is
>>>         pegged to bitcoin's price because of the pool of unredeemed
>>>         bitcoins held within the side chain.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>         On Tue, Jun 20, 2017 at 7:54 AM, Paul Sztorc
>>>         <truthcoin@gmail.com <mailto:truthcoin@gmail.com>> wrote:
>>>
>>>             Hi Erik,
>>>
>>>             As you know:
>>>
>>>             1. If a sidechain is merged mined it basically grows out
>>>             of the existing Bitcoin mining network. If it has a
>>>             different PoW algorithm it is a new mining network.
>>>             2. The security (ie, hashrate) of any mining network
>>>             would be determined by the total economic value of the
>>>             block. In Bitcoin this is (subsidy+tx_fees)*price, but
>>>             since a sidechain cannot issue new tokens it would only
>>>             be (tx_fees)*price.
>>>
>>>             Unfortunately the two have a nasty correlation which can
>>>             lead to a disastrous self-fulfilling prophecy: users
>>>             will avoid a network that is too insecure; and if users
>>>             avoid using a network, they will stop paying txn fees
>>>             and so the quantity (tx_fees)*price falls toward zero,
>>>             erasing the network's security. So it is quite
>>>             problematic and I recommend just biting the bullet and
>>>             going with merged mining instead.
>>>
>>>             And, the point may be moot. Bitcoin miners may decide
>>>             that, given their expertise in seeking out cheap sources
>>>             of power/cooling, they might as well mine both/all
>>>             chains. So your suggestion may not achieve your desired
>>>             result (and would, meanwhile, consume more of the
>>>             economy's resources -- some of these would not
>>>             contribute even to a higher hashrate).
>>>
>>>             Paul
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>             On 6/19/2017 1:11 PM, Erik Aronesty wrote:
>>>>             It would be nice to be able to enforce that a
>>>>             drivechain *not* have the same POW as bitcoin.
>>>>
>>>>             I suspect this is the only way to be sure that a
>>>>             drivechain doesn't destabilize the main chain and push
>>>>             more power to miners that already have too much power.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>
>>>
>>
>>
>
>


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    <div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 6/23/2017 10:19 AM, Erik Aronesty
      wrote:<br>
    </div>
    <blockquote type="cite"
cite="mid:CAJowKg+GLDmOexa89etFep7H1hNEGbqkm_mk79xby7Ka0znS-g@mail.gmail.com">
      <div dir="ltr">
        <div><span style="font-size:12.8px">&gt; They would certainly
            not be cheap, because they are relatively more expensive due
            to the extra depreciation cost.<br>
          </span><br>
          If you design the inflation schedule correctly, it should be
          balance transaction costs *precisely*.<span class="gmail-im"
            style="font-size:12.8px"><br>
          </span></div>
      </div>
    </blockquote>
    <br>
    You have not explained how your scheme would cause a relative
    decrease in transaction costs. The way I see it, tx costs would be
    exactly the same, so it would in fact be impossible to design an
    inflation schedule to "balance" these costs (other than inflation of
    zero as I suggest).<br>
    <br>
    <blockquote type="cite"
cite="mid:CAJowKg+GLDmOexa89etFep7H1hNEGbqkm_mk79xby7Ka0znS-g@mail.gmail.com">
      <div dir="ltr">
        <div><span class="gmail-im" style="font-size:12.8px"><br>
          </span>&gt; <span style="font-size:12.8px">I don't think that
            blind merged mining messes with the main chain's incentive
            structure <br>
          </span><br>
          Miners who are able to deal with the bandwidth caused by
          drivechain coffee transactions<br>
        </div>
      </div>
    </blockquote>
    There is no additional bandwidth requirement. That is the point of
    BMM. They do not even need to run a sidechain node (to be paid just
    as much as if they had).<br>
    <br>
    --Paul<br>
    <br>
    <br>
    <br>
    <blockquote type="cite"
cite="mid:CAJowKg+GLDmOexa89etFep7H1hNEGbqkm_mk79xby7Ka0znS-g@mail.gmail.com">
      <div class="gmail_extra"><br>
        <div class="gmail_quote">On Thu, Jun 22, 2017 at 4:30 PM, Paul
          Sztorc <span dir="ltr">&lt;<a
              href="mailto:truthcoin@gmail.com" target="_blank"
              moz-do-not-send="true">truthcoin@gmail.com</a>&gt;</span>
          wrote:<br>
          <blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0
            .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
            <div text="#000000" bgcolor="#FFFFFF">
              <div class="m_-1820278609258644758moz-cite-prefix">Responses
                inline.<span class=""><br>
                  <br>
                  On 6/22/2017 9:45 AM, Erik Aronesty wrote:<br>
                </span></div>
              <span class="">
                <blockquote type="cite">
                  <div dir="ltr">
                    <div>Users would tolerate depreciation because the
                      intention is to have a cheap way of transacting
                      using a two-way pegged chain that isn't controlled
                      by miners.  Who cares about some minor
                      depreciation when the purpose of the chain is to
                      do cheap secure transactions forever?<br>
                    </div>
                  </div>
                </blockquote>
                <br>
              </span> Thus far you've claimed that these transactions
              would be "cheap", "[not] controlled by miners", and
              "secure".<br>
              <br>
              They would certainly not be cheap, because they are
              relatively more expensive due to the extra depreciation
              cost.<br>
              <br>
              I also doubt that they would be free of control by miners.
              51% hashrate can always filter out any message they want
              from anywhere.<br>
              <br>
              For the same reason, I don't understand why they would be
              any more or less secure.<br>
              <br>
              So I think your way is just a more expensive way of
              accomplishing basically the same result.<span class=""><br>
                <br>
                <blockquote type="cite">
                  <div dir="ltr">
                    <div><br>
                      Add in UTXO commitments and you've got a system
                      that is cheap and secure-enough for transfer.
                      storage and accumulation of a ledger... before
                      moving in to the main chain. </div>
                  </div>
                </blockquote>
                <br>
              </span> As I posted to bitcoin-discuss last week, I
              support UTXO commitments for sidechains.<span class=""><br>
                <br>
                <blockquote type="cite">
                  <div dir="ltr">
                    <div>Seems better to me than messing with the main
                      chain's incentive structure via merged mining.<br>
                    </div>
                  </div>
                </blockquote>
                <br>
              </span> I don't think that blind merged mining messes with
              the main chain's incentive structure. Miners are free to
              ignore the sidechain (and yet still get paid the same as
              other miners), as are all mainchain users.<span
                class="HOEnZb"><font color="#888888"><br>
                  <br>
                  Paul</font></span><span class=""><br>
                <blockquote type="cite"><br>
                  <div class="gmail_extra">
                    <div class="gmail_quote">On Thu, Jun 22, 2017 at
                      9:27 AM, Paul Sztorc <span dir="ltr">&lt;<a
                          href="mailto:truthcoin@gmail.com"
                          target="_blank" moz-do-not-send="true">truthcoin@gmail.com</a>&gt;</span>
                      wrote:<br>
                      <blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0
                        0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc
                        solid;padding-left:1ex">
                        <div text="#000000" bgcolor="#FFFFFF">
                          <div
                            class="m_-1820278609258644758m_3722835584705217683moz-cite-prefix">Hi
                            Erik,<br>
                            <br>
                            I don't think that your design is
                            competitive. Why would users tolerate a
                            depreciation of X% per year, when there are
                            alternatives which do not require such
                            depreciation? It seems to me that none
                            would.<span
                              class="m_-1820278609258644758HOEnZb"><font
                                color="#888888"><br>
                                <br>
                                Paul</font></span><span><br>
                              <br>
                              On 6/20/2017 9:38 AM, Erik Aronesty wrote:<br>
                            </span></div>
                          <span>
                            <blockquote type="cite">
                              <div dir="ltr">
                                <div>- a proof-of-burn sidechain is the
                                  ultimate two-way peg.   you have to
                                  burn bitcoin *or* side-chain tokens to
                                  mine the side chain.   the size of the
                                  burn is the degree of security.    i
                                  actually wrote code to do randomized
                                  blind burns where you have a poisson
                                  distribution (non-deterministic
                                  selected burn).    there is no way to
                                  game it... it's very similar to
                                  algorand - but it uses burns instead
                                  of staking<br>
                                </div>
                                <div><br>
                                </div>
                                <div>- you can then have a secure
                                  sidechain that issues a mining reward
                                  in sidechain tokens, which can be
                                  aggrregated and redeemed for bitcoins.
                                    the result of this is that any
                                  bitcoins held in the sidechain
                                  depreciate in value at a rate of X%
                                  per year.   this deflation rate pays
                                  for increased security</div>
                                <div><br>
                                </div>
                                <div>- logically this functions like an
                                  alt coin, with high inflation and
                                  cheap transactions.   but the altcoin
                                  is pegged to bitcoin's price because
                                  of the pool of unredeemed bitcoins
                                  held within the side chain.</div>
                                <div><br>
                                  <br>
                                </div>
                              </div>
                              <div class="gmail_extra"><br>
                                <div class="gmail_quote">On Tue, Jun 20,
                                  2017 at 7:54 AM, Paul Sztorc <span
                                    dir="ltr">&lt;<a
                                      href="mailto:truthcoin@gmail.com"
                                      target="_blank"
                                      moz-do-not-send="true">truthcoin@gmail.com</a>&gt;</span>
                                  wrote:<br>
                                  <blockquote class="gmail_quote"
                                    style="margin:0 0 0
                                    .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc
                                    solid;padding-left:1ex">
                                    <div text="#000000"
                                      bgcolor="#FFFFFF">
                                      <div
class="m_-1820278609258644758m_3722835584705217683m_-7917178296017049299moz-cite-prefix">Hi
                                        Erik,<br>
                                        <br>
                                        As you know:<br>
                                        <br>
                                        1. If a sidechain is merged
                                        mined it basically grows out of
                                        the existing Bitcoin mining
                                        network. If it has a different
                                        PoW algorithm it is a new mining
                                        network.<br>
                                        2. The security (ie, hashrate)
                                        of any mining network would be
                                        determined by the total economic
                                        value of the block. In Bitcoin
                                        this is (subsidy+tx_fees)*price,
                                        but since a sidechain cannot
                                        issue new tokens it would only
                                        be (tx_fees)*price.<br>
                                        <br>
                                        Unfortunately the two have a
                                        nasty correlation which can lead
                                        to a disastrous self-fulfilling
                                        prophecy: users will avoid a
                                        network that is too insecure;
                                        and if users avoid using a
                                        network, they will stop paying
                                        txn fees and so the quantity
                                        (tx_fees)*price falls toward
                                        zero, erasing the network's
                                        security. So it is quite
                                        problematic and I recommend just
                                        biting the bullet and going with
                                        merged mining instead.<br>
                                        <br>
                                        And, the point may be moot.
                                        Bitcoin miners may decide that,
                                        given their expertise in seeking
                                        out cheap sources of
                                        power/cooling, they might as
                                        well mine both/all chains. So
                                        your suggestion may not achieve
                                        your desired result (and would,
                                        meanwhile, consume more of the
                                        economy's resources -- some of
                                        these would not contribute even
                                        to a higher hashrate).<span
                                          class="m_-1820278609258644758m_3722835584705217683HOEnZb"><font
                                            color="#888888"><br>
                                            <br>
                                            Paul</font></span>
                                        <div>
                                          <div
                                            class="m_-1820278609258644758m_3722835584705217683h5"><br>
                                            <br>
                                            <br>
                                            <br>
                                            On 6/19/2017 1:11 PM, Erik
                                            Aronesty wrote:<br>
                                          </div>
                                        </div>
                                      </div>
                                      <div>
                                        <div
                                          class="m_-1820278609258644758m_3722835584705217683h5">
                                          <blockquote type="cite">
                                            <div dir="ltr">
                                              <div>It would be nice to
                                                be able to enforce that
                                                a drivechain *not* have
                                                the same POW as bitcoin.
                                                <br>
                                                <br>
                                              </div>
                                              <div>I suspect this is the
                                                only way to be sure that
                                                a drivechain doesn't
                                                destabilize the main
                                                chain and push more
                                                power to miners that
                                                already have too much
                                                power.<br>
                                              </div>
                                              <br>
                                            </div>
                                            <div class="gmail_extra"><br>
                                            </div>
                                          </blockquote>
                                          <p><br>
                                          </p>
                                        </div>
                                      </div>
                                    </div>
                                  </blockquote>
                                </div>
                                <br>
                              </div>
                            </blockquote>
                            <p><br>
                            </p>
                          </span></div>
                      </blockquote>
                    </div>
                    <br>
                  </div>
                </blockquote>
                <p><br>
                </p>
              </span></div>
          </blockquote>
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