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To: shymaa arafat <shymaa.arafat@gmail.com>,
 Bitcoin Protocol Discussion <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org>
From: ZmnSCPxj <ZmnSCPxj@protonmail.com>
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Cc: lightning-dev <lightning-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org>
Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] [Lightning-dev] Removing the Dust Limit
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X-List-Received-Date: Fri, 08 Oct 2021 10:39:04 -0000

Good morning shymaa,

> The suggested idea I was replying to is to make all dust TXs invalid by s=
ome nodes.

Is this supposed to be consensus change or not?
Why "some" nodes and not all?

I think the important bit is for full nodes.
Non-full-nodes already work at reduced security; what is important is the s=
ecurity-efficiency tradeoff.

> I suggested a compromise by keeping them in secondary storage for full no=
des, and in a separate Merkle Tree for bridge servers.
> -In bridge servers they won't increase any worstcase, on the contrary thi=
s will enhance the performance even if slightly.
> -In full nodes, and since they will usually appear in clusters, they will=
 be fetched rarely (either by a dust sweeping action, or a malicious attack=
er)
> In both cases as a batch
> -To not exhaust the node with DoS(as the reply mentioned)one may think of=
 uploading the whole dust partition if they were called more than certain t=
hreshold (say more than 1 Tx in a block)=C2=A0=C2=A0
> -and then keep them there for "a while", but as a separate partition too =
to exclude them from any caching mechanism after that block.
> -The "while" could be a tuned parameter.

Assuming you meant "dust tx is considered invalid by all nodes".

* Block has no dust sweep
  * With dust rejected: only non-dust outputs are accessed.
  * With dust in secondary storage: only non-dust outputs are accessed.
* Block has some dust sweeps
  * With dust rejected: only non-dust outputs are accessed, block is reject=
ed.
  * With dust in secondary storage: some data is loaded from secondary stor=
age.
* Block is composed of only dust sweeps
  * With dust rejected: only non-dust outputs are accessed, block is reject=
ed.
  * With dust in secondary storage: significant increase in processing to l=
oad large secondary storage in memory,

So I fail to see how the proposal ever reduces processing compared to the i=
dea of just outright making all dust txs invalid and rejecting the block.
Perhaps you are trying to explain some other mechanism than what I understo=
od?

It is helpful to think in terms always of worst-case behavior when consider=
ing resistance against attacks.

> -Take care that the more dust is sweeped, the less dust to remain in the =
UTXO set; as users are already much dis-incentivised to create more.

But creation of dust is also as easy as sweeping them, and nothing really p=
revents a block from *both* creating *and* sweeping dust, e.g. a block comp=
osed of 1-input-1-output transactions, unless you want to describe some kin=
d of restriction here?

Such a degenerate block would hit your secondary storage double: one to rea=
d, and one to overwrite and add new entries; if the storage is large then t=
he index structure you use also is large and updates can be expensive there=
 as well.


Again, I am looking solely at fullnode efficiency here, meaning all rules v=
alidated and all transactions validated, not validating and simply acceptin=
g some transactions as valid is a degradation of security from full validat=
ion to SPV validation.
Now of course in practice modern Bitcoin is hard to attack with *only* mini=
ng hashpower as there are so many fullnodes that an SPV node would be easil=
y able to find the "True" history of the chain.
However, as I understand it that proporty of fullnodes protecting against a=
ttacks on SPV nodes only exists due to fullnodes being cheap to keep online=
; if the cost of fullnodes in the **worst case** (***not*** average, please=
 stop talking about average case) increases then it may become feasible for=
 miners to attack SPV nodes.

Regards,
ZmnSCPxj