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From: Jameson Lopp <jameson.lopp@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 14 Jun 2017 13:11:07 -0700
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Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Proposal: Demonstration of Phase in Full Network
 Upgrade Activated by Miners
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On Wed, Jun 14, 2017 at 12:04 PM, Zheming Lin <heater@gmail.com> wrote:

> Hi Jameson:
>
> =E5=9C=A8 2017=E5=B9=B46=E6=9C=8815=E6=97=A5=EF=BC=8C02:55=EF=BC=8CJameso=
n Lopp <jameson.lopp@gmail.com> =E5=86=99=E9=81=93=EF=BC=9A
>
>
>
> On Wed, Jun 14, 2017 at 11:29 AM, Zheming Lin <heater@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> Hi Jameson:
>>
>> =E5=9C=A8 2017=E5=B9=B46=E6=9C=8815=E6=97=A5=EF=BC=8C01:20=EF=BC=8CJames=
on Lopp <jameson.lopp@gmail.com> =E5=86=99=E9=81=93=EF=BC=9A
>>
>>
>>
>> On Wed, Jun 14, 2017 at 9:39 AM, Zheming Lin via bitcoin-dev <
>> bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> > =E5=9C=A8 2017=E5=B9=B46=E6=9C=8814=E6=97=A5=EF=BC=8C02:11=EF=BC=8CGr=
egory Maxwell <greg@xiph.org> =E5=86=99=E9=81=93=EF=BC=9A
>>> >
>>> > On Tue, Jun 13, 2017 at 2:23 AM, Zheming Lin via bitcoin-dev
>>> > <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
>>>
>>> > The enforcement of the system's rules by users broadly, and not just
>>> > miners, is specifically described in the white paper (section 8,
>>> > paragraph 2, it especially clear in the last sentence).  This is
>>> > critical for the security of Bitcoin especially with the current
>>> > degree of centralization in pools.  Without it, Bitcoin's security
>>> > would look a lot more like the Ripple system.
>>> >
>>>
>>> =E6=98=AF=E7=9A=84=EF=BC=8C=E7=94=A8=E6=88=B7=E6=B0=B8=E8=BF=9C=E9=83=
=BD=E6=9C=89=E9=80=89=E6=8B=A9=EF=BC=8C=E5=B9=B6=E5=8F=AF=E4=BB=A5=E6=8A=9B=
=E5=BC=83=E9=82=A3=E4=BA=9B=E8=8A=82=E7=82=B9=E3=80=82=E8=BF=99=E4=B8=AA BI=
P =E5=B9=B6=E6=B2=A1=E6=9C=89=E5=8F=8D=E5=AF=B9=E8=BF=99=E4=BA=9B=E7=94=A8=
=E6=88=B7=E8=BF=99=E4=B9=88=E5=81=9A=E3=80=82=E5=8F=AA=E6=9C=89=E9=82=A3=E4=
=BA=9B=E8=A2=AB=E5=8A=A8=E7=9A=84=E9=92=B1=E5=8C=85=E7=94=A8=E6=88=B7=EF=BC=
=8C=E4=BB=96=E4=BB=AC=E9=9C=80=E8=A6=81=E7=9F=A5
>>> =E9=81=93=E5=BF=85=E9=A1=BB=E5=81=9A=E5=87=BA=E4=B8=80=E4=B8=AA=E9=80=
=89=E6=8B=A9=E3=80=82=EF=BC=88=E8=80=8C=E4=B8=8D=E6=98=AF=E8=A2=AB=E5=8A=A8=
=E7=9A=84=E8=B7=9F=E9=9A=8F=E9=BB=98=E8=AE=A4=E7=9A=84=E7=AD=96=E7=95=A5=EF=
=BC=89
>>> Yes, users always have choice that they can abandon the nodes. This BIP
>>> does=E2=80=99t go against them. I mean only the one(especially wallets)=
 that=E2=80=99s
>>> passive, they need to know there=E2=80=99s a choice and pick one.
>>>
>>> =E8=BF=99=E4=B8=AA BIP =E5=8F=AF=E4=BB=A5=E8=A2=AB=E5=BA=94=E7=94=A8=E4=
=BA=8E=E5=87=A0=E4=B9=8E=E4=BB=BB=E4=BD=95=E7=9A=84=E5=8D=87=E7=BA=A7=E4=B8=
=8A=EF=BC=8C=E5=8C=85=E6=8B=AC=E9=9A=94=E7=A6=BB=E8=A7=81=E8=AF=81=EF=BC=8C=
=E4=B8=A4=E5=85=86=E7=9A=84=E9=9A=94=E7=A6=BB=E8=A7=81=E8=AF=81=EF=BC=8C=E4=
=B8=A4=E5=85=86=E6=89=A9=E5=AE=B9=EF=BC=8C=E6=B6=8C=E7=8E=B0=E5=85=B1=E8=AF=
=86=EF=BC=8C=E5=85=AB=E5=85=86=E6=89=A9=E5=AE=B9=E7=AD=89=E3=80=82=E4=BD=86=
=E8=BF=99=E4=BA=9B=E5=8D=87=E7=BA=A7=E5=B9=B6=E4=B8=8D=E6=98=AF=E9=87=8D=E7=
=82=B9=E3=80=82
>>> This BIP can be applied to almost any upgrade, including Segwit,
>>> Segwit2x, 2m, ec, 8m=E2=80=A6 but the upgrade is not the key point.
>>>
>>> =E5=88=B0=E5=BA=95=E6=88=91=E4=BB=AC=E7=9A=84=E7=94=A8=E6=88=B7=E6=98=
=AF=E5=90=A6=E7=9C=9F=E7=9A=84=E6=8B=A5=E6=9C=89=E9=80=89=E6=8B=A9=EF=BC=9F
>>> Did the users have any real choice?
>>>
>>> =E6=88=91=E5=B9=B6=E4=B8=8D=E8=83=BD=E7=90=86=E8=A7=A3=E4=BB=96=E4=BB=
=AC=E7=9B=B8=E4=BF=A1=E5=A4=A7=E9=83=A8=E5=88=86=E7=9F=BF=E5=B7=A5=EF=BC=88=
=E5=B0=B1=E5=83=8F=E5=BD=93=E5=89=8D=E4=B8=80=E6=A0=B7=EF=BC=89=EF=BC=8C=E4=
=BD=86=E6=8B=92=E7=BB=9D=E8=BF=99=E4=BA=9B=E5=A4=9A=E6=95=B0=E7=9F=BF=E5=B7=
=A5=E5=AF=B9=E5=8D=8F=E8=AE=AE=E6=94=B9=E5=8F=98=E7=9A=84=E6=8A=95=E7=A5=A8=
=E7=BB=93=E6=9E=9C=E3=80=82
>>> I don=E2=80=99t see the reason they trust the majority miners(as they d=
o today)
>>> but refuse the vote for upcoming protocol upgrade.
>>>
>>
>> To be clear, Bitcoin is not a democracy - if you find yourself using the
>> term "voting" then you may be misunderstanding how consensus forms. Once=
 a
>> feature has been vetted and the code is deployed, miners may signal that
>> they are ready to enforce new rules. If for some reason miners are too
>> "passive or lazy" or wish to "veto" the activation of the new rules, use=
rs
>> may choose to circumvent said veto by refusing to accept blocks that do =
not
>> show readiness for enforcing the new rules.
>>
>>
>> How does the users show their opinion? They can fork away and leave. But
>> what remains will be united. Are you afraid of the united users or the f=
ork?
>>
>> I agree with you that the =E2=80=9Cvote=E2=80=9D is not accurate. Could =
you kindly
>> suggest an other word for that?
>>
>> I think users should have choice to follow the miners or not. Do you
>> agree with this or not?
>>
>> Regarding consensus changes, users can voice their opinion on any number
> of communication platforms. Though if you're looking for a way for users =
to
> signal their intentions at the protocol level, every proposal for doing
> that to date has been arguably flawed. Measuring meatspace consensus is
> pretty tricky if not completely impossible, especially given the fact tha=
t
> the vast majority of Bitcoin users do not voice any opinions on the matte=
r
> of consensus rules.
>
>
> =E2=80=9CSybil attack=E2=80=9D. The genuine node will leave the chain if =
it doesn=E2=80=99t like
> the change. That=E2=80=99s what restrain the majority miners acting fooli=
shly.
>
> If the users like the idea, they follow. If they don=E2=80=99t the fork a=
way(and
> not afraid of replay attack). I think it=E2=80=99s a way to move forward =
together.
>
> Would you support the idea that we put the choice to the users to decide?
>
> The concept of "sybil attacks" doesn't really apply to enforcing
network-wide consensus changes. Even if someone spooled up 100 times more
nodes than currently exist and they all "signal" for some consensus rule
change, that doesn't compel the rest of the "genuine" nodes to change the
rules they enforce.

The users always have a choice with regard to what consensus rules to
enforce and what software to run. Everyone is welcome to propose changes
and write software that they make available to users.

> Most attempts at measuring user consensus would probably be best describe=
d
> as signaling rather than voting given that the act of doing so has no
> actual power to affect consensus. Every user who runs a fully validating
> node is free to enforce the rules with which the agree regardless of what
> rules other entities are enforcing.
>
>>
>>
>>>
>>> =E5=AF=B9=E9=92=B1=E5=8C=85=E7=94=A8=E6=88=B7=E7=9A=84=E9=80=89=E6=8B=
=A9=EF=BC=8C=E6=98=AF=E4=BB=96=E4=BB=AC=E6=98=AF=E5=90=A6=E7=9B=B8=E4=BF=A1=
=E5=A4=9A=E6=95=B0=E7=9F=BF=E5=B7=A5=E3=80=82=E5=A6=82=E6=9E=9C=E4=BB=96=E4=
=BB=AC=E4=B8=8D=E7=9B=B8=E4=BF=A1=EF=BC=8C=E5=8F=AF=E4=BB=A5=E9=80=9A=E8=BF=
=87=E5=88=86=E5=8F=89=E6=9D=A5=E6=B6=88=E9=99=A4=E6=8E=89=E7=9F=BF=E5=B7=A5=
=E3=80=82
>>> This choice for wallet users right now, is wether to follow the 51%
>>> majority miners. If they don=E2=80=99t, they can have their fork that g=
et rid of
>>> miners.
>>>
>>> =E5=A6=82=E6=9E=9C=E4=BB=96=E4=BB=AC=E4=BB=8D=E6=97=A7=E7=9B=B8=E4=BF=
=A1=E7=9F=BF=E5=B7=A5=EF=BC=8C=E9=82=A3=E4=B9=88=E5=8F=AF=E4=BB=A5=E7=95=99=
=E4=B8=8B=E6=9D=A5=E5=B9=B6=E8=B7=9F=E9=9A=8F=E7=9F=BF=E5=B7=A5=E5=B0=86=E6=
=9D=A5=E7=9A=84=E5=8D=8F=E8=AE=AE=E6=94=B9=E5=8F=98=E3=80=82
>>> If they do trust the majority miners, they stay and follow the vote for
>>> upcoming protocol upgrade.
>>>
>>> =E6=89=80=E4=BB=A5=E9=97=AE=E9=A2=98=E5=9C=A8=E4=BA=8E=EF=BC=9A=E6=AF=
=94=E7=89=B9=E5=B8=81=E7=9A=84=E5=BC=80=E5=8F=91=E8=80=85=E3=80=81=E7=94=A8=
=E6=88=B7=E3=80=81=E6=8B=A5=E6=9C=89=E8=80=85=E3=80=81=E6=9C=8D=E5=8A=A1=E6=
=8F=90=E4=BE=9B=E8=80=85=E3=80=81=E7=94=9A=E8=87=B3=E7=9F=BF=E5=B7=A5=EF=BC=
=8C=E6=98=AF=E5=90=A6=EF=BC=88=E4=BB=8D=E7=84=B6=EF=BC=89=E5=A6=82=E7=99=BD=
=E7=9A=AE=E4=B9=A6=E4=B8=AD=E6=8F=8F=E8=BF=B0=E7=9A=84=E5=AF=B9=E5=A4=A7=E5=
=A4=9A=E6=95=B0=E7=9F=BF=E5=B7=A5=E6=8B=A5=E6=9C=89=E4=BF=A1=E4=BB=BB=E3=80=
=82
>>> So the questions is: Do the bitcoin developers, users, holders, service
>>> provides, even miners, (still) have faith in the majority of miners as
>>> designed in the white paper?
>>>
>>>
>> There is a fundamental misconception regarding this point - the white
>> paper refers to majority hashpower needing to be honest with regard to
>> determining the correct chain within the context of many possible /valid=
/
>> chain forks. It is not referring to using hashpower to determine the
>> correct chain amongst an infinitely variable number of currently invalid
>> chain forks. Bitcoin ecosystem participants should not have faith in min=
ers
>> (or any other entity) when it comes to choosing the consensus rules they
>> wish to enforce.
>>
>>
>> Arrrgh. I think in the BIP, the miners just invalids tx version 1
>> temporarily. That=E2=80=99s a =E2=80=9Csoft fork=E2=80=9D right? If they=
 dislike the idea, they can
>> leave as always.
>>
>> From my understanding, if the only change miners make is to stop
> confirming transactions that have a version less than X then it should be=
 a
> soft fork, yes.
>
>
> And if we add a version 2 valid, does that still be a =E2=80=9Csoft fork=
=E2=80=9D?
>
> As far as I know - if you're only restricting the validation rules then i=
t
should be a non-breaking change.

>
> Regards,
>
> LIN Zheming
>

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><br><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quo=
te">On Wed, Jun 14, 2017 at 12:04 PM, Zheming Lin <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:heater@gmail.com" target=3D"_blank">heater@gmail.com</a>&gt;=
</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .=
8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div style=3D"word-wrap:br=
eak-word;line-break:after-white-space">Hi Jameson:<br><div><div><div class=
=3D"h5"><br><blockquote type=3D"cite"><div>=E5=9C=A8 2017=E5=B9=B46=E6=9C=
=8815=E6=97=A5=EF=BC=8C02:55=EF=BC=8CJameson Lopp &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:jam=
eson.lopp@gmail.com" target=3D"_blank">jameson.lopp@gmail.com</a>&gt; =E5=
=86=99=E9=81=93=EF=BC=9A</div><br class=3D"m_4141752577551746550Apple-inter=
change-newline"><div><br class=3D"m_4141752577551746550Apple-interchange-ne=
wline"><br style=3D"font-family:Helvetica;font-size:12px;font-style:normal;=
font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:normal;letter-spacing:normal;text-alig=
n:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing=
:0px"><div class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"font-family:Helvetica;font-size:1=
2px;font-style:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:normal;letter-sp=
acing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-spa=
ce:normal;word-spacing:0px">On Wed, Jun 14, 2017 at 11:29 AM, Zheming Lin<s=
pan class=3D"m_4141752577551746550Apple-converted-space">=C2=A0</span><span=
 dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:heater@gmail.com" target=3D"_blank">heat=
er@gmail.com</a>&gt;</span><span class=3D"m_4141752577551746550Apple-conver=
ted-space">=C2=A0</span>wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=
=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-style:solid;=
border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div style=3D"word-wra=
p:break-word;line-break:after-white-space"><div style=3D"word-wrap:break-wo=
rd;line-break:after-white-space">Hi Jameson:<br><div><br><blockquote type=
=3D"cite"><span><div>=E5=9C=A8 2017=E5=B9=B46=E6=9C=8815=E6=97=A5=EF=BC=8C0=
1:20=EF=BC=8CJameson Lopp &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:jameson.lopp@gmail.com" tar=
get=3D"_blank">jameson.lopp@gmail.com</a>&gt; =E5=86=99=E9=81=93=EF=BC=9A</=
div><br class=3D"m_4141752577551746550m_4937264445905329853Apple-interchang=
e-newline"></span><div><br class=3D"m_4141752577551746550m_4937264445905329=
853Apple-interchange-newline"><br style=3D"font-family:Helvetica;font-size:=
12px;font-style:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:normal;letter-s=
pacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-sp=
ace:normal;word-spacing:0px"><div class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"font-famil=
y:Helvetica;font-size:12px;font-style:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-=
weight:normal;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-t=
ransform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px"><span>On Wed, Jun 14, 20=
17 at 9:39 AM, Zheming Lin via bitcoin-dev<span class=3D"m_4141752577551746=
550m_4937264445905329853Apple-converted-space">=C2=A0</span><span dir=3D"lt=
r">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org" target=3D"_=
blank">bitcoin-dev@lists<wbr>.linuxfoundation.org</a>&gt;</span><span class=
=3D"m_4141752577551746550m_4937264445905329853Apple-converted-space">=C2=A0=
</span>wrote:<br></span><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0=
px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-style:solid;border-left-=
color:rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><span><span><br><br>&gt; =E5=9C=A8=
 2017=E5=B9=B46=E6=9C=8814=E6=97=A5=EF=BC=8C02:11=EF=BC=8CGregory Maxwell &=
lt;<a href=3D"mailto:greg@xiph.org" target=3D"_blank">greg@xiph.org</a>&gt;=
 =E5=86=99=E9=81=93=EF=BC=9A<br>&gt;<br>&gt; On Tue, Jun 13, 2017 at 2:23 A=
M, Zheming Lin via bitcoin-dev<br>&gt; &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:bitcoin-dev@li=
sts.linuxfoundation.org" target=3D"_blank">bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfounda<wb=
r>tion.org</a>&gt; wrote:<br></span></span><span><span><br>&gt; The enforce=
ment of the system&#39;s rules by users broadly, and not just<br>&gt; miner=
s, is specifically described in the white paper (section 8,<br>&gt; paragra=
ph 2, it especially clear in the last sentence).=C2=A0 This is<br>&gt; crit=
ical for the security of Bitcoin especially with the current<br>&gt; degree=
 of centralization in pools.=C2=A0 Without it, Bitcoin&#39;s security<br>&g=
t; would look a lot more like the Ripple system.<br>&gt;<br><br></span>=E6=
=98=AF=E7=9A=84=EF=BC=8C=E7=94=A8=E6=88=B7=E6=B0=B8=E8=BF=9C=E9=83=BD=E6=9C=
=89=E9=80=89=E6=8B=A9=EF=BC=8C=E5=B9=B6=E5=8F=AF=E4=BB=A5=E6=8A=9B=E5=BC=83=
=E9=82=A3=E4=BA=9B=E8=8A=82=E7=82=B9=E3=80=82=E8=BF=99=E4=B8=AA BIP =E5=B9=
=B6=E6=B2=A1=E6=9C=89=E5=8F=8D=E5=AF=B9=E8=BF=99=E4=BA=9B=E7=94=A8=E6=88=B7=
=E8=BF=99=E4=B9=88=E5=81=9A=E3=80=82=E5=8F=AA=E6=9C=89=E9=82=A3=E4=BA=9B=E8=
=A2=AB=E5=8A=A8=E7=9A=84=E9=92=B1=E5=8C=85=E7=94=A8=E6=88=B7=EF=BC=8C=E4=BB=
=96=E4=BB=AC=E9=9C=80=E8=A6=81=E7=9F=A5<wbr>=E9=81=93=E5=BF=85=E9=A1=BB=E5=
=81=9A=E5=87=BA=E4=B8=80=E4=B8=AA=E9=80=89=E6=8B=A9=E3=80=82=EF=BC=88=E8=80=
=8C=E4=B8=8D=E6=98=AF=E8=A2=AB=E5=8A=A8=E7=9A=84=E8=B7=9F=E9=9A=8F=E9=BB=98=
=E8=AE=A4=E7=9A=84=E7=AD=96=E7=95=A5=EF=BC=89<br>Yes, users always have cho=
ice that they can abandon the nodes. This BIP does=E2=80=99t go against the=
m. I mean only the one(especially wallets) that=E2=80=99s passive, they nee=
d to know there=E2=80=99s a choice and pick one.<br><br>=E8=BF=99=E4=B8=AA =
BIP =E5=8F=AF=E4=BB=A5=E8=A2=AB=E5=BA=94=E7=94=A8=E4=BA=8E=E5=87=A0=E4=B9=
=8E=E4=BB=BB=E4=BD=95=E7=9A=84=E5=8D=87=E7=BA=A7=E4=B8=8A=EF=BC=8C=E5=8C=85=
=E6=8B=AC=E9=9A=94=E7=A6=BB=E8=A7=81=E8=AF=81=EF=BC=8C=E4=B8=A4=E5=85=86=E7=
=9A=84=E9=9A=94=E7=A6=BB=E8=A7=81=E8=AF=81=EF=BC=8C<wbr>=E4=B8=A4=E5=85=86=
=E6=89=A9=E5=AE=B9=EF=BC=8C=E6=B6=8C=E7=8E=B0=E5=85=B1=E8=AF=86=EF=BC=8C=E5=
=85=AB=E5=85=86=E6=89=A9=E5=AE=B9=E7=AD=89=E3=80=82=E4=BD=86=E8=BF=99=E4=BA=
=9B=E5=8D=87=E7=BA=A7=E5=B9=B6=E4=B8=8D=E6=98=AF=E9=87=8D=E7=82=B9=E3=80=82=
<br>This BIP can be applied to almost any upgrade, including Segwit, Segwit=
2x, 2m, ec, 8m=E2=80=A6 but the upgrade is not the key point.<br><br>=E5=88=
=B0=E5=BA=95=E6=88=91=E4=BB=AC=E7=9A=84=E7=94=A8=E6=88=B7=E6=98=AF=E5=90=A6=
=E7=9C=9F=E7=9A=84=E6=8B=A5=E6=9C=89=E9=80=89=E6=8B=A9=EF=BC=9F<br>Did the =
users have any real choice?<br><br>=E6=88=91=E5=B9=B6=E4=B8=8D=E8=83=BD=E7=
=90=86=E8=A7=A3=E4=BB=96=E4=BB=AC=E7=9B=B8=E4=BF=A1=E5=A4=A7=E9=83=A8=E5=88=
=86=E7=9F=BF=E5=B7=A5=EF=BC=88=E5=B0=B1=E5=83=8F=E5=BD=93=E5=89=8D=E4=B8=80=
=E6=A0=B7=EF=BC=89=EF=BC=8C=E4=BD=86=E6=8B=92=E7=BB=9D=E8=BF=99=E4=BA=9B=E5=
=A4=9A<wbr>=E6=95=B0=E7=9F=BF=E5=B7=A5=E5=AF=B9=E5=8D=8F=E8=AE=AE=E6=94=B9=
=E5=8F=98=E7=9A=84=E6=8A=95=E7=A5=A8=E7=BB=93=E6=9E=9C=E3=80=82<br>I don=E2=
=80=99t see the reason they trust the majority miners(as they do today) but=
 refuse the vote for upcoming protocol upgrade.<br></span></blockquote><spa=
n><div><br></div><div>To be clear, Bitcoin is not a democracy - if you find=
 yourself using the term &quot;voting&quot; then you may be misunderstandin=
g how consensus forms. Once a feature has been vetted and the code is deplo=
yed, miners may signal that they are ready to enforce new rules. If for som=
e reason miners are too &quot;passive or lazy&quot; or wish to &quot;veto&q=
uot; the activation of the new rules, users may choose to circumvent said v=
eto by refusing to accept blocks that do not show readiness for enforcing t=
he new rules.</div></span></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>How =
does the users show their opinion? They can fork away and leave. But what r=
emains will be united. Are you afraid of the united users or the fork?</div=
><div><br></div><div>I agree with you that the =E2=80=9Cvote=E2=80=9D is no=
t accurate. Could you kindly suggest an other word for that?</div><div><br>=
</div><div>I think users should have choice to follow the miners or not. Do=
 you agree with this or not?</div><span><br></span></div></div></div></bloc=
kquote><div>Regarding consensus changes, users can voice their opinion on a=
ny number of communication platforms. Though if you&#39;re looking for a wa=
y for users to signal their intentions at the protocol level, every proposa=
l for doing that to date has been arguably flawed. Measuring meatspace cons=
ensus is pretty tricky if not completely impossible, especially given the f=
act that the vast majority of Bitcoin users do not voice any opinions on th=
e matter of consensus rules.</div><div><br></div></div></div></blockquote><=
div><br></div></div></div><div>=E2=80=9CSybil attack=E2=80=9D. The genuine =
node will leave the chain if it doesn=E2=80=99t like the change. That=E2=80=
=99s what restrain the majority miners acting foolishly.</div><div><br></di=
v><div>If the users like the idea, they follow. If they don=E2=80=99t the f=
ork away(and not afraid of replay attack). I think it=E2=80=99s a way to mo=
ve forward together.=C2=A0</div><div><br></div><div>Would you support the i=
dea that we put the choice to the users to decide?</div><span class=3D""><b=
r></span></div></div></blockquote><div>The concept of &quot;sybil attacks&q=
uot; doesn&#39;t really apply to enforcing network-wide consensus changes. =
Even if someone spooled up 100 times more nodes than currently exist and th=
ey all &quot;signal&quot; for some consensus rule change, that doesn&#39;t =
compel the rest of the &quot;genuine&quot; nodes to change the rules they e=
nforce.=C2=A0</div><div><br></div><div>The users always have a choice with =
regard to what consensus rules to enforce and what software to run. Everyon=
e is welcome to propose changes and write software that they make available=
 to users.</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8e=
x;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div style=3D"word-wrap:brea=
k-word;line-break:after-white-space"><div><span class=3D""><blockquote type=
=3D"cite"><div><div class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"font-family:Helvetica;fo=
nt-size:12px;font-style:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:normal;=
letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;=
white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px"><div>Most attempts at measuring user c=
onsensus would probably be best described as signaling rather than voting g=
iven that the act of doing so has no actual power to affect consensus. Ever=
y user who runs a fully validating node is free to enforce the rules with w=
hich the agree regardless of what rules other entities are enforcing.=C2=A0=
</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;b=
order-left-width:1px;border-left-style:solid;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,=
204);padding-left:1ex"><div style=3D"word-wrap:break-word;line-break:after-=
white-space"><div style=3D"word-wrap:break-word;line-break:after-white-spac=
e"><div><span><blockquote type=3D"cite"><div><div class=3D"gmail_quote" sty=
le=3D"font-family:Helvetica;font-size:12px;font-style:normal;font-variant-c=
aps:normal;font-weight:normal;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-i=
ndent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px"><div>=C2=
=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8e=
x;border-left-width:1px;border-left-style:solid;border-left-color:rgb(204,2=
04,204);padding-left:1ex"><br>=E5=AF=B9=E9=92=B1=E5=8C=85=E7=94=A8=E6=88=B7=
=E7=9A=84=E9=80=89=E6=8B=A9=EF=BC=8C=E6=98=AF=E4=BB=96=E4=BB=AC=E6=98=AF=E5=
=90=A6=E7=9B=B8=E4=BF=A1=E5=A4=9A=E6=95=B0=E7=9F=BF=E5=B7=A5=E3=80=82=E5=A6=
=82=E6=9E=9C=E4=BB=96=E4=BB=AC=E4=B8=8D=E7=9B=B8=E4=BF=A1=EF=BC=8C=E5=8F=AF=
<wbr>=E4=BB=A5=E9=80=9A=E8=BF=87=E5=88=86=E5=8F=89=E6=9D=A5=E6=B6=88=E9=99=
=A4=E6=8E=89=E7=9F=BF=E5=B7=A5=E3=80=82<br>This choice for wallet users rig=
ht now, is wether to follow the 51% majority miners. If they don=E2=80=99t,=
 they can have their fork that get rid of miners.<br><br>=E5=A6=82=E6=9E=9C=
=E4=BB=96=E4=BB=AC=E4=BB=8D=E6=97=A7=E7=9B=B8=E4=BF=A1=E7=9F=BF=E5=B7=A5=EF=
=BC=8C=E9=82=A3=E4=B9=88=E5=8F=AF=E4=BB=A5=E7=95=99=E4=B8=8B=E6=9D=A5=E5=B9=
=B6=E8=B7=9F=E9=9A=8F=E7=9F=BF=E5=B7=A5=E5=B0=86=E6=9D=A5=E7=9A=84=E5=8D=8F=
=E8=AE=AE=E6=94=B9=E5=8F=98<wbr>=E3=80=82<br>If they do trust the majority =
miners, they stay and follow the vote for upcoming protocol upgrade.<br><br=
>=E6=89=80=E4=BB=A5=E9=97=AE=E9=A2=98=E5=9C=A8=E4=BA=8E=EF=BC=9A=E6=AF=94=
=E7=89=B9=E5=B8=81=E7=9A=84=E5=BC=80=E5=8F=91=E8=80=85=E3=80=81=E7=94=A8=E6=
=88=B7=E3=80=81=E6=8B=A5=E6=9C=89=E8=80=85=E3=80=81=E6=9C=8D=E5=8A=A1=E6=8F=
=90=E4=BE=9B=E8=80=85=E3=80=81=E7=94=9A=E8=87=B3<wbr>=E7=9F=BF=E5=B7=A5=EF=
=BC=8C=E6=98=AF=E5=90=A6=EF=BC=88=E4=BB=8D=E7=84=B6=EF=BC=89=E5=A6=82=E7=99=
=BD=E7=9A=AE=E4=B9=A6=E4=B8=AD=E6=8F=8F=E8=BF=B0=E7=9A=84=E5=AF=B9=E5=A4=A7=
=E5=A4=9A=E6=95=B0=E7=9F=BF=E5=B7=A5=E6=8B=A5=E6=9C=89=E4=BF=A1=E4=BB=BB=E3=
=80=82<br>So the questions is: Do the bitcoin developers, users, holders, s=
ervice provides, even miners, (still) have faith in the majority of miners =
as designed in the white paper?<br><span><br></span></blockquote><div>=C2=
=A0</div><div>There is a fundamental misconception regarding this point - t=
he white paper refers to majority hashpower needing to be honest with regar=
d to determining the correct chain within the context of many possible /val=
id/ chain forks. It is not referring to using hashpower to determine the co=
rrect chain amongst an infinitely variable number of currently invalid chai=
n forks. Bitcoin ecosystem participants should not have faith in miners (or=
 any other entity) when it comes to choosing the consensus rules they wish =
to enforce.</div><div><br></div></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div></s=
pan><div>Arrrgh. I think in the BIP, the miners just invalids tx version 1 =
temporarily. That=E2=80=99s a =E2=80=9Csoft fork=E2=80=9D right? If they di=
slike the idea, they can leave as always.</div><div><br></div></div></div><=
/div></blockquote><div>From my understanding, if the only change miners mak=
e is to stop confirming transactions that have a version less than X then i=
t should be a soft fork, yes.=C2=A0</div></div></div></blockquote><div><br>=
</div></span><div>And if we add a version 2 valid, does that still be a =E2=
=80=9Csoft fork=E2=80=9D?</div></div><br></div></blockquote><div>As far as =
I know - if you&#39;re only restricting the validation rules then it should=
 be a non-breaking change.=C2=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" sty=
le=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div s=
tyle=3D"word-wrap:break-word;line-break:after-white-space"><div><br></div><=
div>Regards,</div><div><br></div><div>LIN Zheming</div></div></blockquote><=
/div><br></div></div>

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