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From: Greg Sanders <gsanders87@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 9 Jan 2023 14:31:51 -0500
Message-ID: <CAB3F3DsyN_Nj0Fs4LseiwxUE96tFt079qbb0hKBnTBZdyaPcSQ@mail.gmail.com>
To: rot13maxi <rot13maxi@protonmail.com>, 
 Bitcoin Protocol Discussion <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org>
Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="000000000000567b1205f1d9d2d6"
Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] OP_VAULT: a new vault proposal
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Hi James and co,

Currently there is no way to make this compatible with scripthashes of any
kind, since the script interpreter has no insight into the OP_UNVAULT
outputs' "execution script", and one of the arguments of OP_UNVAULT is
freeform, resulting in an unpredictable output scriptpubkey.

I think the fix is just requiring a single additional witness data item
during OP_VAULT spend(for unvault path), mandating the
<target-outputs-hash> to be included in the witness stack as an input to
OP_VAULT opcode, and transaction introspection then checks to make sure the
witness item and the corresponding output script template matches the
expected.

This would only be necessary for the unvaulting path, and not for the
recovery path.

Cheers,
Greg

On Mon, Jan 9, 2023 at 2:10 PM rot13maxi via bitcoin-dev <
bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:

> Hey James,
>
> Really cool proposal. I=E2=80=99ve been thinking a lot lately about scrip=
t paths
> for inheritance. In a lot of the =E2=80=9Chave a relative time lock that =
allows a
> different key to spend coins, or allows a smaller threshold of a multisig
> to spend=E2=80=9D schemes, you have the problem of needing to =E2=80=9Cre=
fresh=E2=80=9D all of your
> coins when the timelock is close to maturation. In a lot of the =E2=80=9C=
use
> multisig with ephemeral keys to emulate covenants=E2=80=9D schemes, you h=
ave to
> pre-commit to the terminal destination well in advance of the spend-path
> being used, which leads to all kinds of thorny questions about security a=
nd
> availability of *those* keys. In other words, you either have to have
> unbound destinations but a timer that needs resetting, or you have unboun=
d
> time but fixed destinations. This design gets you the best of both becaus=
e
> the destination SPKs aren=E2=80=99t committed to until the unvaulting pro=
cess
> starts. This (or something like this with destination binding at
> unvault-time) would be an incredibly useful tool for inheritance designs =
in
> wallets.
>
> I need to think a bit more about the recovery path not having any real
> encumbrances on it. Maybe in practice if you=E2=80=99re worried about DoS=
, you have
> UTXOs that commit to multiple vault paths that have tweaked recovery
> destinations or something, or maybe it really is the right move to say th=
at
> if recovery is triggered, you probably do want it for all of your infligh=
t
> unvaultings.
>
> Looking forward to reading this a few more times and talking more about
> it.
>
> Thanks!
> rijndael
>
>
> On Mon, Jan 9, 2023 at 11:07 AM, James O'Beirne via bitcoin-dev <
> bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
>
> For the last few years, I've been interested in vaults as a way to
> substantially derisk custodying Bitcoin, both at personal and commercial
> scales. Instead of abating with familiarity, as enthusiasm sometimes
> does, my conviction that vaults are an almost necessary part of bitcoin's
> viability has only grown over the years.
>
> Since people first started discussing vaults, it's been pretty clear that
> some kind of covenant-enabling consensus functionality is necessary to
> provide the feature set necessary to make vault use practical.
>
> Earlier last year I experimented with using OP_CTV[1], a limited covenant
> mechanism, to implement a "minimum-viable" vault design. I found that the
> inherent limitations of a precomputed covenant scheme left the resulting
> vault implementation wanting, even though it was an improvement over
> existing strategies that rely on presigned transactions and (hopefully)
> ephemeral keys.
>
> But I also found proposed "general" covenant schemes to be
> unsuitable for this use. The bloated scriptPubKeys, both in size and
> complexity, that would result when implementing something like a vault
> weren't encouraging. Also importantly, the social-consensus quagmire
> regarding which covenant proposal to actually deploy feels at times
> intractable.
>
> As a result, I wanted to explore a middle way: a design solely concerned
> with making the best vault use possible, with covenant functionality as a
> secondary consideration. In other words, a proposal that would deliver
> the safety benefits of vaults to users without getting hung up on
> trying to solve the general problem of covenants.
>
> At first this design, OP_VAULT, was just sort of a pipe dream. But as I
> did more thinking (and eventually implementing) I became more convinced
> that, even if it isn't considered for soft-fork, it is a worthwhile
> device to serve as a standard benchmark against which other proposals
> might be judged.
>
> I wrote a paper that summarizes my findings and the resulting proposal:
> https://jameso.be/vaults.pdf
>
> along with an accompanying draft implementation:
> https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/26857
>
> I might work on a BIP if there's interest.
>
> James
>
> [1]: https://github.com/jamesob/simple-ctv-vault
>
> _______________________________________________
> bitcoin-dev mailing list
> bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org
> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
>

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<div dir=3D"ltr">Hi James and co,<div><br></div><div>Currently there is no =
way to make this compatible=C2=A0with scripthashes=C2=A0of any kind, since =
the script interpreter has no insight into the OP_UNVAULT outputs&#39; &quo=
t;execution script&quot;, and one of the arguments of OP_UNVAULT is freefor=
m, resulting in an unpredictable output scriptpubkey.<br></div><div><br></d=
iv><div>I think the fix is just requiring a single additional witness data =
item during OP_VAULT spend(for unvault path), mandating the &lt;target-outp=
uts-hash&gt; to be included in the witness stack as an input to OP_VAULT op=
code, and transaction introspection then checks to make sure the witness it=
em and the corresponding output script template matches the expected.</div>=
<div><br></div><div>This would only be necessary for the unvaulting path, a=
nd not for the recovery path.</div><div><br></div><div>Cheers,</div><div>Gr=
eg</div></div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmai=
l_attr">On Mon, Jan 9, 2023 at 2:10 PM rot13maxi via bitcoin-dev &lt;<a hre=
f=3D"mailto:bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org">bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxf=
oundation.org</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" sty=
le=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);paddi=
ng-left:1ex"><div>Hey James,<div><br></div><div>Really cool proposal. I=E2=
=80=99ve been thinking a lot lately=C2=A0about script paths for inheritance=
. In a lot of the =E2=80=9Chave a relative time lock that allows a differen=
t key to spend coins, or allows a smaller threshold of a multisig to spend=
=E2=80=9D schemes, you have the problem of needing to =E2=80=9Crefresh=E2=
=80=9D all of your coins when the timelock is close to maturation. In a lot=
 of the =E2=80=9Cuse multisig with ephemeral keys to emulate covenants=E2=
=80=9D schemes, you have to pre-commit to the terminal destination well in =
advance of the spend-path being used, which leads to all kinds of thorny qu=
estions about security and availability of *those* keys. In other words, yo=
u either have to have unbound destinations but a timer that needs resetting=
, or you have unbound time but fixed destinations. This design gets you the=
 best of both because the destination SPKs aren=E2=80=99t committed to unti=
l the unvaulting process starts. T<u></u><u></u>his (or something like this=
 with destination binding at unvault-time) would be an incredibly useful to=
ol for inheritance designs in wallets.=C2=A0</div><div><br></div><div>I nee=
d to think a bit more about the recovery path not having any real encumbran=
ces on it. Maybe in practice if you=E2=80=99re worried about DoS, you have =
UTXOs that commit to multiple vault paths that have tweaked recovery destin=
ations or something, or maybe it really is the right move to say that if re=
covery is triggered, you probably do want it for all of your inflight unvau=
ltings.=C2=A0</div><div><br></div><div>Looking forward to reading this a fe=
w more times and talking more about it.=C2=A0</div><div><br></div>Thanks!<d=
iv>rijndael<br><div><br><div><br></div>On Mon, Jan 9, 2023 at 11:07 AM, Jam=
es O&#39;Beirne via bitcoin-dev &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:bitcoin-dev@lists.lin=
uxfoundation.org" target=3D"_blank">bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org</=
a>&gt; wrote:<blockquote type=3D"cite">  <div dir=3D"ltr">For the last few =
years, I&#39;ve been interested in vaults as a way to<br>substantially deri=
sk custodying Bitcoin, both at personal and commercial<br>scales. Instead o=
f abating with familiarity, as enthusiasm sometimes<br>does, my conviction =
that vaults are an almost necessary part of bitcoin&#39;s<br>viability has =
only grown over the years.<br><br>Since people first started discussing vau=
lts, it&#39;s been pretty clear that<br>some kind of covenant-enabling cons=
ensus functionality is necessary to<br>provide the feature set necessary to=
 make vault use practical.<br><br>Earlier last year I experimented with usi=
ng OP_CTV[1], a limited covenant<br>mechanism, to implement a &quot;minimum=
-viable&quot; vault design. I found that the<br>inherent limitations of a p=
recomputed covenant scheme left the resulting<br>vault implementation wanti=
ng, even though it was an improvement over<br>existing strategies that rely=
 on presigned transactions and (hopefully)<br>ephemeral keys.<br><br>But I =
also found proposed &quot;general&quot; covenant schemes to be<br>unsuitabl=
e for this use. The bloated scriptPubKeys, both in size and<br>complexity, =
that would result when implementing something like a vault<br>weren&#39;t e=
ncouraging. Also importantly, the social-consensus quagmire<br>regarding wh=
ich covenant proposal to actually deploy feels at times<br>intractable.<br>=
<br>As a result, I wanted to explore a middle way: a design solely concerne=
d<br>with making the best vault use possible, with covenant functionality a=
s a<br>secondary consideration. In other words, a proposal that would deliv=
er<br>the safety benefits of vaults to users without getting hung up on<br>=
trying to solve the general problem of covenants.<br><br>At first this desi=
gn, OP_VAULT, was just sort of a pipe dream. But as I<br>did more thinking =
(and eventually implementing) I became more convinced<br>that, even if it i=
sn&#39;t considered for soft-fork, it is a worthwhile<br>device to serve as=
 a standard benchmark against which other proposals<br>might be judged.<br>=
<br>I wrote a paper that summarizes my findings and the resulting proposal:=
<br><a href=3D"https://jameso.be/vaults.pdf" target=3D"_blank">https://jame=
so.be/vaults.pdf</a><br><br>along with an accompanying draft implementation=
:<br><a href=3D"https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/26857" target=3D"_b=
lank">https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/26857</a><br><br>I might work=
 on a BIP if there&#39;s interest.<br><div><br></div><div>James<br></div><b=
r>[1]: <a href=3D"https://github.com/jamesob/simple-ctv-vault" target=3D"_b=
lank">https://github.com/jamesob/simple-ctv-vault</a><br></div>
</blockquote></div></div></div>____________________________________________=
___<br>
bitcoin-dev mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org" target=3D"_blank">=
bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev" =
rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mail=
man/listinfo/bitcoin-dev</a><br>
</blockquote></div>

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