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Date: Sun, 3 Nov 2013 01:41:11 -0500
From: Timo Hanke <timo.hanke@web.de>
To: Thomas Voegtlin <thomasv1@gmx.de>
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Cc: bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net
Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] Proposal to replace BIP0039
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On Sat, Nov 02, 2013 at 10:44:58AM +0100, Thomas Voegtlin wrote:
>
> >To be specific, we (in cooperation with / inspired by Timo Hanke)
> >developed method how to prove that the seed generated by Trezor
> >has been created using combination of computer-provided entropy
> >and device-provided entropy, without leaking full private
> >information to other computer, just because we want Trezor to be
> >blackbox-testable and fully deterministic (seed generation is
> >currently the only operation which uses any source of RNG).
> >
>
> Thanks for the explanation. Here is how I understand how it works,
> please correct me if I'm wrong:
>
> The user's computer picks a random number a, the Trezor picks a
> random number b.
> Trezor adds a and b in the secp256k1 group, and this creates a
> master private key k.
> Trezor sends the corresponding master public key K to the computer.
> Thus, the computer can check that K was derived from a, without knowing b.
No. You mean the computer would use B for this check?
(k,K) could be rigged by Trezor, who computes b as k-a.
Timo
> This also allows the computer to check that any bitcoin address
> derived from K is derived from a, without leaking b. (and
> reciprocally)
>
> However, it seems to me that this property will work only with bip32
> public derivations; if a private derivation is used, don't you need
> to know k?
>
>
>
--
Timo Hanke
PGP 1EFF 69BC 6FB7 8744 14DB 631D 1BB5 D6E3 AB96 7DA8
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