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From: AJ West <ajwest@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 5 Dec 2017 13:20:49 -0500
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Hello,

I would like to refer to these BIPs in other contexts and conversations.
Regardless of the pitfalls or benefits, the discussion and technical review
happening in this thread (and the ones before) are well-formed ideas with
an active champion. The point of BIP numbers/conventions are so we're all
on the same page about what we're talking about.

Please assign these BIP numbers so discussion may continue in a controlled,
tagged, linear manner, instead of "the first BIP" and "the second BIP."

Thank you
AJ West

On Tue, Dec 5, 2017 at 1:05 PM, Paul Sztorc via bitcoin-dev <
bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:

> Hello Chris,
>
> 1. Marginal Cost
>
> There actually is a very small cost to casting a malicious vote, relative
> to an honest vote. This is because the software (when run as-is), will
> automatically vote correctly. But to vote fraudulently you must decide on
> what to do instead, and configure that! This might not be as easy as it
> seems (see collective action part, below).
>
> It is true that there is no *marginal* cost to creating a bad vote, in the
> fraudulent withdrawal case. But then again there is no marginal cost to
> creating a good vote either -- in fact there is no cost at all. In fact,
> there is no marginal cost to creating a bad block either, in the 51%
> hashrate reorganization case. Epistemologically, the protocol has no way of
> differentiating a "bad" block/vote from a good one. So one cannot "cost"
> more than the other, in a narrow sense.
>
> I suppose in the reorganization case there is the risk of lost mining
> effort on a chain that actually does *not* have 51% and therefore won't
> catch up. But this only encourages conformity to the longest chain,
> including fraudulent chains. For example, imagine that the reorganization
> is done via secretly mining a longer chain -- once that chain is published,
> it will be the longest. Then, according to your framework, there will be a
> "marginal cost" to doing the *right* thing (trying to preserve the honest,
> transparent chain). So I'm afraid I don't understand what you mean.
>
> 2. Repercussions
>
> As for there being no repercussions, that is incorrect. The miner's choice
> to engage in a fraudulent withdraw is one that has several negative
> consequences. They take a variety of forms and likelihoods, but they
> definitely exist and are very relevant.
>
> The first repercussion is the loss of victim-sidechain future tx-fees. A
> second is the loss of all future tx fees on all sidechains. A third is that
> the Bitcoin super-network is changed from being a "sidechain enabled"
> network to a "sidechain disabled" network.
>
> The impact of these repercussions is still unclear and open to
> interpretation. On one hand, the impact may be small and therefore not very
> persuasive (as in the case where a sidechain has few tx-fees, few
> sidechains are used, few are expected to be created/used, and so little is
> lost by attacking). On the other hand, a single fraudulent withdrawal might
> motivate the creation of a new spinoff network that is exactly the same as
> the old network, but with merely two changes: the fraudulent withdrawal
> surgically removed (as if it were never attempted) AND a new proof of work
> algorithm. Since the withdrawals are so slow, there would be plenty of time
> to organize such an option (and people who already want a pow-change would
> jump at this glaring opportunity). Will the repercussions be small or
> large? Even if there is only a *risk* of large repercussions, it can be
> very persuasive. (Just as the IRS is very persuasive to tax-paying
> Americans, even though only a tiny proportion of tax returns are audited.)
>
> 0. Useless Sidechain Fallacy
>
> Finally, you are joining the long list of people who are committing the
> "useless sidechain fallacy". You are saying that because you believe the
> sidechain is useless, therefore everyone must believe as you do, and
> therefore the option to use a sidechain must be one that has zero value.
> However, in the real world people are heterogeneous. They may decide that
> your interpretation contains errors, or else their circumstances might
> incline them towards a different risk-reward tradeoff. Finally, this
> fallacy obfuscates the main benefit of sidechains, which is that they are
> optional -- the sidechain-designer must convince users to deposit funds
> there.
>
> 3. Collective Action Problem
>
> There actually is a collective action problem inherent to fraudulent
> withdrawals.
>
> If miners wish to fraudulently withdraw from the sidechain, they need to
> choose the destination addresses (on mainchain Bitcoin Core) months in
> advance. Then they need to upvote/downvote this destination, despite that
> fact that --during this time-- new hashpower might be coming
> online/offline, and/or hashers might be joining/leaving specific pools. I
> bring this up to demonstrate that even the most straightforward attack (of
> "a 51% hashrate group attacks a sidechain and distributes the proceeds to
> the group proportional to hashpower") is actually one that contains a
> difficult (and potentially interminable) negotiation. The effort required
> to initiate the negotiation is the source of the collective action problem
> here.
>
> I think that this collective action problem is actually more burdensome
> than Bitcoin's -- for mainchain Bitcoin miners merely need to decide which
> block height they intend to reorganize from.
>
> You may wish to read Drivechain's security model to learn more:
> http://www.truthcoin.info/blog/drivechain/#drivechains-security
>
> In this case, I don't see a way to measure "security" cardinally or
> ordinally. Instead, I am only able to see it as either "secure enough" or
> "not secure enough". But perhaps someone can enlighten me as to the math
> they are using to produce these cardinal/ordinal rankings.
>
> --Paul
>
>
> On 12/4/2017 2:36 PM, Chris Pacia wrote:
>
>
> I think you are missing a few things.
>
> First of all, I think the security model for sidechains is the same as
> that of every blockchain
>
> People will say things, like "but with sidechains 51% hashrate can steal
> your coins!", but as I have repeated many times, this is also true of
> mainchain btc-tx.  is something else?
>
>
> There are substantial opportunity costs as well as a collective action
> problem when it comes to re-writing the mainchain.
>
> Is there anything similar for drivechains? As far as I can tell there is
> no opportunity cost to casting a malicious vote, no repercussions, and no
> collective action barrier that needs to be overcome.
>
> Unless I'm missing something I wouldn't liken the security of a drivechain
> to that of the mainchain.
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> bitcoin-dev mailing list
> bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org
> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
>
>

--94eb2c1c074a372422055f9be684
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr"><div>Hello,</div><div><br></div><div>I would like to refer=
 to these BIPs in other contexts and conversations. Regardless of the pitfa=
lls or benefits, the discussion and technical review happening in this thre=
ad (and the ones before) are well-formed ideas with an active champion. The=
 point of BIP numbers/conventions are so we&#39;re all on the same page abo=
ut what we&#39;re talking about.<br></div><div><br></div><div dir=3D"auto">=
Please assign these BIP numbers so discussion may continue in a controlled,=
 tagged, linear manner, instead of &quot;the first BIP&quot; and &quot;the =
second BIP.&quot;</div><div dir=3D"auto"><br></div><div dir=3D"auto">Thank =
you<br></div><div>AJ West</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D=
"gmail_quote">On Tue, Dec 5, 2017 at 1:05 PM, Paul Sztorc via bitcoin-dev <=
span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.or=
g" target=3D"_blank">bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org</a>&gt;</span> w=
rote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;borde=
r-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
 =20
   =20
 =20
  <div text=3D"#000000" bgcolor=3D"#FFFFFF">
    <div class=3D"m_5648554002538150650moz-cite-prefix">Hello Chris,<br>
      <br>
      1. Marginal Cost<br>
      <br>
      There actually is a very small cost to casting a malicious vote,
      relative to an honest vote. This is because the software (when run
      as-is), will automatically vote correctly. But to vote
      fraudulently you must decide on what to do instead, and configure
      that! This might not be as easy as it seems (see collective action
      part, below).<br>
      <br>
      It is true that there is no *marginal* cost to creating a bad
      vote, in the fraudulent withdrawal case. But then again there is
      no marginal cost to creating a good vote either -- in fact there
      is no cost at all. In fact, there is no marginal cost to creating
      a bad block either, in the 51% hashrate reorganization case.
      Epistemologically, the protocol has no way of differentiating a
      &quot;bad&quot; block/vote from a good one. So one cannot &quot;cost&=
quot; more than
      the other, in a narrow sense.<br>
      <br>
      I suppose in the reorganization case there is the risk of lost
      mining effort on a chain that actually does *not* have 51% and
      therefore won&#39;t catch up. But this only encourages conformity to
      the longest chain, including fraudulent chains. For example,
      imagine that the reorganization is done via secretly mining a
      longer chain -- once that chain is published, it will be the
      longest. Then, according to your framework, there will be a
      &quot;marginal cost&quot; to doing the *right* thing (trying to prese=
rve the
      honest, transparent chain). So I&#39;m afraid I don&#39;t understand =
what
      you mean.<br>
      <br>
      2. Repercussions<br>
      <br>
      As for there being no repercussions, that is incorrect. The
      miner&#39;s choice to engage in a fraudulent withdraw is one that has
      several negative consequences. They take a variety of forms and
      likelihoods, but they definitely exist and are very relevant.<br>
      <br>
      The first repercussion is the loss of victim-sidechain future
      tx-fees. A second is the loss of all future tx fees on all
      sidechains. A third is that the Bitcoin super-network is changed
      from being a &quot;sidechain enabled&quot; network to a &quot;sidecha=
in disabled&quot;
      network.<br>
      <br>
      The impact of these repercussions is still unclear and open to
      interpretation. On one hand, the impact may be small and therefore
      not very persuasive (as in the case where a sidechain has few
      tx-fees, few sidechains are used, few are expected to be
      created/used, and so little is lost by attacking). On the other
      hand, a single fraudulent withdrawal might motivate the creation
      of a new spinoff network that is exactly the same as the old
      network, but with merely two changes: the fraudulent withdrawal
      surgically removed (as if it were never attempted) AND a new proof
      of work algorithm. Since the withdrawals are so slow, there would
      be plenty of time to organize such an option (and people who
      already want a pow-change would jump at this glaring opportunity).
      Will the repercussions be small or large? Even if there is only a
      *risk* of large repercussions, it can be very persuasive. (Just as
      the IRS is very persuasive to tax-paying Americans, even though
      only a tiny proportion of tax returns are audited.)<br>
      <br>
      0. Useless Sidechain Fallacy<br>
      <br>
      Finally, you are joining the long list of people who are
      committing the &quot;useless sidechain fallacy&quot;. You are saying =
that
      because you believe the sidechain is useless, therefore everyone
      must believe as you do, and therefore the option to use a
      sidechain must be one that has zero value. However, in the real
      world people are heterogeneous. They may decide that your
      interpretation contains errors, or else their circumstances might
      incline them towards a different risk-reward tradeoff. Finally,
      this fallacy obfuscates the main benefit of sidechains, which is
      that they are optional -- the sidechain-designer must convince
      users to deposit funds there.<br>
      <br>
      3. Collective Action Problem<br>
      <br>
      There actually is a collective action problem inherent to
      fraudulent withdrawals.<br>
      <br>
      If miners wish to fraudulently withdraw from the sidechain, they
      need to choose the destination addresses (on mainchain Bitcoin
      Core) months in advance. Then they need to upvote/downvote this
      destination, despite that fact that --during this time-- new
      hashpower might be coming online/offline, and/or hashers might be
      joining/leaving specific pools. I bring this up to demonstrate
      that even the most straightforward attack (of &quot;a 51% hashrate
      group attacks a sidechain and distributes the proceeds to the
      group proportional to hashpower&quot;) is actually one that contains =
a
      difficult (and potentially interminable) negotiation. The effort
      required to initiate the negotiation is the source of the
      collective action problem here.<br>
      <br>
      I think that this collective action problem is actually more
      burdensome than Bitcoin&#39;s -- for mainchain Bitcoin miners merely
      need to decide which block height they intend to reorganize from.<br>
      <br>
      You may wish to read Drivechain&#39;s security model to learn more:
      <a class=3D"m_5648554002538150650moz-txt-link-freetext" href=3D"http:=
//www.truthcoin.info/blog/drivechain/#drivechains-security" target=3D"_blan=
k">http://www.truthcoin.info/<wbr>blog/drivechain/#drivechains-<wbr>securit=
y</a><br>
      <br>
      In this case, I don&#39;t see a way to measure &quot;security&quot; c=
ardinally
      or ordinally. Instead, I am only able to see it as either &quot;secur=
e
      enough&quot; or &quot;not secure enough&quot;. But perhaps someone ca=
n enlighten
      me as to the math they are using to produce these cardinal/ordinal
      rankings.<span class=3D"HOEnZb"><font color=3D"#888888"><br>
      <br>
      --Paul</font></span><div><div class=3D"h5"><br>
      <br>
      On 12/4/2017 2:36 PM, Chris Pacia wrote:<br>
    </div></div></div><div><div class=3D"h5">
    <blockquote type=3D"cite">
      <div dir=3D"auto">
        <div><br>
          <div class=3D"gmail_extra">
            <div class=3D"gmail_quote">
              <blockquote class=3D"m_5648554002538150650quote" style=3D"mar=
gin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
                <div class=3D"m_5648554002538150650quoted-text">I think you=
 are missing a few
                  things.<br>
                </div>
                <br>
                First of all, I think the security model for sidechains
                is the same as<br>
                that of every blockchain<br>
                <br>
                People will say things, like &quot;but with sidechains 51%
                hashrate can steal<br>
                your coins!&quot;, but as I have repeated many times, this =
is
                also true of<br>
                mainchain btc-tx. =C2=A0is something else?<br>
              </blockquote>
            </div>
          </div>
        </div>
        <div dir=3D"auto"><br>
        </div>
        <div dir=3D"auto">There are substantial opportunity costs as well
          as a collective action problem when it comes to re-writing the
          mainchain.=C2=A0</div>
        <div dir=3D"auto"><br>
        </div>
        <div dir=3D"auto">Is there anything similar for drivechains? As
          far as I can tell there is no opportunity cost to casting a
          malicious vote, no repercussions, and no collective action
          barrier that needs to be overcome.=C2=A0</div>
        <div dir=3D"auto"><br>
        </div>
        <div dir=3D"auto">Unless I&#39;m missing something I wouldn&#39;t l=
iken
          the security of a drivechain to that of the mainchain.</div>
      </div>
    </blockquote>
    <p><br>
    </p>
  </div></div></div>

<br>______________________________<wbr>_________________<br>
bitcoin-dev mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org">bitcoin-dev@lists.=
<wbr>linuxfoundation.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev" =
rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://lists.linuxfoundation.<wbr>org=
/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-<wbr>dev</a><br>
<br></blockquote></div><br></div></div>

--94eb2c1c074a372422055f9be684--