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Cc: Bitcoin Dev <bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net>
Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] Identity protocol observation
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Interesting observation, thanks.

I'd think any competent implementation of such an identity scheme would not
involve end users directly handling randomized nonsense words, however. I
always imagined a sacrifice as being a file that you make with a GUI tool
and load into a browser extension.


On Thu, Oct 3, 2013 at 3:35 PM, Daniel Lidstrom <lidstrom83@gmail.com>wrote:

> A couple more thoughts on this:
>
> 1) Both c and k can be kept if c is pronounced 'ch', giving ~10.9 bits per
> phoneme.
> 2) An extra phoneme (4 encode 43 bits total) gives room to put extra
> information into the name, e.g. the first 5 bits could be input as the key
> to a PRP that permutes the last 38 back to a standard encoding of a tx
> location.  This would give the user 32 random names per sacrifice to choose
> from, and 38 bits to encode its location in the blockchain, which is enough
> for pretty large blocks.
>
> Sample 4 phoneme names:
> ~milmoz-vyrnyx
> ~mypnoz-fojzas
> ~sawfex-bovlec
> ~fidhut-guvgis
> ~bobfej-jessuk
> ~furcos-diwhuw
> ~wokryx-wilrox
> ~bygbyl-caggos
> ~vewcyv-jyjsal
> ~daxsaf-cywkul
>
> They're not that bad IMHO, especially if you get to pick a decent one from
> a bunch.
>
>
> On Thu, Oct 3, 2013 at 3:35 AM, Daniel Lidstrom <lidstrom83@gmail.com>wrote:
>
>> The location of a tx in the blockchain can be encoded in
>> n=log2(h)+log2(t) bits, where h is the block height, and t is the number of
>> transactions in the block.  Currently h~250,000 and t~500, so n~27.  A CVC
>> phoneme encodes ~10.7 bits *, so a transaction today can be located in the
>> blockchain with 3 of these, e.g. reb-mizvig.  This is reasonably short,
>> readable and memorable.
>>
>> The identity protocol Jeff Garzik is working on will link a public key
>> fingerprint to a miner sacrifice transaction.  This tx could in turn be
>> uniquely described with a short name as above.  Associating this name with
>> the public key becomes secure once the tx is sufficiently buried in the
>> blockchain.  In the identity protocol, lightweight clients check the
>> validity of a sacrifice tx by checking that its merkle path is valid.  But
>> this path encodes, via the ordering of the hashes at each level, the
>> location of the transaction in the block, so the lightweight client can
>> verify the sacrifice tx's short name using only the information he already
>> has.
>>
>> Some more random names:
>> vec-halhic
>> wom-vizpyd
>> guv-zussof
>> jog-copwug
>> seg-rizges
>> jyg-somgod
>> pax-synjem
>> zyg-zuxdyj
>> gid-mutdyj
>> rel-hyrdaj
>>
>> Sources of inspiration:
>> urbit.org
>> https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Identity_protocol_v1
>>
>> * This is somewhat restricted: I disallowed q for obvious reasons and k
>> because it conflicts with c, and c looks much softer and less like
>> Klingon.  H is allowed for the first consonant, but not the second, and x
>> is allowed for the last one, but not the first one.  Y is a vowel, but not
>> a consonant.  Maybe these weren't quite the right choices.  Paint away!
>>
>
>
>
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<div dir=3D"ltr">Interesting observation, thanks.<div><br></div><div>I&#39;=
d think any competent implementation of such an identity scheme would not i=
nvolve end users directly handling randomized nonsense words, however. I al=
ways imagined a sacrifice as being a file that you make with a GUI tool and=
 load into a browser extension.</div>
</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Thu,=
 Oct 3, 2013 at 3:35 PM, Daniel Lidstrom <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"m=
ailto:lidstrom83@gmail.com" target=3D"_blank">lidstrom83@gmail.com</a>&gt;<=
/span> wrote:<br>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div>A couple more thoughts=
 on this:<br><br></div><div>1) Both c and k can be kept if c is pronounced =
&#39;ch&#39;, giving ~10.9 bits per phoneme.<br>
</div><div>2) An extra phoneme (4 encode 43 bits total) gives room to put e=
xtra information into the name, e.g. the first 5 bits could be input as the=
 key to a PRP that permutes the last 38 back to a standard encoding of a tx=
 location.=C2=A0 This would give the user 32 random names per sacrifice to =
choose from, and 38 bits to encode its location in the blockchain, which is=
 enough for pretty large blocks.<br>

<br></div><div>Sample 4 phoneme names:<br>~milmoz-vyrnyx<br>~mypnoz-fojzas<=
br>~sawfex-bovlec<br>~fidhut-guvgis<br>~bobfej-jessuk<br>~furcos-diwhuw<br>=
~wokryx-wilrox<br>~bygbyl-caggos<br>~vewcyv-jyjsal<br>~daxsaf-cywkul<br>

<br></div><div>They&#39;re not that bad IMHO, especially if you get to pick=
 a decent one from a bunch.<br></div></div><div class=3D"HOEnZb"><div class=
=3D"h5"><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Th=
u, Oct 3, 2013 at 3:35 AM, Daniel Lidstrom <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D=
"mailto:lidstrom83@gmail.com" target=3D"_blank">lidstrom83@gmail.com</a>&gt=
;</span> wrote:<br>

<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr">The location of a tx in the=
 blockchain can be encoded in n=3Dlog2(h)+log2(t) bits, where h is the bloc=
k height, and t is the number of transactions in the block.=C2=A0 Currently=
 h~250,000 and t~500, so n~27.=C2=A0 A CVC phoneme encodes ~10.7 bits *, so=
 a transaction today can be located in the blockchain with 3 of these, e.g.=
 reb-mizvig.=C2=A0 This is reasonably short, readable and memorable.<br>


<br>The identity protocol Jeff Garzik is working on will link a public key =
fingerprint to a miner sacrifice transaction.=C2=A0 This tx could in turn b=
e uniquely described with a short name as above.=C2=A0 Associating this nam=
e with the public key becomes secure once the tx is sufficiently buried in =
the blockchain.=C2=A0 In the identity protocol, lightweight clients check t=
he validity of a sacrifice tx by checking that its merkle path is valid.=C2=
=A0 But this path encodes, via the ordering of the hashes at each level, th=
e location of the transaction in the block, so the lightweight client can v=
erify the sacrifice tx&#39;s short name using only the information he alrea=
dy has.<br>


<br>Some more random names:<br>vec-halhic<br>wom-vizpyd<br>guv-zussof<br>jo=
g-copwug<br>seg-rizges<br>jyg-somgod<br>pax-synjem<br>zyg-zuxdyj<br>gid-mut=
dyj<br>rel-hyrdaj<br><br>Sources of inspiration:<br><a href=3D"http://urbit=
.org" target=3D"_blank">urbit.org</a><br>


<a href=3D"https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Identity_protocol_v1" target=3D"_blan=
k">https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Identity_protocol_v1</a><br><br>* This is som=
ewhat restricted: I disallowed q for obvious reasons and k because it confl=
icts with c, and c looks much softer and less like Klingon.=C2=A0 H is allo=
wed for the first consonant, but not the second, and x is allowed for the l=
ast one, but not the first one.=C2=A0 Y is a vowel, but not a consonant.=C2=
=A0 Maybe these weren&#39;t quite the right choices.=C2=A0 Paint away!<br>


</div>
</blockquote></div><br></div>
</div></div><br>-----------------------------------------------------------=
-------------------<br>
October Webinars: Code for Performance<br>
Free Intel webinars can help you accelerate application performance.<br>
Explore tips for MPI, OpenMP, advanced profiling, and more. Get the most fr=
om<br>
the latest Intel processors and coprocessors. See abstracts and register &g=
t;<br>
<a href=3D"http://pubads.g.doubleclick.net/gampad/clk?id=3D60134791&amp;iu=
=3D/4140/ostg.clktrk" target=3D"_blank">http://pubads.g.doubleclick.net/gam=
pad/clk?id=3D60134791&amp;iu=3D/4140/ostg.clktrk</a><br>___________________=
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Bitcoin-development mailing list<br>
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<br></blockquote></div><br></div>

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