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From: Christian Decker <decker.christian@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] New standard transaction types: time to
schedule a blockchain split?
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If I remember the details correctly you could combine (lagrange
interpolation) the results of m smaller encryptions/signatures without ever
sharing the secret key share itself. No idea if that is possible with ecdsa
at all, but it sure would solve quite a few problems, as it would allow
several independent servers to share a secret key, sign transactions with
it, but no m-1 compromised machines would endanger the whole balance.
I will definitely look into it when I'm back from holidays.
Cheers,
Cdecker
On Aug 24, 2011 9:29 PM, "Gregory Maxwell" <gmaxwell@gmail.com> wrote:
> On Wed, Aug 24, 2011 at 3:05 PM, Christian Decker
> <decker.christian@gmail.com> wrote:
>> we could add an rsa-like scheme which allows m-out-of-n signatures. It
works
>> by distributing shares of the key which are points on a curve having the
>> actual key as 0-value. It does not require special length for the key so
if
>> ecdsa allows something similar there need not be anything changed.
>
> This works fine for ECC. But it requires that the composite key
> signer has simultaneous access to all the key-parts, so it doesn't
> solve the "my PC has malware" problem.
--000e0cd23ecc084ad504ab5b255d
Content-Type: text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1
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<p>If I remember the details correctly you could combine (lagrange interpol=
ation) the results of m smaller encryptions/signatures without ever sharing=
the secret key share itself. No idea if that is possible with ecdsa at all=
, but it sure would solve quite a few problems, as it would allow several i=
ndependent servers to share a secret key, sign transactions with it, but no=
m-1 compromised machines would endanger the whole balance.<br>
I will definitely look into it when I'm back from holidays.</p>
<p>Cheers,<br>
Cdecker</p>
<div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Aug 24, 2011 9:29 PM, "Gregory Maxwell&q=
uot; <<a href=3D"mailto:gmaxwell@gmail.com">gmaxwell@gmail.com</a>> w=
rote:<br type=3D"attribution">> On Wed, Aug 24, 2011 at 3:05 PM, Christi=
an Decker<br>
> <<a href=3D"mailto:decker.christian@gmail.com">decker.christian@gma=
il.com</a>> wrote:<br>>> we could add an rsa-like scheme which all=
ows m-out-of-n signatures. It works<br>>> by distributing shares of t=
he key which are points on a curve having the<br>
>> actual key as 0-value. It does not require special length for the =
key so if<br>>> ecdsa allows something similar there need not be anyt=
hing changed.<br>> <br>> This works fine for ECC. But it requires th=
at the composite key<br>
> signer has simultaneous access to all the key-parts, so it doesn't=
<br>> solve the "my PC has malware" problem.<br></div>
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