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From: Jeremy <jlrubin@mit.edu>
Date: Mon, 15 Mar 2021 23:16:23 -0700
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To: ZmnSCPxj <ZmnSCPxj@protonmail.com>
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Cc: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org>
Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Delegated signatures in Bitcoin within existing
 rules, no fork required
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inline responses
--
@JeremyRubin <https://twitter.com/JeremyRubin>
<https://twitter.com/JeremyRubin>


On Mon, Mar 15, 2021 at 11:10 PM ZmnSCPxj <ZmnSCPxj@protonmail.com> wrote:

> Good morning Jeremy,
>
> This is a very cool idea!
>
> > Multiple Delegates: By signing a txn with several delegate outputs, it
> is possible to enforce multiple disparate conditions. Normally this is
> superfluous -- why not just concatenate S1 and S2? The answer is that you
> may have S1 require a relative height lock and S2 require a relative time
> lock (this was one of the mechanisms investigated for powswap.com).
>
> I am somewhat confused by this.
> Do you mean that the delegating transaction (the one signed using the
> script of A with `SIGHASH_NONE`) has as input (consumes) multiple delegate
> outputs D1, D2... with individual scripts S1, S2... ?
>
>
Correct -- you can do this if you want multiple independent delegates to be
able to revoke, or if you want S1 and S2 to mix height + time based
relative locks -- bonus points if D1.txid == D2.txid, then you can be sure
they're counting from the same origin point.



> > Sequenced Contingent Delegation: By constructing a specific TXID that
> may delegate the coins, you can make a coin's delegation contingent on some
> other contract reaching a specific state. For example, suppose I had a
> contract that had 100 different possible end states, all with fixed
> outpoints at the end. I could delegate coins in different arrangements to
> be claimable only if the contract reaches that state. Note that such a
> model requires some level of coordination between the main and observing
> contract as each Coin delegate can only be claimed one time.
>
> Does this require that each contract end-state have a known TXID at setup
> time?
>

Without anyprevout or similar, I believe so.



>
> > Redelegating: This is where A delegates to S, S delegates to S'. This
> type of mechanism most likely requires the coin to be moved on-chain to the
> script (A OR S or S'), but the on-chain movement may be delayed (via
> presigned transactions) until S' actually wants to do something with the
> coin.
>
> The script `A || S || S'` suggests that delegation effectively still
> allows the original owner to still control the coin, right?
> Which I suppose is implied by "Revocation" above.
>

Yes, redelegating (or I guess rather recursive delegation?) would mean A,
S, and S' are all in play. if you want to revoke just A, then S must move
to a utxo with S and S'.

>
> Regards,
> ZmnSCPxj
>
>

--000000000000e9b82705bda14e09
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"fon=
t-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:small;color:#000000">inline r=
esponses<br clear=3D"all"></div><div><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_signat=
ure" data-smartmail=3D"gmail_signature"><div dir=3D"ltr">--<br><a href=3D"h=
ttps://twitter.com/JeremyRubin" target=3D"_blank">@JeremyRubin</a><a href=
=3D"https://twitter.com/JeremyRubin" target=3D"_blank"></a></div></div></di=
v><br></div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_=
attr">On Mon, Mar 15, 2021 at 11:10 PM ZmnSCPxj &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:ZmnSC=
Pxj@protonmail.com">ZmnSCPxj@protonmail.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockq=
uote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1p=
x solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">Good morning Jeremy,<br>
<br>
This is a very cool idea!<br>
<br>
&gt; Multiple Delegates: By signing a txn with several delegate outputs, it=
 is possible to enforce multiple disparate conditions. Normally this is sup=
erfluous -- why not just concatenate S1 and S2? The answer is that you may =
have S1 require a relative height lock and S2 require a relative time lock =
(this was one of the mechanisms investigated for <a href=3D"http://powswap.=
com" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">powswap.com</a>).<br>
<br>
I am somewhat confused by this.<br>
Do you mean that the delegating transaction (the one signed using the scrip=
t of A with `SIGHASH_NONE`) has as input (consumes) multiple delegate outpu=
ts D1, D2... with individual scripts S1, S2... ?<br>
<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div><div style=3D"font-family:arial,helvet=
ica,sans-serif;font-size:small;color:rgb(0,0,0)" class=3D"gmail_default">Co=
rrect -- you can do this if you want multiple independent delegates to be a=
ble to revoke, or if you want S1 and S2 to mix height + time based relative=
 locks -- bonus points if D1.txid =3D=3D D2.txid, then you can be sure they=
&#39;re counting from the same origin point.<br></div><br></div><div>=C2=A0=
</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;b=
order-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
&gt; Sequenced Contingent Delegation: By constructing a specific TXID that =
may delegate the coins, you can make a coin&#39;s delegation contingent on =
some other contract reaching a specific state. For example, suppose I had a=
 contract that had 100 different possible end states, all with fixed outpoi=
nts at the end. I could delegate coins in different arrangements to be clai=
mable only if the contract reaches that state. Note that such a model requi=
res some level of coordination between the main and observing contract as e=
ach Coin delegate can only be claimed one time.<br>
<br>
Does this require that each contract end-state have a known TXID at setup t=
ime?<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div><div style=3D"font-family:arial,he=
lvetica,sans-serif;font-size:small;color:rgb(0,0,0)" class=3D"gmail_default=
">Without anyprevout or similar, I believe so.</div><br></div><div>=C2=A0</=
div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;bor=
der-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
<br>
&gt; Redelegating: This is where A delegates to S, S delegates to S&#39;. T=
his type of mechanism most likely requires the coin to be moved on-chain to=
 the script (A OR S or S&#39;), but the on-chain movement may be delayed (v=
ia presigned transactions) until S&#39; actually wants to do something with=
 the coin.<br>
<br>
The script `A || S || S&#39;` suggests that delegation effectively still al=
lows the original owner to still control the coin, right?<br>
Which I suppose is implied by &quot;Revocation&quot; above.<br></blockquote=
><div><br></div><div style=3D"font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif;font-s=
ize:small;color:rgb(0,0,0)" class=3D"gmail_default">Yes, redelegating (or I=
 guess rather recursive delegation?) would mean A, S, and S&#39; are all in=
 play. if you want to revoke just A, then S must move to a utxo with S and =
S&#39;.</div><div style=3D"font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif;font-size=
:small;color:rgb(0,0,0)" class=3D"gmail_default"></div><blockquote class=3D=
"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(2=
04,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
<br>
Regards,<br>
ZmnSCPxj<br>
<br>
</blockquote></div></div>

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