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Date: Wed, 30 Jun 2021 14:12:35 +0200 (CEST)
From: Prayank <prayank@tutanota.de>
To: Eric <eric@voskuil.org>
Message-ID: <MdRpSHI--3-2@tutanota.de>
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Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Trinary Version Signaling for softfork
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>=C2=A0I=E2=80=99ve seen no actual demonstration of the relevance of game t=
heory to Bitcoin. People throw the words around quite a bit, but I can=E2=
=80=99t give you an answer because I have found no evidence of a valid game=
 theoretic model applicable to Bitcoin. It=E2=80=99s not a game, it=E2=80=
=99s a market.

Agree its difficult to predict and include all the possible things that may=
 happen.=C2=A0Two articles I had read in past that explained few things bas=
ed on game theory:

https://jimmysong.medium.com/uasf-bip148-scenarios-and-game-theory-9530336d=
953e

https://jimmysong.medium.com/segwit2x-game-theory-scenarios-part-1-7f863904=
a72

>=C2=A0Who knows, I don=E2=80=99t get invited to round table meetings.

My question was related to discussions on mailing list, IRC channels, Reddi=
t, Twitter, GitHub etc. Not sure if everyone does but few had no issues wit=
h Taproot before signaling according to=C2=A0https://web.archive.org/web/20=
210316221837/https://taprootactivation.com/

>=C2=A0Every time two people trade both party validates what they receive (=
not what they trade away). Those receiving Bitcoin are economically relevan=
t and their power is a function of how much they are doing so.

Agree. Running and 'using' the node for economic activity can be considered=
 enforcing consensus rules.

>=C2=A0Majority miners can enforce censorship by simply not building on any=
 non-censoring blocks. This is what soft fork enforcement is.

I am not sure about this.=C2=A0

>=C2=A0I don=E2=80=99t see that it needs a label apart from signaling. Ther=
e are many kinds of voting. It would be hard to equate signaling with any o=
f them. It=E2=80=99s a public signal that the miner who mined a given block=
 miner intends to censor, that=E2=80=99s all.

Signaling can be done for many things. In this case I think miners are sign=
aling 'readiness'.=C2=A0 Pieter Wuille had answered a related question on S=
E:=C2=A0https://bitcoin.stackexchange.com/questions/97043/is-there-an-activ=
e-list-of-bips-currently-open-for-voting/

Since this is misunderstood or misinterpreted by many, I had even requested=
 Hampus Sj=C3=B6berg=C2=A0to mention this in=C2=A0https://taproot.watch/ :=
=C2=A0https://github.com/hsjoberg/fork-explorer/issues/57


--=20
 Prayank


Jun 30, 2021, 14:47 by eric@voskuil.org:

>
> Hi Prayank,
>
>
> =C2=A0
>
>
> > So majority hash power not following the consensus rules can result in =
chain split?
>
>
> =C2=A0
>
>
> Any two people on different rules implies a chain split. That=E2=80=99s p=
resumably why rule changes are called forks. There is no actual concept of =
=E2=80=9Cthe rules=E2=80=9D just one set of rules or another.
>
>
> =C2=A0
>
>
> > Why would majority of miners decide to mine a chain that nobody wants t=
o use?
>
>
> =C2=A0
>
>
> I don=E2=80=99t presume to know why people prefer one thing over another,=
 or what people want to use, nor does economics.
>
>
> =C2=A0
>
>
> > What are different things possible in this case based on game theory?
>
>
> =C2=A0
>
>
> I=E2=80=99ve seen no actual demonstration of the relevance of game theory=
 to Bitcoin. People throw the words around quite a bit, but I can=E2=80=99t=
 give you an answer because I have found no evidence of a valid game theore=
tic model applicable to Bitcoin. It=E2=80=99s not a game, it=E2=80=99s a ma=
rket.
>
>
> =C2=A0
>
>
> > Do miners and mining pools participate in discussions before signaling =
for a soft fork begins?
>
>
> =C2=A0
>
>
> Who knows, I don=E2=80=99t get invited to round table meetings.
>
>
> =C2=A0
>
>
> > Can they still mine something else post activation even if signaling re=
adiness for soft fork?=C2=A0
>
>
> =C2=A0
>
>
> A person can mine whatever they want. Signaling does not compel a miner t=
o enforce. Each block mined is anonymous. But each miner seeing the signals=
 of others, unless they are coordinating, would presumably assume that othe=
rs will enforce.
>
>
> =C2=A0
>
>
> > Who enforces consensus rules technically in Bitcoin? Full nodes or Mine=
rs?
>
>
> =C2=A0
>
>
> A node (software) doesn=E2=80=99t enforce anything. Merchants enforce con=
sensus rules when they reject trading for something that they don=E2=80=99t=
 consider money. Every time two people trade both party validates what they=
 receive (not what they trade away). Those receiving Bitcoin are economical=
ly relevant and their power is a function of how much they are doing so.
>
>
> =C2=A0
>
>
> Miners censor, which is inconsequential unless enforced. Majority miners =
can enforce censorship by simply not building on any non-censoring blocks. =
This is what soft fork enforcement is.
>
>
> =C2=A0
>
>
> > Is soft fork signaling same as voting?
>
>
> =C2=A0
>
>
> I don=E2=80=99t see that it needs a label apart from signaling. There are=
 many kinds of voting. It would be hard to equate signaling with any of the=
m. It=E2=80=99s a public signal that the miner who mined a given block mine=
r intends to censor, that=E2=80=99s all.
>
>
> =C2=A0
>
>
> > According to my understanding, miners follow the consensus rules enforc=
ed by full nodes and get (subsidy + fees) for their work.
>
>
> =C2=A0
>
>
> Miners mine a chain, which ever one they want. There are many. They earn =
the block reward.
>
>
> =C2=A0
>
>
> > Signaling is not voting although lot of people consider it voting inclu=
ding some mining pools and exchanges.
>
>
> =C2=A0
>
>
> What people consider it is inconsequential. It has clearly defined behavi=
or.
>
>
> =C2=A0
>
>
> e
>
>
> =C2=A0
>
>
>
>
> From:>  Prayank <prayank@tutanota.de>=20
> Sent:>  Sunday, June 27, 2021 5:01 AM
> To:>  eric@voskuil.org
> Cc:>  Bitcoin Dev <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org>
> Subject:>  Re: [bitcoin-dev] Trinary Version Signaling for softfork
>
>
>
>
> =C2=A0
>
>
> Hello Eric,
>
>
> =C2=A0
>
>
> I have few questions:
>
>
> =C2=A0
>
>
> >=C2=A0Without majority hash power support, activation simply means you a=
re off on a chain split.
>
>
> =C2=A0
>
>
> So majority hash power not following the consensus rules can result in ch=
ain split? Why would majority of miners decide to mine a chain that nobody =
wants to use? What are different things possible in this case based on game=
 theory?=C2=A0
>
>
> =C2=A0
>
>
> >=C2=A0And activation without majority hash power certainly does not =E2=
=80=9Censure=E2=80=9D this.
>
>
> =C2=A0
>
>
> Do miners and mining pools participate in discussions before signaling fo=
r a soft fork begins? Can they still mine something else post activation ev=
en if signaling readiness for soft fork?=C2=A0
>
>
> =C2=A0
>
>
> >=C2=A0If one wants to enforce a soft fork (or otherwise censor) this is =
accomplished by mining (or paying others to do so). Anyone can mine, so eve=
ryone gets a say. Mining is trading capital now for more later. If enough p=
eople want to do that, they can enforce a soft fork. It=E2=80=99s time Bitc=
oiners stop thinking of miners as other people. Anyone can mine, and that=
=E2=80=99s your vote.
>
>
> =C2=A0
>
>
> Who enforces consensus rules technically in Bitcoin? Full nodes or Miners=
?
>
>
> =C2=A0
>
>
> Is soft fork signaling same as voting?
>
>
> =C2=A0
>
>
> According to my understanding, miners follow the consensus rules enforced=
 by full nodes and get (subsidy + fees) for their work. Signaling is not vo=
ting although lot of people consider it voting including some mining pools =
and exchanges.
>
>
> =C2=A0
>
>
> =C2=A0
>
>
> --
>
>
> Prayank
>
>


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<div>&gt;&nbsp;I=E2=80=99ve seen no actual demonstration of the relevance o=
f game theory to Bitcoin. People throw the words around quite a bit, but I =
can=E2=80=99t give you an answer because I have found no evidence of a vali=
d game theoretic model applicable to Bitcoin. It=E2=80=99s not a game, it=
=E2=80=99s a market.<br></div><div dir=3D"auto"><br></div><div dir=3D"auto"=
>Agree its difficult to predict and include all the possible things that ma=
y happen.&nbsp;Two articles I had read in past that explained few things ba=
sed on game theory:<br></div><div dir=3D"auto"><br></div><div dir=3D"auto">=
<a href=3D"https://jimmysong.medium.com/uasf-bip148-scenarios-and-game-theo=
ry-9530336d953e" rel=3D"noopener noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://jimm=
ysong.medium.com/uasf-bip148-scenarios-and-game-theory-9530336d953e</a><br>=
</div><div dir=3D"auto"><br></div><div dir=3D"auto"><a href=3D"https://jimm=
ysong.medium.com/segwit2x-game-theory-scenarios-part-1-7f863904a72" rel=3D"=
noopener noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://jimmysong.medium.com/segwit2=
x-game-theory-scenarios-part-1-7f863904a72</a><br></div><div dir=3D"auto"><=
br></div><div dir=3D"auto">&gt;&nbsp;Who knows, I don=E2=80=99t get invited=
 to round table meetings.<br></div><div dir=3D"auto"><br></div><div dir=3D"=
auto">My question was related to discussions on mailing list, IRC channels,=
 Reddit, Twitter, GitHub etc. Not sure if everyone does but few had no issu=
es with Taproot before signaling according to&nbsp;<a href=3D"https://web.a=
rchive.org/web/20210316221837/https://taprootactivation.com/" rel=3D"noopen=
er noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://web.archive.org/web/20210316221837=
/https://taprootactivation.com/</a><br></div><div dir=3D"auto"><br></div><d=
iv dir=3D"auto">&gt;&nbsp;Every time two people trade both party validates =
what they receive (not what they trade away). Those receiving Bitcoin are e=
conomically relevant and their power is a function of how much they are doi=
ng so.<br></div><div dir=3D"auto"><br></div><div dir=3D"auto">Agree. Runnin=
g and 'using' the node for economic activity can be considered enforcing co=
nsensus rules.<br></div><div dir=3D"auto"><br></div><div dir=3D"auto">&gt;&=
nbsp;Majority miners can enforce censorship by simply not building on any n=
on-censoring blocks. This is what soft fork enforcement is.<br></div><div d=
ir=3D"auto"><br></div><div dir=3D"auto">I am not sure about this.&nbsp;<br>=
</div><div dir=3D"auto"><br></div><div dir=3D"auto">&gt;&nbsp;I don=E2=80=
=99t see that it needs a label apart from signaling. There are many kinds o=
f voting. It would be hard to equate signaling with any of them. It=E2=80=
=99s a public signal that the miner who mined a given block miner intends t=
o censor, that=E2=80=99s all.<br></div><div dir=3D"auto"><br></div><div dir=
=3D"auto">Signaling can be done for many things. In this case I think miner=
s are signaling 'readiness'.&nbsp; Pieter Wuille had answered a related que=
stion on SE:&nbsp;<a href=3D"https://bitcoin.stackexchange.com/questions/97=
043/is-there-an-active-list-of-bips-currently-open-for-voting/" rel=3D"noop=
ener noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://bitcoin.stackexchange.com/questi=
ons/97043/is-there-an-active-list-of-bips-currently-open-for-voting/</a><br=
></div><div dir=3D"auto"><br></div><div dir=3D"auto">Since this is misunder=
stood or misinterpreted by many, I had even requested Hampus Sj=C3=B6berg&n=
bsp;to mention this in&nbsp;<a href=3D"https://taproot.watch/">https://tapr=
oot.watch/</a> :&nbsp;<a href=3D"https://github.com/hsjoberg/fork-explorer/=
issues/57" rel=3D"noopener noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://github.com=
/hsjoberg/fork-explorer/issues/57</a><br></div><div dir=3D"auto"><br></div>=
<div dir=3D"auto"><br></div><div>-- <br></div><div> Prayank<br></div><div><=
br></div><div><br></div><div>Jun 30, 2021, 14:47 by eric@voskuil.org:<br></=
div><blockquote class=3D"tutanota_quote" style=3D"border-left: 1px solid #9=
3A3B8; padding-left: 10px; margin-left: 5px;"><div class=3D""><p class=3D""=
>Hi Prayank,<br></p><p class=3D"">&nbsp;<br></p><p class=3D"">&gt; So major=
ity hash power not following the consensus rules can result in chain split?=
<br></p><p class=3D"">&nbsp;<br></p><p class=3D"">Any two people on differe=
nt rules implies a chain split. That=E2=80=99s presumably why rule changes =
are called forks. There is no actual concept of =E2=80=9Cthe rules=E2=80=9D=
 just one set of rules or another.<br></p><p class=3D"">&nbsp;<br></p><p cl=
ass=3D"">&gt; Why would majority of miners decide to mine a chain that nobo=
dy wants to use?<br></p><p class=3D"">&nbsp;<br></p><p class=3D"">I don=E2=
=80=99t presume to know why people prefer one thing over another, or what p=
eople want to use, nor does economics.<br></p><p class=3D"">&nbsp;<br></p><=
p class=3D"">&gt; What are different things possible in this case based on =
game theory?<br></p><p class=3D"">&nbsp;<br></p><p class=3D"">I=E2=80=99ve =
seen no actual demonstration of the relevance of game theory to Bitcoin. Pe=
ople throw the words around quite a bit, but I can=E2=80=99t give you an an=
swer because I have found no evidence of a valid game theoretic model appli=
cable to Bitcoin. It=E2=80=99s not a game, it=E2=80=99s a market.<br></p><p=
 class=3D"">&nbsp;<br></p><p class=3D"">&gt; Do miners and mining pools par=
ticipate in discussions before signaling for a soft fork begins?<br></p><p =
class=3D"">&nbsp;<br></p><p class=3D"">Who knows, I don=E2=80=99t get invit=
ed to round table meetings.<br></p><p class=3D"">&nbsp;<br></p><p class=3D"=
">&gt; Can they still mine something else post activation even if signaling=
 readiness for soft fork?&nbsp;<br></p><p class=3D"">&nbsp;<br></p><p class=
=3D"">A person can mine whatever they want. Signaling does not compel a min=
er to enforce. Each block mined is anonymous. But each miner seeing the sig=
nals of others, unless they are coordinating, would presumably assume that =
others will enforce.<br></p><p class=3D"">&nbsp;<br></p><p class=3D"">&gt; =
Who enforces consensus rules technically in Bitcoin? Full nodes or Miners?<=
br></p><p class=3D"">&nbsp;<br></p><p class=3D"">A node (software) doesn=E2=
=80=99t enforce anything. Merchants enforce consensus rules when they rejec=
t trading for something that they don=E2=80=99t consider money. Every time =
two people trade both party validates what they receive (not what they trad=
e away). Those receiving Bitcoin are economically relevant and their power =
is a function of how much they are doing so.<br></p><p class=3D"">&nbsp;<br=
></p><p class=3D"">Miners censor, which is inconsequential unless enforced.=
 Majority miners can enforce censorship by simply not building on any non-c=
ensoring blocks. This is what soft fork enforcement is.<br></p><p class=3D"=
">&nbsp;<br></p><p class=3D"">&gt; Is soft fork signaling same as voting?<b=
r></p><p class=3D"">&nbsp;<br></p><p class=3D"">I don=E2=80=99t see that it=
 needs a label apart from signaling. There are many kinds of voting. It wou=
ld be hard to equate signaling with any of them. It=E2=80=99s a public sign=
al that the miner who mined a given block miner intends to censor, that=E2=
=80=99s all.<br></p><p class=3D"">&nbsp;<br></p><p class=3D"">&gt; Accordin=
g to my understanding, miners follow the consensus rules enforced by full n=
odes and get (subsidy + fees) for their work.<br></p><p class=3D"">&nbsp;<b=
r></p><p class=3D"">Miners mine a chain, which ever one they want. There ar=
e many. They earn the block reward.<br></p><p class=3D"">&nbsp;<br></p><p c=
lass=3D"">&gt; Signaling is not voting although lot of people consider it v=
oting including some mining pools and exchanges.<br></p><p class=3D"">&nbsp=
;<br></p><p class=3D"">What people consider it is inconsequential. It has c=
learly defined behavior.<br></p><p class=3D"">&nbsp;<br></p><p class=3D"">e=
<br></p><p class=3D"">&nbsp;<br></p><div><div style=3D"border:none;border-t=
op:solid #E1E1E1 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0in 0in 0in"><p class=3D""><br></p><di=
v><b>From:</b> Prayank &lt;prayank@tutanota.de&gt; <br></div><div><b>Sent:<=
/b> Sunday, June 27, 2021 5:01 AM<br></div><div><b>To:</b> eric@voskuil.org=
<br></div><div><b>Cc:</b> Bitcoin Dev &lt;bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation=
.org&gt;<br></div><div><b>Subject:</b> Re: [bitcoin-dev] Trinary Version Si=
gnaling for softfork<br></div><p><br></p></div></div><p class=3D"">&nbsp;<b=
r></p><div><p class=3D"">Hello Eric,<br></p></div><div><p class=3D"">&nbsp;=
<br></p></div><div><p class=3D"">I have few questions:<br></p></div><div><p=
 class=3D"">&nbsp;<br></p></div><div><p class=3D"">&gt;&nbsp;Without majori=
ty hash power support, activation simply means you are off on a chain split=
.<br></p></div><div><p class=3D"">&nbsp;<br></p></div><div><p class=3D"">So=
 majority hash power not following the consensus rules can result in chain =
split? Why would majority of miners decide to mine a chain that nobody want=
s to use? What are different things possible in this case based on game the=
ory?&nbsp;<br></p></div><div><p class=3D"">&nbsp;<br></p></div><div><p clas=
s=3D"">&gt;&nbsp;And activation without majority hash power certainly does =
not =E2=80=9Censure=E2=80=9D this.<br></p></div><div><p class=3D"">&nbsp;<b=
r></p></div><div><p class=3D"">Do miners and mining pools participate in di=
scussions before signaling for a soft fork begins? Can they still mine some=
thing else post activation even if signaling readiness for soft fork?&nbsp;=
<br></p></div><div><p class=3D"">&nbsp;<br></p></div><div><p class=3D"">&gt=
;&nbsp;If one wants to enforce a soft fork (or otherwise censor) this is ac=
complished by mining (or paying others to do so). Anyone can mine, so every=
one gets a say. Mining is trading capital now for more later. If enough peo=
ple want to do that, they can enforce a soft fork. It=E2=80=99s time Bitcoi=
ners stop thinking of miners as other people. Anyone can mine, and that=E2=
=80=99s your vote.<br></p></div><div><p class=3D"">&nbsp;<br></p></div><div=
><p class=3D"">Who enforces consensus rules technically in Bitcoin? Full no=
des or Miners?<br></p></div><div><p class=3D"">&nbsp;<br></p></div><div><p =
class=3D"">Is soft fork signaling same as voting?<br></p></div><div><p clas=
s=3D"">&nbsp;<br></p></div><div><p class=3D"">According to my understanding=
, miners follow the consensus rules enforced by full nodes and get (subsidy=
 + fees) for their work. Signaling is not voting although lot of people con=
sider it voting including some mining pools and exchanges.<br></p></div><di=
v><p class=3D"">&nbsp;<br></p></div><div><p class=3D"">&nbsp;<br></p></div>=
<div><p class=3D"">--<br></p></div><div><p class=3D"">Prayank<br></p></div>=
</div></blockquote><div dir=3D"auto"><br></div>  </body>
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